

OUTLINES OF

A GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY

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
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OUTLINES OF A GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY


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Otto Rank

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
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The material in this volume has been reproduced from mimeographed notes of lectures which Dr. Otto Rank himself released for use in the Pennsylvania School of Social Work. To this have been added two chapters: "The Genesis of Guilt-feeling" and "The Genesis of Genitality", the latter of which was published as an article in the Psychoanalytic Review of April, 1926.

A group of students familiar with the value of this material in its existing form arranged for its reproduction. Though intended primarily for students, soon after subscriptions were opened, it was found that there was a demand for it among alumni as well, so it was given somewhat wider circulation. As it was intended only for those already familiar with it, no editing or correction of the original text was felt necessary. Copies were made available through subscription only and were limited to seventy-five in number.

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BOOK I.

OUTLINES OF A GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY

BOOK I.

Section II.

THE GENETIC ASPECT

The baby new to earth and sky,
What time his tender palm is prest
Against the circle of the breast,
Has never thought that this is "I".

But as he grows he gathers much,
And learns the use of "I" and "me"
And finds "I am not what I see,
And other than the things I touch."

So rounds he to a separate mind
From whence clear memory may begin
And through the frame that binds him in
His isolation grows defined.

This use may lie in blood and breath
Which use were fruitless of their due
Had man to learn himself anew
Beyond the second birth of death.

Tennyson (In Memoriam, XLV).

Chapter I.

The Genesis of Genitality

In applying the results of my psychoanalytic investigations and experience to social problems, and especially to maladjustment, I pointed out that the decisive factor for the final form of adjustment is the impulse that we call sadism. By the term sadism, we mean a rather complicated impulse, which we can analyze only by following it through the various stages of its development and outlining its manifestations at the biological, psychological and social levels.

We will, therefore, start again with the genetic point of view and follow up the manifestations and development of this so-called sadistic impulse from its origin in the new-born child to the first stage of adjustment in the Oedipus situation. This investigation will at the same time throw light on what is perhaps one of the most important problems of the human being's development, the libidinal relation of the child to the object, especially as it is manifested in the adjustment of the biological impulses to our social life. In other words, we must discover how the child, from its originally purely biological libido relation to the mother, effects the sexual and social adjustment described as the Oedipus situation. Whereas Freud was mainly concerned in tracing the further development of the Oedipus complex in the neuroses, as well as in the normal life of the individual and of the race, I have taken special interest in investigating how the child arrives at this sexual and socially most important stage, the Oedipus situation, and why it should fail in mastering it. In my book, "The Trauma of Birth", I have tried to deal with this problem at its deepest psycho-biological level. Now I want to take it up at the next biological stage, that is, in the relation of the suckling to the mother, at which stage sadism first comes definitely into play.

In considering this problem, we must remember that there are two different aspects of it, the objective and the subjective, the objective aspect having to do with the child's relation to the mother, the subjective with the inner processes and mechanisms in the child which enable it to establish its relationship to the mother and which, on the other hand, are influenced by this relationship. We shall first take up the problem from the objective side as it manifests itself in the various reactions of the suckling. The analysis of these reactions will throw some light on the mechanisms that are at work in the child from the beginning

and that develop through the natural stimuli. In tracing this development, we shall have to show what energies are displaced, by means of what mechanisms this displacement occurs, what inhibitions are to be overcome, and what we must regard as the final result of this biological adjustment. At the same time we shall have to consider not only the general dynamic problem of libido displacement from one erogenous zone to another, but also the traumatic privations that are apparently necessary to set in action the phylogenetically preformed mechanism of displacement, and so to guarantee the continuity of the biological development. A closer study of these mechanisms and processes will enable us to recognize the obstacles that are responsible for arrests in development at definite points or for regressions to earlier stages of development.

We take up the problem at a point that for a long time has been and still is represented by a big question mark in psychoanalytic investigation. The question is how the girl makes the transition to the Oedipus situation. In the case of the boy, this seemed simple, since he keeps his first libido object - the mother - from his earliest childhood to his adult love life. So the problem first came to attention in connection with the girl, who has to change her primal libido-object, the mother, in order to become attached to the father, according to her biological role. We certainly do not forget that the biological attraction of the sexes will be a strong impulse in that direction. But the specifically human problem involves factors that cannot be accounted for on purely biological grounds. The analytic study of the neuroses has taught us how many women never completely accomplish the transference from the primal object, the mother, to the father and subsequently to the man. This shows that the biological attraction of the sexes must be definitely interfered with by strong obstacles, which seem to be founded in the specifically human development of the ego.

If we look at our problem from the point of view of the ego, we shall find that successful transition from the purely biological to the sexual stage represents something of an achievement not only for the girl, but for the boy also since he has to effect a somewhat similar displacement and adjustment in the matter of his sexual object. Hitherto, the boy's task has been underestimated because, as we have said, he carries the same object - the woman - into his mature life. This certainly is true, but at the same time we must realize that in later life he takes possession of the woman at the genital stage, whereas he originally possessed the mother orally. This change, however, is neither a sudden nor a

complete one. That is, a considerable part of the oral libido remains at its original state and is activated and satisfied in the normal sex act and its preliminaries. Indeed, even the fullest accomplishment of this aim, the complete sexual subjugation of the woman, is accompanied by sadistic gratification not only on the genital level, but on the oral level as well, as in biting or violent kissing.

But we are less interested here in the question how much of the suckling's oral-sadistic gratification is carried on into later life in normal or perverse sex experiences than we are in considering how the remainder is to be displaced to the genital level. From our knowledge of the numerous perversions and neuroses, we are inclined to the opinion that in most cases only a minor part has been displaced to the genitals. From a dynamic point of view, the problem is not to explain the tendency to hold fast to and to re-experience the primal pleasure. This is so obvious as to need no explanation. The question is, what are the mechanisms that make possible the re-establishment and continuation of this primal pleasure on a different level? And a still weightier question is - How is it possible to overcome the resistances that hinder even the partial renunciation of early forms of gratification, which must be relinquished if displacement is to be effected.

As a result of my analytic investigations, I can say that masturbation in the suckling is the biologically preformed MECHANISM OF THIS DISPLACEMENT OF ENERGY FROM THE MOUTH TO THE GENITALS. This starts with the sucking of the finger, which, as we know, is accompanied by a rhythmical tugging (playing) at other parts of the body that soon leads to rhythmical stimulations of the genital zone by the hand (finger). This I call a purely mechanical masturbation because it is obviously instinctive, although it soon leads to purposeful masturbation, which the child performs consciously in order to gain pleasure. This latter, however, soon brings about the guilt-feeling, the genesis of which, at this early infantile stage, we will deal with later. This first conflict at the genital stage, seems to repeat the weaning conflict at the oral stage, and so very often manifests itself in infantile disturbances connected with eating (vomiting, anorexia, etc.). The outcome of this conflict determines when and how genital primacy is reached, and so determines also the form, kind and intensity of the inhibitions and regressions that are likely to be experienced later. But in any case the child's later masturbation signifies the beginning of the displacement of oral libido to the genital zone, and with it the discovery of the genitals as a source of pleasure and a substitute for the mother's breast on its own self. Because of the unconscious

phantasies accompanying it and the guilt feeling connected with it, I would suggest calling this masturbation an "oral" one. For we have here something more than a mere awakening of the biological eroto-genicity of the genital zone, which is actually brought about by the urethral functions plus the inevitable stimulus from the maternal care (washing, caressing, and the like). We have, rather, a displacement of the oral-sadistic libido, which, in my opinion, is most important for genital functioning and which is affected by means of the masturbatory mechanisms. Without this, the genital zone could not predominate, but would remain at the same level as, for example, the anal zone, which always gives a certain amount of pleasure, too, but rather as a passive by-product of its biological functioning than as an active, independent source of pleasure.

In the matter of this displacement of oral-sadistic libido from above downwards, we are almost tempted to say that the afore-mentioned task of the little girl looks simple compared with that of the boy. Because with the girl it is a question of two anatomically similar erogenous holes (the mouth and the vagina), which are stimulated and gratified by the introduction of another erogenous (erectile) organ (nipple and penis). Whereas with the boy this anatomical parallel does not exist, so that the displacement mechanism must be somewhat more complicated. The girl's difficulty lies in another direction - namely, in the fact that the real female genital (the hole of the vagina) can be discovered and accepted (as a libidinal substitute for the mouth) only at the mature stage of genitality. This explains why so many women remain frigid in the vagina. The penis, on the other hand, as a substitute for the breast (nipple), seems to belong to the earliest infantile "sex theories", and enables the little girl to transfer a part of the oral libido primarily attached to the mother (breast) to the father (boy, man), because he seems to possess in his penis the most important organ representing the mother, that is, the breast (substitute). Hence arises the concept of the mother with the penis, a phantasy that indicates a definite displacement from the first libido object, the mother, to the father, whom the child first takes as the mother with a penis (instead of breast). The well-known shock of neurotic women at the sight of a large (erected) penis and the recognition of its real significance turns out to be to a great extent the result of the infantile disappointment that this masculine organ is actually no substitute for the breast in the infantile sense, belongs, so to speak, not to the mouth, but to its genital substitute, the vagina. With regard to the girl's infantile masturbation on the clitoris, I have discovered that the most deeply repressed and most vigorously defended phantasy accompanying

it primarily refers to playing with the nipple (sucking) and only later, by identification of the clitoris with the recognized penis of the boy, becomes sexual (genital). So in the boy the primary content of the masturbatory phantasies, that is, the breast (sucking) is later replaced by phantasies that refer to the female genitals (mother). Originally, however, the masturbatory activity of the little girl on the clitoris has the same significance as the boy's play with his penis, both being a continuation of playing on the breast (nipple) and so having the same biological origin. Later the girl, by comparison and identification of the clitoris with the penis, lays the foundation for certain difficulties known as envy of the penis, which complicate the process of her adjustment to her biological role.

In the case of the boy, the finger, substituting for the nipple, is replaced by the whole hand (forming a hollow), substituting for the mouth (as hole) when the displacement to the genitals occurs. In this, as I have said, I see a biologically preformed mechanism. At maturity the semen becomes in this connection a substitute for the milk, so that one may describe masturbation in its final phase as a symbolic substitute for the act of sucking, performed on oneself. But here the anatomical difference between the sexes leads to an important difference in the masturbation mechanism. With the boy, as we have pointed out, complete substitution for the sucking act is gained; penis equals breast; hollow of the hand equals mouth; ejaculation of semen equals milk. With the girl, on the other hand, only partial substitution is possible; thus, the clitoris, which equals the nipple, is played upon by another nipple substitute, namely, the finger, which only later is identified with the penis. In the case of the girl identification with the mother is effected not only through the substitution of the vagina for the mouth, but also by means of a narcissistic investment of her own breasts with oral libido. Thus the girl, through liking her breasts and wanting them to be sucked, is compensated for the lack of the penis and semen, which, as we pointed out, are only symbolic substitutes for the primary libido gratification of the suckling. I should like here to point out also that in the neurotic we generally find a result exacting the reverse of this normal genital fulfillment. That is, with the man there is a strong mother identification, mainly shown in the fact that the penis is still regarded as breast, while the girl shows a strong tendency to subjugate the partner in a genital way, a tendency well known as the "masculinity complex".

The mechanism that makes possible the displacement of libido energy from the mouth to the genitals is the

possessive impulse, which, at the suckling age is concentrated in the hand. This possessive impulse, another phylogenetically preformed mechanism owes its specifically human characteristic to a contribution of oral libido. In view of the repressed aggressive tendencies shown by most neurotics, one would be inclined to say that in the course of the sadistic libido's displacement from the mouth to the genitals, a good part of it remains, so to speak, in the hand. This lends to the gripping instinct its specifically human characteristic of possessing sadistically. It explains why the baby grasps at everything with its hands and, not being satisfied with that alone, at the same time inserts the object into its mouth. May we add here that this hand-sadism manifests itself later on in the mature sex life as pleasure in seizing and touching the love object, and normally expresses itself in an inhibited form of aggression, which we call tenderness. Aggression itself can be fully expressed on the genital level only from time to time. The capacity for such expression we are accustomed - at least in men - to characterize as potency. Its visible indication, the erection, we might then describe as a passagere conversion symptom of oral-sadistic libido, which we call sexual appetite. In fact only in erection is the penis recognized as an active organ for pleasure; otherwise it is passive, like the breast.

This very complicated mechanism, which makes possible the transference, displacement and conversion of sadistic libido from the mouth to the genitals, throws a new light on the genesis and function of so-called sexual symbolism, especially on its biological background. The libido displacement from the mouth to the vagina explains the concept of the vagina dentata, widespread in folklore, which is found in every case of sexual disturbance, whether of a neurotic or a perverse nature, in men. In the masculine process of displacement, the penis, aggressively penetrating into a hole (hand, vagina), takes on the significance of a tooth. (See the masturbatory significance of tooth dreams in men). So this symbolism is a phylogenetic sediment ontogenetically used as a conductor for the displacement, the driving force of which we recognize in the next stage, that of teething, as oral sadism, manifesting itself in biting. As the beginning of teething may be considered as the biological termination of weaning, one may assume that with it a new economic distribution of libido occurs by means of the above-mentioned displacement processes. The oral sadism is no longer to be gratified at the mother's breast, but part of it remains in the mouth and is manifested in eating (biting) and part is displaced to the genitals by means of the afore-mentioned tooth symbolism. In this process the genital organ changes definitely from a passive one (breast substitute) to an active one (mouth substitute), that is, it becomes really an organ

for subjugation in the one sex and for incorporation in the other.

I can here only briefly mention the fact that oral sadism manifests itself at the genital stage in both sexes in a manner apparently contrary to their respective biological roles. This biological problem of activity and passivity - probably the most fundamental of all biological problems - presents itself at the libidinal stage here in question in the following way. The vagina takes over the active drawing-in (saugende) erogenicity of the mouth (in sucking), and the biologically conditioned passivity of the woman is distributed over her whole body, so that a certain amount of prudery has to be conquered by the man's act of courting. With the man, on the other hand, the penis originally takes on the passive (giving) role of the breast, and only later, by identification with the tooth, takes on the active (seizing) quality, which then is communicated to the whole body (ego) and so enables the man to assume the aggressive role of wooer. However, this contradiction between the genitals and the whole ego (body) in the matter of activity and passivity is based on our bisexual disposition and explains why both sexes are able to use either the one or the other way of displacement and become normal or neurotic accordingly. This has to do not only with their reversed concept of the genitals in the matter of activity or passivity, but also with what is called femininity or masculinity in general (social behavior, etc.). This opens up new points of view as to the role of the genital, or genitalised, libido in the formation of character.

The deviations from this normal development of genitality which, by the way, are not to be qualified as definitely abnormal may be thus clearly distinguished. When in the man the normally genitalised oral libido is emphasized as the vagina dentata, or in the woman the penis as a tooth, then morbid fear of being bitten on the genitals arises. This fear comes up earlier in the child as the well-known fear that the penis will be cut off by some implement (hand). I should like to differentiate it as cultural castration fear, on the social (father) level of the Oedipus situation, from the biological castration fear of being bitten at the oral (mother) level. The specifically neurotic disturbances of mature genitality are, then, impotency in men, which usually betrays the original fear of the vagina dentata, and frigidity or vaginismus in women, whilst the various disturbances of ejaculation show clear characteristics of the oral stage in making semen equal to milk (genital spluttering). If, on the other hand, the child, because of a

strong oral erotism, holds on to the penis as a breast substitute, the result is the active perversion of fellatio in the (masculine) woman as well as in the (homosexual) man, the mouth being made the vagina, as it were. But the man normally retains a good part of the original mouth erotism on the lips, whilst the normal woman must displace more of it to the genitals. The man, therefore, is more given to drinking, smoking, and actively kissing, tendencies that with some justification are estimated as masculine and unfeminine. Neurotic illnesses at this stage are best known and studied in the form of hysterical derangements of the alimentary functions, which Freud early explained as displacements from below upwards, whereas really they represent a lack of displacement from above downwards.

We have attempted to show how a large part of the sadistic libido, primarily experienced and gratified orally in the act of sucking, is displaced by means of the hand to the genitals. This displacement begins very early, while the child is still taking its nourishment by sucking, and is ontogenetically brought about by the discontinuity of this oral nourishment. The decisive step in this displacement process is initiated by the weaning trauma, which, following the biological trauma, the cutting of the navel cord, signifies definite emancipation from the maternal nourishment. I should like here to anticipate the possible misunderstanding that I am now transferring the weight of the trauma from the birth to the weaning. Rather I want to emphasize the fact that I am using the term "weaning trauma", like the term "birth trauma" as an apt characterization of a definite biological stage of development which normally causes no harm in a traumatic sense. The real traumatic effect, pathologically so important, lies not so much in the biologically conditioned traumata themselves as in the intervening displacement processes, which initiate or terminate each particular stage of development. And so the trauma becomes effective only at the next biological stage. Thus the pathogenic actually lies between traumata, that is, depends upon the more or less exact functioning of the displacement mechanism which, biologically preformed, is set in action before the trauma takes place. From a teleological point of view, this mechanism seems designed to protect the individual from the traumatic effects of biological development. The ego, in order to avoid trauma, prepares, as it were, substitute gratifications by means of which it usually succeeds in paralysing the shock of new experience. In case the displacement does not succeed to the extent necessary for a new adjustment of the shaken libido distribution, then reactions arise which differ according to whether too much or

too little displacement took place, and whether it occurred too early or too late. Since the decisive displacement to the genitals (by means of masturbation) occurs in the weaning trauma a failure at this stage is of paramount importance in the production of pathological disturbances. Normally the trauma seems to have the function of reducing the sadistic energy to the cultural level by utilizing it biologically at the genital stage for propagation. So the phylogenetically preformed mechanism of displacement initiated in early childhood is continually repeated in the sex act, which is introduced and accompanied by kissing.

Up to this point we have been occupied in showing how this oral sadism is utilized in the preparation of the individual for his biological role, part of it in the seizing tendency of the hand, part in awakening genital activity, while the greater part remains in the mouth as biting energy, equipping the child for the attainment of his own later nourishment, independently of the mother. All these uses of the primal oral sadism may be described as means for dominating the outer world for the satisfaction of hunger and libido; or, one might call them "animal" utilizations of the oral-sadistic libido, in a biological sense. We are able to grasp the human side of the development process only after we have traced the method by which another part of this oral sadism is utilized to build up inhibitions and regulations within our own ego to dam up those aggressive tendencies which otherwise would prevent our proper social adjustment. Analysis has approached the study of these inhibiting factors within the ego from the point of view of the "guilt-feeling". From therapeutic experiences, especially in cases of impotency, I have discovered that the freeing of the patient from the guilt-feeling is followed by an investment of the genitals with sadistic libido, which re-establishes potency. Thus there is no doubt that not only the aggressive tendencies of the ego, but its inhibitions also arise from unapplied and ungratified oral-sadistic libido. Denied expression by prohibitions in the external world, it is thrown back, by a kind of damming up process, into the ego and there leads to a structure of inhibitions which we recognize as the pattern for the super-ego.

To understand more fully the genesis of these primal inhibitions in the infant, we must relate them to the earliest period of life, in which the mother trains the infant to control its excretory functions. Even at that early age, the child is willing to renounce the untimely gratification gained at these zones, at first to please the mother, later in fear of her displeasure and her punishment. The well-known traits of the so-called anal character - cleanliness and orderliness -

appear as the final products of an identification process which has to be accomplished when the mother must be given up and which replaces the former obedience to her; whilst obstinacy results from the original protest of the naughty (libidinal) child, which is never completely tamed. But all these privations, such as, for example, the temporary withdrawal from the mother's breast, are accepted with comparative ease; whereas the weaning signifies a final, and therefore severe, loss of libido gratification, which is emphasized by the parental command not to establish the biologically preformed substitute gratifications, either at the mouth (finger sucking), or at the genitals (masturbation). Certainly at that time the undeveloped genital apparatus is as yet unable to consume and work off the whole quantity of the sadistic libido that is set free at the weaning. And so the immaturity and inadequacy of the whole genital apparatus at weaning seems to be the final cause for the damming up of the sadistic libido within the ego. On this the later sadistic super-ego is built up, first by the addition of the identification with the strict (punishing) mother, when she is given up as an immediate object for libido gratification and is replaced by one's own ego (in sucking, masturbation).

The significance of the weaning trauma for the development of the later super-ego (inhibitions) can be briefly explained thus: That part of the oral sadism which at the time cannot be utilized in genital activity changes the child's earliest obedience, based on love for the mother, into inhibitions resulting from identification with the withdrawn and therefore unlovable mother. The mechanism of this process is set going by the throwing back of the oral sadism into the ego, which strengthens the negative component of obstinacy and hate toward the mother as the cause of this withdrawal of libido gratification. In this way the primal ambivalence toward the mother, already manifest in the birth trauma, is re-activated and emphasized at the weaning trauma and so is particularly likely at this stage to cause pathological (traumatic) effects. I should like to summarize the primal obedience of the child to the beloved mother under the name of the sphincter-ego, which owes its real psychological backbone - the sadistic structure emphasized by Freud - to orally displaced hatred of the mother. Only later on is this hatred socially transferred to the father (super-ego). Only by taking into consideration this attitude of sadistic revenge toward the bad mother shall we be able to trace back all the various reactions to libido objects, as well as to one's own ego, to the levels at which they manifest themselves as anxiety, desire for punishment, guilt-feeling, or masochism, respectively. The inhibitions built

up by the damned oral relation not only, as we have pointed out, change the child's obedience for passivity in the matter of controlling the excretory functions, but also extend to the new kind of libido satisfaction, genital masturbation, in which a certain amount of inhibition is localised as guilt-feeling. The well-known conflict over the breaking of this infantile habit, with the alternate desire for satisfying it, seems to repeat the similar oral experience at the mother's breast. This explains why the infantile masturbation conflict so often manifests itself in hysterical disturbances with regard to food, which again should not be considered as displacements from below upwards, but rather as replacement of the libido to its original source.

At the genital stage, oral sadism will manifest itself with regard to the object-giving libido in the inhibited form of tenderness (caressing), which is really only a return to the original relation to the beloved mother, whose tenderness the child soon adopts in that it learns from the mother how to love. In this way also the child becomes able to give up gratifications and habits which the mother despises, that it may be rewarded by the mother's tenderness. The return from the oral-sadistic relation toward the original tender relation is finally accomplished in the Oedipus situation where the boy has to captivate the mother in a tender (inhibited) way, just as the girl has to win her father. Infantile phantasies of raping or being seduced are sediments of the aggressive or inhibited (tender) component of the genitalized oral libido. In this sense genitality, viewed from the standpoint of its libidinal genesis, may be considered rather as a function for reducing (distributing and weakening) the sadistic libido, the uninhibited outlet of which would be socially disastrous. This explains also the insatiable character of the libido that is utilised for the continuation of the biologically preformed propagation function, executed by the genitals. So both sexes attempt to regain at the genital stage the oral-sadistic pleasure originally experienced at the mother's breast. As we have shown, this succeeds only partially and so complicates the biologically conditioned function of procreation, as shown in the disturbances of the sexual functions characteristic of human love life. These disturbances, which are caused by the displacement of either too much or too little oral libido to the genitals, we characterise as perverse tendencies or neurotic inhibitions respectively. The normal sex act represents not only a compensatory gratification for the oral libido but also a sadistic revenge on the mother for having withdrawn herself. The predominance of one or the other tendency results in the well-known disturbances of our love life. These for both sexes

may be formulated as follows: the child seeks a substitute for oral gratification for the purpose of the satisfaction of a revenge for the withdrawal.

This whole process of displacement and development, from the oral-sadistic satisfaction at the breast to the partial regaining of this gratification on the genitals of the other sex, passes through the very important stage of a narcissistic substitution on one's own genitals, which we know as masturbation. The way thus leads from an object, the same for both sexes (mother's breast) over one's own (bodily) ego, anatomically different in both sexes, to an object of the opposite sex- with the boy back again to the female (maternal), with the girl to the male (paternal). This detour of the libido over the ego, or, more precisely, over one's own genitals - is a direction contrary to its final goal, we know roughly as the narcissistic stage. A further study of its subtle structure, which I can here only briefly indicate, is of very great importance for an understanding of the psychology and pathology of the ego-formation.

Let us start with the problem as to how the child comes to seek on its own body a substitute for the loss of the breast (by sucking the finger or masturbation). This question cannot be fully answered here because we do not know enough about the genesis of the narcissistic libido organization, which I have attempted to trace back into the prenatal stage. But analysis of the symptoms resulting from unhappy love relations shows unmistakably that the lost or abandoned object is not only sought for on one's own ego (identification), but is regarded as a part of one's own ego (lost as it were by "castration") - indeed it is sought for just because it has been considered from the very beginning as a part of one's own ego. Undoubtedly this sense of the object as a part of the ego goes back in the last analysis to the biological unity of mother and child, a unity that the trauma of birth severs only biologically, but ~~psychologically~~ psychologically. The suckling's gradual attempts to find on his own body, considered as an external object, substitute for the mother's breast, (mouth, finger, hand, genitals), I should like to consider as indications of the degree to which the mother has been accepted as an object in the outer world. The problem, therefore, is not why the child seeks substitutes for the mother on its own body. The fact that it does so is rather a natural holding fast to the mother (breast) as an original part of its own body. Later on, when the child goes back from its ego to the object, the ego endows the object with its own qualities. If this process is carried too far, pathological results will follow, as the best known of which I will merely mention the narcissistic object choice of the

homosexual. Later I will show in what way and to what extent this finding again of the self (or part of it) in the object determines the normal love relation also, and the construction and destruction of the Oedipal situation.

Certainly the finger at first, and later on the genitals, are retained as breast substitutes on one's own body, whilst the lost object is not given up in a psychological sense but is belittled (*verleugnet*) as a reality, as the grapes were by the fox in the fable. At the same time the ego tries to make itself independent of this reality and, so to speak, grateful to the genitals for enabling it to a certain extent to succeed in this attempt. Psychologically speaking, the genitals are charged narcissistically with libido, which leads to the surprising identification of the infantile ego with its genitals, expressed in the widespread sexual symbolism of the "little one". Certainly a part of the oral libido, displaced first on to the genitals, permeates from that point the whole ego identified with them, and so narcissistically invests the sphincter-ego, which has hitherto functioned only in dependence on the object. This creates a certain pride in the matter of controlling the bodily functions and so lays the foundation for a kind of narcissistic ideal formation of one's own ego, which is the prototype of later ego ideals projected into the outer world.

The boy then reverts to this first narcissistic ideal formation when he, for successful mastery of the Oedipus situation, has to go back from the narcissistically invested ego (genitals) to the ego (part) objectified in the mother. He is able to do this by taking as a prototype the father who, according to the scientific conception of coitus, subjugates the mother. At the same time he overcomes his own fear of castration by using his penis sadistically, himself becoming the castrator of the virgin. This final overcoming of the castration anxiety is related on the deepest biological level to the fear of the vagina and is prepared for by the gradual transference of the inhibiting (punishing) mother-image to the interfering father, in whom the "bad" mother (with the penis) is objectified. Later on, in building up the social super-ego, the boy takes the father, who originally represented the bad mother only, back into his own ego. The father, unlike the mother, has been from the very beginning a strange object of the outer world and so can be related to the ego only through being identified with the mother, who originally was considered as part of the child's ego. Just as the boy sees in the father mainly an objectification of the interfering mother, so the girl learns to see in the father the kind, protecting mother. She therefore maintains the penis for a long time as a breast substitute and

in consequence genital fright. In the other hand, the boy will not lose his fear of castration as long as he maintains the penis as a (possible) breast substitute of which he has been deprived. Originally the mother was made responsible for this loss. At the genital stage the father becomes responsible because he possesses the mother entirely. In order to overcome the castration fear, the boy normally has to establish the sadistic tooth symbolism which enables him narcissistically to invest with libido his penis as an inseparable part of his ego and to regard the breast as belonging to the mother as an object, a point of view which he apparently never quite succeeds in attaining. The girl, on the other hand, is able to give up the penis as breast substitute only after investing her own breasts narcissistically with libido at maturity and so with a certain pride identifying herself with the nourishing mother, an identification that is completed in the discovery of the vagina as an organ for libidinal pleasure and for procreation.

From this, her biologically determined fate in the Oedipus situation, the woman's super-ego differentiates itself from the man's. While he can work out on a genital level, in his father identification, the original oral sadism, instead of having to dispose of it socially, the woman's mother identification grows up as a direct continuation of the primitive sphincter-ego and so inhibits her sexual aggression and brings about her social adjustment. With the man, on the other hand, the socially necessary inhibition of his sexual aggression is accomplished through fear of castration by the father, a fear that is characteristic of the man; the woman knows only of biological castration at the oral stage. These differences explain some of the specific characteristics in man and woman, which should be taken into consideration in further investigations of characterology and sex ethics. Here we can only say that in general the woman's mother identification will always impel her to maintain the ethics of the first maternal command, "You mustn't". ("That's not nice for a girl"), in her social and sexual behavior, whereas the man will follow the aggressive paternal imperative, "You must".

The Genesis of the Guilt-Feeling

We have attempted to show how the original oral sadism is biologically used in the seizure of the external world for the satisfaction of animal needs, part of it being maintained at the mouth as pleasure in eating (biting) and part transformed into the grasping instinct of the hand. Finally, through the intervention of the hand it is transferred to the genitals, where it finds in the sexual act a more or less extensive gratification which is used biologically in propagation. But since our domesticated sexual life affords no completely satisfying sadistic gratification, a part of this unused libido-energy is thrown back into the ego. There it is dammed up in various ways and so forms the nucleus of that part of the ego which inhibits the animal impulses in social ways. Let us now follow more closely the genesis of the ego-inhibitions at the various stages of their development.

Adopting the same point of view as in our previous paper, we will not begin with the Oedipus situation and trace back analytically the guilt-feeling localised there, but will try to present its development genetically. In doing so, we shall be obliged to relinquish the Freudian explanation of the guilt-feeling as arising in the "castration-complex", which we shall find to be itself only a symptom of the guilt-feeling. We shall also get now light on the Freudian "super-ego", which Freud assumed to be a derivative of the Oedipus complex, but which actually is built up genetically from inhibited sadism long before the Oedipus complex is formed. This takes place through the relation to the mother object, to whom the inhibited sadistic child learns to adjust itself by subjugating its ego (masochism). We have already indicated how the ego-inhibition originally springs up from the relation of the suckling and small child to the mother, that is, we have assumed a so-called "sphincter-ego" as the physiological nucleus of the later purely psychological super-ego. This "sphincter-ego" is formed during the first training by the mother and as a result of the child's earlier libidinal relation to her (in the sucking act). This primal privation and the damming up of the oral libido that it entails enables the child to suffer the later inhibitions imposed by the mother, in order that it may get tenderness as a reward.

The first real privations imposed by the mother apart from the great biological privation, the trauma of birth, have to do with nourishment at the breast. The child apparently

accepts the temporary interruption of this nourishment placidly, so long as the psychological need for nourishment stands alone in the foreground and so long as its satisfaction brings also complete libidinal gratification. But soon the need for obtaining oral pleasure appears independent of hunger or of the feeling of satisfaction, and manifests itself in the compulsion to suck the finger. This shows that the child has clearly recognized the mother's breast as an organ for gaining pleasure and that it places the breast libidinally in two intervals, constantly increasing, during which the breast is withdrawn. For the child at this stage, the withdrawal of the mother's breast seems to take on the character of a "privation". As a reaction to this, the child's ambivalent attitude toward the mother already pre-formed, in my opinion, by the birth trauma clearly appears for the first time. The privation, felt as unpleasant, is accepted only under protest, such as crying, weeping, struggling reactions in which the unsatisfied oral-sadistic libido is partially sublimated as rage, anger, hatred towards the mother. The other part of the oral-sadistic libido is dammed up in the ego and thus leads to the construction and elaboration of inhibitions or, in other words, inner privations. Even in my first analytic work (Der Künstler, 1907), I assumed that this inner self-inhibition of an impulse is the most essential preparation for the building up of character and the moral ego. Sigmund Freud assumed them to be the products of external impulse-inhibition (privation) only. Later, in his concept of the super-ego, Freud has accepted this character of inner inhibition, but only in the case of the later phase of identification, in the sense that the paternal threat of castration is incorporated in the ego.

The child, from the beginning, is able to accept the maternal privations only by looking for and finding substitute-gratifications on its own body (finger, toes, lobe of the ear), the most suitable of which it soon discovers in the biologically preformed genital zone. Thus another part of sadism, having become libidinally ungratifiable at the mother's breast, is directed against the mother herself, insofar as she is already felt as an object. It is important to bear in mind that the mother - as we have already indicated - is recognized and accepted as an object when she imposes privations and thus behaves like the rest of the hostile external world.

A process similar to that of the partial weaning takes place in the child at the next educational stage of privation. That is, at the first effort to train him in habits of cleanliness (sphincter control) which is made, according to the character of the mother and the child,

either early or late, in milder or in stricter form. The child accepts these privations in the free expression of the pleasure of excretion more or less willingly. He will obey the mother partly out of love for her, partly out of fear, at the same time protesting against her with acts of rebellion. Finally the child adapts itself, under more or less silent protest, by suppressing, either from love or fear, its aggressive rage against the mother and expressing it in the compromise symptoms of stubbornness toward her. I have already indicated how the oral sadism dammed up in the ego strengthens this obstinacy and brings into the ambivalent attitude toward the mother a definite element of hatred, which is of decisive importance for all later object relations.

After having shown the child's reactions to the privations imposed by the mother at the purely biological stage namely, weaning, we will now follow its reactions at the "social" stage of training in cleanliness. In this process two given factors work together, the constitutional equipment of the child and the mother's influence over it, which represent the hereditary and the fortuitous elements in the situation. Doubtless a premature or brusque action on the mother's part will strengthen the child's reactions; or the father's share in this early infantile training will essentially influence the picture. But if we consider the whole process from the standpoint of the child's ego, the education of which consists in fitting it into a definite milieu, then, from analytic experience with pathological material, we see built up genetically the following average picture.

As a result of the economic division of the oral-sadistic libido in the ego, part of which is dammed up as inhibition, the privation-causing mother, irrespective of whether she is really strict or not, is comprehended as a punishing object and is apprehended as such by the auto-sadistically charged ego. It is this mechanism that, at a later stage, we might describe as "identification" with the (punishing) mother. We must understand this in the sense of the first definition of identification given by Freud, namely, that it occurs "by reason of the same etiologically claim". To understand the mechanisms of identification, we must turn from the analysis of the object and of the object-relation back to the analysis of the ego. That means, in terms of our problem, that the child's ego is even at this stage, in consequence of partial weaning, so far invested auto-sadistically - i.e. inhibited - that it recognizes and acknowledges the mother as an external inhibiting force. The result is that it saves itself inner efforts, but at the same time has to subjugate itself masochistically. So long as one does not postulate this psychological ego mechanism,

one will always have to assume a "borrowed guilt-feeling" (Freud) resting on identification. In this sense every consciousness of guilt may be regarded as borrowed, but the point of view seems to me both clinically and genetically untenable, clinically because the patient's guilt consciousness is always justified objectively; genetically, because in its kernel, it proves to be a sediment of the ego-formation built up as a result of privations that are, not only socially, but also biologically, necessary. Even the "social" element does not come first through the father, but is prepared for at the early transition stage from the purely biological to the social relationship to the mother. In essence it comes to this, that the child cannot, because of love, and dare not, because of fear, react with (oral) sadism against the depriving and punishing mother, but has to inhibit this impulse and so even at this stage reacts sadistically and punitively against its own ego. Here is to be sought the origin of what we find later in the ego as "need of punishment" (Reik), which, genetically, represents a re-establishing of the mother relation (not the father relation) in the ego.

Thus, from inhibited sadism, the object of which has become one's own ego, an image of the strict (punitive) mother is formed as a result of the privations experienced at the hands of the mother. In this image the ego finds relief from its own inhibitions, a relief that we find later on magnified in masochistic gratification. One can understand neither the pleasure of perverse masochists, nor the need for punishment of the child, the neurotic and the criminal unless one takes into consideration this inner unloading-tendency, which finds extensive gratification in the re-establishment through punishment from without, of a part of the objective mother-relation. Insofar as sadism cannot unburden itself in revenge and the infliction of pain upon the object, the depriving mother, the sadistic impulse is dammed up in a kind of self-inhibition. This again represents the depriving mother, whose withdrawal of libido-gratification at this stage is experienced as punishment (negative punishment). If the mother really punishes (in a positive sense) then the ego is unburdened at least temporarily of these tense, often unbearable inhibitions (self-punishment tendencies). Thus identification with the strict mother affords simultaneously outlet and gratification to the sadistic tendencies.

The "strict mother" thus forms the real nucleus of the super-ego. We may put it in another way and say that the early super-ego formation based upon the inhibitions set up as a result of maternal privations is objectified in the image of the strict, punitive mother, and later on is sought in masochistic gratification. When Freud devised a super-ego

(in the masculine sense) to the woman he overlooked the fact that the nucleus even of the ~~super-ego~~ super-ego originates from the father and can be described, in a psychoanalytic sense as the result of the struggle with the depriving mother. This genetic concept throws a clear light not only on the psychological development of the child, but also on a number of the human being's pathological expressions and reactions, as well as on the possibility of influencing them by therapy. It is remarkable that we often find a very strongly pronounced guilt-feeling in individuals (especially women) whose mothers have not been strict in the usual sense of the word. This confirms our theory that the strength of inner self-inhibitions increases in the absence of adequate external inhibitions, inasmuch as such external inhibitions afford an opportunity for a corresponding expression of aggressive and sadistic impulses, which then do not so strongly inhibit the ego. Anal, urethral, and sexual "neuroticisms" or symbol-formation (in child or adult) may be understood as an attempt to unburden the ego, which tries to provoke punishment (from the mother) in order to get rid of inner inhibitions and at the same time to make sure of the mother's love. What appears as a "masochistic" punishment tendency (Reik) or as a "protest" (Adler) against the strict mother may be understood, in the light of the ego-psychology, as an attempt to unburden oneself of inner inhibitions and to set up again the primitive code of punishment.

In the therapy of such cases, one must avoid everything that could possibly oppose the patient's tendency to unburden himself and so secure gratification of his masochistic guilt-feeling. One must rather, by a passive attitude (not in interpretation!), to compel him to build up a correctly functioning super-ego, instead of gratifying libidinally the primitive one. Strict education, necessary on the whole, spares the child a superfluity of inner inhibitions which would cause it to react neurotically. In cases where the child has not later developed a social super-ego, analysis has to further the inner exorcism of these inhibitions by not allowing the patient to gratify the punishment tendency. This brings him - through love and not through fear - to accept the ethical demands of his milieu and to adjust to the "love-code" (Liebes-Moral - Odier). When the analyst forbids, scolds, and punishes, then - aside from satisfying his own sadism - he only gratifies the masochism of the patient, enabling him to give up temporarily the symptoms of his self-punishment tendency (guilt-feeling), but not to succeed in setting up a socially functioning super-ego. Other symptoms, those from which the patient is getting a masochistic pleasure because they are socially condemned - as, for example, drunkenness or certain perversions - can only be removed by active intervention.

however hard the patient may try to move the analyst to give prohibiting commands, and even when he would only protest. Here, also, by patiently showing up these tendencies for what they are, one must bring the patient himself to renounce them for love of the analyst (mother), instead of using them as touchstones of the analyst's love for him.

While postponing further discussion of the sado-masochistic impulses and their importance for an understanding of the whole pathology of the ego and its object relations, we will here follow up one connection brought to light by my analytic study of these phenomena. Whilst the sado-masochistic mechanism, as we have tried to show, is, so to speak, set in biological motion at the oral stage, the content of this complex is acquired in the later period of training in cleanliness. Again we see how a biological process can become pathologically effective only at the next stage of social adjustment, and certainly under the influence of traumata added in the meantime. For whilst at the suckling period the withdrawal of the mother's breast is already, because of the oral-sadism damaged up in the ego, felt as (negative) punishment (privation), at the next stage (the anal and urethral) positive punishments, or at least threats of punishment, are added. It is well known that real pathological masochism relates as a rule to the anus (beating the buttock), from which we may conclude that the real element to be designated as "masochistic" - perhaps in contrast to the earlier auto-sadism - appears first at the anal stage. From the genetic standpoint, "the sadistic-anal phase" (Freud) can be divided into a sadistic oral, which is biological, and a masochistic anal, which is already influenced by the "moral" relation to the mother. At the third genital stage, we see the sadistic inhibition appearing as anxiety, the masochistic the moral relation to the mother. At the third or genital stage, we find the sadistic inhibition appearing as anxiety, the masochistic submission as guilt-feeling. Anxiety also represents in part an unburdening of inner inhibitions and is, as it were, a primitive therapeutic attempt to make others responsible for one's own inhibitions. This indeed the patient attempts to do permanently with the analyst. The "beating phantasy", which in pathological cases makes an orgasm possible and effective (either in masturbation or in coitus) is really a punishment for the sexual enjoyment (orgasm), a punishment that the patient, like the forbidding mother, imposes on himself. Here is a clear demonstration of the tendency to unburden one's own ego of one's own inhibitions through phantasies of the strict mother.

The wide-spread anal perversions (coprophilia) thus not only represent a fixation at this auto-erotic stage of infantile development, but are at the same time sediments of the early object relation to the mother. They represent, on

the one hand, stubborn rebellion against the maternal commands, and on the other an attempt to find in the partner an ideal mother who will allow uninhibited gratification. Their frankly masochistic element represents the further activity of the inner punishment tendency which arises from the original maternal prohibition of infantile transgression.

The process by which the anal prohibitions (inhibitions) are combined with the sexual, or are replaced by it, is in both sexes connected with the function of urination which, like the anal function, is an excretory process, but makes use of the genital apparatus. This explains not only the psychical equation of enuresis and masturbation (pollution), but also the comparison of the feminine genital to the despised anal opening. A number of sexual disturbances (and of urethral symptoms also) must be traced further back than the castration complex to the pregenital mother relationship, if one wants to understand them genetically and influence them therapeutically.

If we follow to the genital stage the effect of maternal privations at the pregenital stage, we must not forget that very frequently it is the mother (and not the father) who forbids (prevents) genital gratification (masturbation) just as strictly as oral and anal pleasure, indeed even more strictly. But we have attempted to show that even the child's earliest masturbation, which is often not recognized as such, is inhibited, so to speak, through an inner damming up, even in the absence of any kind of external prohibition. We know also that "analytically" educated children, on whom no such kind of prohibition has been enforced, show guilt-feeling reactions as strong as, occasionally even stronger than, those of the average child who has been terrified and really punished or threatened with punishment. This shows that anxiety (castration-fear) is not called into being by prohibition, threat or punishment. It is a question whether external threat does not rather have a relieving effect in unburdening the system of inner inhibitions. This state of affairs makes it extraordinarily difficult to put into effect educational or therapeutic measures. For experience teaches us that a too strict mother, although she unburdens the child's inner inhibitions, may induce a masochistic fixation at this stage; whilst a mother who is too gentle may compel the ego to erect excessively strong inner inhibitions (neurotic guilt-feeling).

From analysis of cases in which the sexual guilt-feeling either is manifest (actual sexual conflict) or can easily be traced to masturbation, we can draw the following picture of the genetic development that one must trace back analytically for therapeutic purposes. Auto-sadism, which

functions as inhibition at the oral stage, becomes masochism at the stage of anal fixation or reaction to the strictly punishing mother. In this process the atavistic component of self-will develops more or less strongly, and can be overcome only in the extreme of pathological submission (masochism). Thus the anal stage, which already involves the genital organ, may lead to genital guilt-feeling, which has already been prepared for through the sadistic cathexis of the genitals at the oral stage (infantile masturbation). The genital guilt-feeling is therefore not primary at all; it is only the counterpart of the sadistic cathexis of the genitals, which is partly renounced in that the maternal restrictions at the oral and anurathral stages are carried along to the genital stage, where the social restrictions represented by the father are added.

Men with only slightly inhibited sadistic sexual impulses and a correspondingly slight sexual guilt-feeling (the Don Juan type) often have the anal and anurathral guilt-feeling fully preserved.* On the other hand, in women the pre-genital guilt-feeling in the displacement to the genitals leads to frigidity. If during analysis one forbids such women to masturbate, they react with a protest against the mother at the oral or anurathral stage. One patient, as a direct reaction to the forbidding of masturbation, stated that she had her first orgasm at puberty in defecating. One of her symptoms is frequent urination (also at night). Functional bladder and intestinal disturbances (flatulency) are frequent symptoms of such a protest against the mother at an early stage.**

The full effect of the pregenital maternal inhibitions are seen first at the genital stage, when the sexual organs first become. This proper sexual enjoyment is then often charged with such strong guilt-feeling by the ego that impotence in men, and, even more frequently, frigidity in women, arise from it. We must, therefore, to have here an intense rejection of narcissistic and sadistic ego-gratification brought about by the restricting code of the maternal moral, which to the child seems to forbid everything pleasant.

* See the case in "Sensibilität und Schuldgefühl" published by me, p. 134 ff. Another patient to whom his mother had given medicine against pollution frequently dreamed that he urinated or defecated (with discharge of semen).

** I hold Ferenczi's theoretical restriction of these functions to be unjustified because he is not conscious that he is thus playing the part of the strict mother, instead of freeing the patient from the desire for her. The forbidding of masturbation of which I spoke must not be proceed without a revealing of its significance to the patient, which will bring to light reactions at the pregenital stage.

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This explains why most religious women are extremely masochistic, and why many of them need a masochistic (beating) phantasy or situation to achieve an orgasm. In the masochistic phantasy of one patient, the man ordered her, under threat or dispensation of blows on the bottom, to produce an orgasm, which in the phantasy led to his gratification. Analysis showed that this referred back to corresponding punishments from the mother, and that the patient in her phantasy played not only the parts of man and woman, but also those of mother and child. In the role of the strict mother, she not only allowed, but ordered the orgasm; on the other hand, she punished herself for protesting against the mother in being beaten. But the production of the orgasm did not satisfy herself as an active sadistic pleasure gratification, which is incompatible with the passive submission of the feminine sexual role; therefore, the patient had to be compensated in the masochistic phantasy by the man. The connection of the orgasm with early maternal prohibitions becomes definite at puberty through the fact that it also is an excretory process like those to which the maternal prohibitions originally relate. This connection explains a number of sexual disturbances in men which are unintelligible until they are traced back to their pregenital origin.

The anal origin of the sexual guilt-feeling, its connection with the early training by the mother in cleanliness, is manifest in certain cases where there is a pathological inhibition against repeating obscene words from the child's language. If one brings the patient in the analysis to do this, a procedure that Ferenczi recognized long ago as therapeutically important,* then one sees that as a good mother one removes the prohibition originally imposed by the strict mother. However, one soon finds that these words originally relate not to the sexual, but to the anal sphere, and represent merely a repetition at the verbal stage of ill-timed functionings. The reproduction of these words which often occurs under strong protest, is usually disguised in the form of blasphemous insults, leaving no doubt that they originally related to the mother (protest) although sometimes they are later displaced as curses against God, namely, the father. The analytic meaning of this appearance of obscene words under cover of anxiety in the form of blasphemy is that the analyst, in compelling the patient to express these words, puts himself in the place of the strict mother, to whom the insults now refer. In defiance of her, the patient now says everything that she in her time forbade him to say; he commits this offense again in his sadistic revengeful phantasies

* "Über obscene Worte" (Zentralblatt f. Ps A Vol. 1 1911).

about the mother. The expression of despised words is, however, only a specific case of the removal of inner inhibitions which the individual achieves himself after the initial compulsion was removed. But it seems that speech is, in general, at least in the form of admission (confession), over the greater part of its relieving (cathartic) effect to the removal of one's own inner inhibitions, rather than to the communication with another. On the other hand, stuttering is only a general symptom of strong inner inhibitions at the pregenital mother stage if one lacks a constantly inhibited and at the same time cherished protest against the mother. But speech as such undoubtedly contains also an oral (sadistic) gratification, which, in connection with the narcissistic gratification in the general act of what is spoken (about oneself), makes up an essential part of the therapeutic effect of analysis. The sadistic element in it appears clearly in the act of the human being's seduction, in which the seductive art of persuasion, in the form of affectionately "abusive" words of love, plays a part not to be underestimated.

At the sexual stage, this protest against the depriving mother is expressed in a way that influences our whole attitude toward sex, in that the concept of "cleanliness" is transferred to the genitals and so to our whole sex life. If the boy's attitude toward the educating and depriving mother is carried over from the anal to the genital stage, then follows dislike of the female genitals, which are felt to be unclean, dirty. In this we see the prototype of the genital horror explained by Freud as castration complex. The connecting idea seems to be that the mother, who fusses so much about cleanliness, must herself be dirty, a fact that often seems confirmed by the child's chance experiences (smell, menstruation, etc.). From this follows the demand for sexual "cleanliness" in the woman; indeed even the generally accepted womanly "ideal of beauty" seems to be determined by this. Beauty (of face and body) must cover up and help to overcome everything ugly, dirty, repulsive.** Where this compensation

* Later Ferenczi notices that the tic also is "only a distorted expression for obscene words, gestures, coprophilic curses, even also sadistic offensive acts", without, however, recognizing it as a protest against the mother, who in her time forbade the so-called "childish faults" (making faces, putting out the tongue, picking the nose, winking the eyes, etc.). In the connection between "obscene words" and the orgasm, Ferenczi has not recognized the deeper relation to the pregenital maternal prohibitions. (See his work "Kontaminationen der aktiven psychoanalytischen Technik" Internat. Jacht. f. Ps A, XII 1926 No. I).

** See my interpretation of "Melusine", who is beautiful above, but misshapen from the navel down, in "Die Nacktheit in Sage und Dichtung" (Imago 1911).

does not occur, there results impotency, which is frequently based on the repulsive idea of the urinating or defecating woman. The pleasurable counterpart to this - thus the corresponding sadistic against the mother as first in the coprophilic practices of the perverse. A yet stronger flight from the repulsive woman (anal) is shown in the homosexual, in whom the entire infantile fear of the mother is attached to the female genital, but in this alienation from the woman, there is at the same time an element of revenge against the mother, whom the homosexual and the impotent refuse because she frustrated privations on them. The privations which begin with birth, through weaning and the training in cleanliness, and their pathogenic after-effects, the symptoms already mentioned appear at the sexual stage. Normally, in the sex act itself, the sadistic captivation of the mother seems to take place in opposition to her privations and prohibitions and at the same time as a kind of revenge for them. This conception possibly throws new light on the significance of the "incest prohibition", which can now be considered as the sexual expression of all the pre-sexual inhibitions and prohibitions originating from the mother.

In tracing further the psychic development of these inhibiting tendencies at the genital stage it will be best to treat the male and the female development separately. So far the two have shown more similarities than differences; certainly the inhibitions that manifest themselves as anxiety and guilt-feeling in both sexes originally relate to the mother and only later are reconnected according to the sex role. This new orientation occurs in the Oedipus situation, which in a certain sense signifies for both sexes a decisive change in attitude. The girl changes the libidinal object, making it quite clear that the guilt-feeling toward the mother does not arise from the Oedipus situation; rather it represents almost without exception a hindrance to the attainment of this normal object stage. The mother is not the source of hatred and guilt-feeling merely as a rival with the father, she was already that by reason of her earlier restrictions of the ego and its narcissistic gratification tendencies. Just the mother has played the same role in the boy's infantile development, so that this factor alone is a strong inhibition against the captivation of the mother as a sex object even in the absence of the father as an external hindrance. Indeed, in such cases we frequently find the boy later becoming homosexual, not because of a father-fixation, but because there was no father; thus the boy strengthens the primary inhibitions against the mother in complete flight from her, in order to counterbalance the lack of restrictions from the father. Normally the inhibition against the strict, depriving mother, which is operative at the sexual stage also, is overcome through masculine mastery of the woman in the sex act, a sadism that plays an essential part in the pleasure gratification. The sexual possession of the woman is in no

way made difficult for the man by the Oedipus complex, but rather is facilitated in that it enables him to objectify a part of his own inner resistance in the father and through this to remove them in himself. We can make a second step in the formation of the super-ego, initiated by Freud from the "father-identification". The boy projects, as it were, his primitive maternal super-ego on to the father, whilst at the same time identifying himself with the father in possession of the mother. Here is the first appearance of the specifically inhibiting role of the father, which, to distinguish it from the primary (at first) restriction of the ego in the pre-Oedipal phase, I have called the formation of the social super-ego, bounded by what under the term castration complex. The boy now has to undergo a change of viewpoint: "The mother remains the libido object and keeps in the father-identification the primary psychobiological super-ego, the own social libido object and changes the super-ego, at least in part, the primary maternal, the paternal social super-ego. The child-ego toward the father no more arises from the desire situation as the case of the boy than the guilt-feeling toward the mother in the case of the girl. Both are only to be understood practically in terms of the ego psychology. Thus the boy's guilt-feeling is not so much reaction to desire for the mother, rather it is objectively justified inasmuch as the boy has wanted for himself an "evil father" by projecting the mother's strictness and his own inhibitions on to the father. The castration anxiety at the social (father) stage has thus the same psychological significance as the biological preservation at the mother stage, inasmuch as both result from the inhibition of a sadistic-aggressive impulse against the mother who arises first at the oral, then at the genital stage. But at the genital stage the sadistic aggression - inhibited this time by the father - causes anxiety, guilt-feeling, and the self-punishment tendency that manifests itself in masochistic phantasies and that Freud has described as the castration complex. Only thus can be explained the typical form of castration phantasy, which does not go back to an external threat made by the father, but arises in an inner defense of sadistic tendencies, the instrument of which at this stage is the genitals. The threat of castration is not the cause of the libido inhibition, but sadism, already inhibited within, is the cause of the masochistic castration anxiety. The sadistic counterpart of this is, however, never lacking, and often appears in the impulse to castrate the father (the rival).

The case of the woman is essentially different, indeed normally just the reverse. Clinical observation shows that the woman in general has less anxiety than the man, indeed one might almost say a different kind of anxiety. Her super-ego consists much more of inhibitions and guilt-feeling, whereas in the male super-ego anxiety dominates. At first sight this seems to confirm the castration theory, and it is certainly

connected not merely with the anatomic sex differentiation, but also with the biological sexual role, which itself tends to determine in conclusive ways the varying sadistic element in the man and the woman. But in any case it is sadism that determines the kind and degree of anxiety and with it also the auto-sexualistic satisfaction tendencies. We shall be able to trace these relations further when we follow the relation of the sexes beyond the purely biological sex function into the so-called love-life. Here it is enough to mention that it is less anxiety in the woman than its positive counterpart, the narcissistic pride of the ego, that makes her shrink from accepting her passive sexual role. On the other hand, we see clearly how the guilt-feeling in her super-ego enables the woman to give herself and to surrender to the man, a yielding against which the ego strives. Hence a too extensive submission frequently occurs as masochistic bondage which, however, is only a pathological exaggeration of the normal biological submission, and which manifests itself psychologically in the form of being in love. The woman's sexual anxiety is anxiety of the ego at the dependance and satisfaction demanded of her by her biological role. So the anxiety of the woman who has no "castration complex" is a sexual anxiety in the narrow sense, whereas the anxiety of the man is a social anxiety in the broad sense, involving the suppression of sadism. With regard to the anxiety problem of the woman, it seems to us also no matter of indifference that the woman in parturition at least partially re-experiences the anxiety affect originally experienced at her own birth and thus abreacts it, whereas the man reproduces it only at other levels.

The origin of the castration complex is thus really pre-Oediposean, i.e., it is not first brought into being in the Oedipus-situation, but is conditioned by the anatomic differentiation of the sexes and obtains its pathogenic significance only at the Oedipus stage. Before that stage there was the significant anal relationship to the strict, punishing mother, by reason of which the child learned to feel that the genitals are "dirty" and later on that sexuality is objectionable. The Oedipus complex serves the purpose of partly overcoming this early phase in that the boy attempts genitally to return to the mother, on the genital level. He is, however, continually prevented by the prohibitions imposed by the mother. For in the return to the mother at the genital stage, the boy comes into conflict not only with the disturbing father, but just as much with the depriving (punishing) mother whom, in this role, we have considered hitherto only in relation to the girl's Oedipus complex. But the boy's disappointment in the unattainable, because depriving, mother is just as great and momentous as the girl's disappointment in the father. So, after a short and intensive period of biological genital

development (Oedipus situation), the child is thrown back again upon its own ego, as once before by the first maternal privations. The difference is that now in the Oedipus-situation the parent of the other sex is, for psycho-biological reasons, made responsible for the privation, a change of attitude that manifests itself particularly in the boy in the father complex (castration anxiety).

If we want to understand this second retreat of the child to his narcissism, we must keep in mind the relation established in the childhood toward the punishing (depriving) mother, which also forms the nucleus of the guilt-feeling. Bearing in mind the genesis of this guilt-feeling, we might consider it as a kind of "negative narcissism". For narcissism also (or what we find as a symptom of it) has proved itself analytically (Lager) as a sediment in the relation between mother and child, as a result of which the ego loves and admires itself as long as it was loved and admired by the good mother, or as it desired to be loved by the ideal mother. On the other hand, identification with the bad mother, with the emphasis placed on the inhibiting and punishing tendencies, is expressed in the ego as guilt-feeling. The attitude of the individual toward these two primal mother types (which Jung worked out typologically as good and evil mother) determines not only the construction of his ego and with it his whole type of character, but also his relation to his fellows in general as well as to the love object in particular.

Chapter III

The Genesis of the Object Relation

We have attempted to show how the mother (her breast) is originally conceived by the suckling as belonging to his own ego or self. And we have shown how the child, as he gradually learns to accept the mother as an object of the external world that can be denied him, tries to find an independent and permanent substitute for her on his own body (finger, genital). This process of the narcissistic cathexis, valuation and utilization of the ego might be described as a first real psychological manifestation. We have learned further that the mechanism of every object-cathexis or object relation is a kind of "externalisation". By this I mean that the relation of the object to the ego is maintained through the fact that the object is invested with libido originally transferred from the ego to the mother and later is again taken back into the narcissistic ego. This mechanism explains not only the "libidinal cathexis" of the outer world (Kang's interest) and the loss of this cathexis in the psychotic idea of the end of the world; more important still, it explains the relation of the ego to other human beings in the love life and in social life.

The withdrawal of the object, leads, as we have seen, to the search for a substitute in one's own ego, but on the other hand every object cathexis definitely contains ego elements. By this I mean that the ego tries to find itself or part of its beloved self in the object. Moreover, the relation of the ego to the object is twofold not only in the sense just described, but in another sense also, because of the child's original idea of the mother as both good (vouchsafing) and bad (depriving) object. We have shown how a substitute for the good mother, the mother as the source of pleasure gratification, is sought on one's own body (sucking, masturbation) or later on, in psychical form in one's own ego. But at the same time the depriving mother, through identification with the inner libidinal ego, is set up in the ego as a feared and punishing element, which, in contrast to the narcissistic substitute gratification manifests itself as anxiety or guilt-feeling.

On the way to social adjustment in the biologically conditioned Oedipus situation, the boy, then, learns gradually to identify the bad, depriving, feared mother with the father. For in the Oedipus situation he learns to recognize the father as the real possessor of the mother. In

This progresses from the biological rivalry with brothers and sisters at the biological mother-stage to social rivalry with the father. The original picture of the good, protecting mother is definitely re-established, as a prerequisite to the establishment of a mature love and sex relation to the woman. The girl, on the contrary, on the way to the Oedipus situation finds again the interfering, denying mother, while she gradually has to learn to find in the father a substitute for the pleasure-giving (breast) mother. This comes about through the equation already described, of breast and penis, which presupposes a "displacement from above downwards" and with it a re-establishment in the regime of the original (oral) sucking activity. The biological Oedipus relation can thus be completely established only if the positive and negative attitudes toward the mother, which manifest themselves in the ego as narcissism and guilt-feeling, have become simultaneously projected again in an object relation. This new object relation at the Oedipus stage differs from the primary object relation to the mother in that now the two mother roles, the good and the bad, are divided up between the father and the mother, the role assigned to each depending upon the sex of the child. The success of this division determines the kind and intensity of the child's later sexual and social relations. This is why the Oedipus complex has such an important bearing upon the later fate of the human being's object relations. But that should not blind us to the fact that the Oedipus complex is only a transient phase of development and that its success or failure has been decisively determined beforehand by the original relation to the mother.

The Oedipus situation compels the child to project on to both sexes the ambivalent attitude that originally referred to the mother only. This ambivalence it has already utilized and built up in its ego as narcissism and guilt-feeling. Its projection in the Oedipus situation is for the infantile ego not so much a task as an unburdening, enabling the ego to find again in objects gratifications and inhibitions which the maternal deprivations had forced within the ego. The Oedipus situation and the love relations corresponding to it psychologically at a later stage thus enable the individual partially and temporarily to cancel earlier ego-developments that involved a psychical expenditure. One can, so to speak, unburden oneself in the love relation because one can objectify in the partner parts and mechanisms of one's own ego. This explains also the definite clear "object hunger" that we see manifested to a marked degree in the analytic transference situation. But its aim is not merely a re-establishment of the Oedipus situation as such, or even a re-establishment of the original libidinal-relation to the mother;

as analysis of the narcissist undoubtedly teaches us, it serves also the purpose of an unburdening of the ego of anxiety and guilt-feelings. This tendency of the ego to seize at every opportunity offered it to unload itself of inner tensions through the object relation shows us that the ego is, as it were, built up against its own will by necessity, as a result of deprivations. And it shows us, too, that the ego is always ready to unravel its ego structure in object relations as soon as it finds objects and situations suitable for its purpose.

But there are certain dangers in this unburdening tendency which appears in the various forms of social and sexual maladjustments. Certainly this tendency as such is the psychological prerequisite to the establishment and maintenance of all human relationships. But if it goes too far in any one direction, say, for example, in the pathological form of "being in love" or in paranoid "projections", then it leads to a partial dissolution of the ego structure, which disturbs its social adjustment inasmuch as absorption in one object relation or pathological restriction to a definite kind of object relation makes social relations to other objects impossible. Another danger, that of narcissistic limitation, threatens the ego when it strives too much against the tendency to object relations, that is, when it will not submit to any form of dependency on any kind of an object.

In order to understand all the processes and possibilities of conflict that come to attention in normal and pathological ways, we must not only consider the psychological mechanisms which are constructed on the biological mother relationship. We must take into account also the influences and disturbances of the given milieu, which are also of importance for a thorough understanding of the individual case. In analysis we regularly find the picture of the strict, bad mother, which has its origin in the biological deprivations associated with the mother, quite irrespective of the parents' real attitudes or of their type of character and educational influences on the child. From that time on, the "image" of the father and mother is created in the Oedipus situation. This image, as I have said, does not always represent their real character, but it plays a great part in analytic and educational situations. Thus the transference proves to be not so much a repetition of the real Oedipus situation as a projection of one's own inner parent image, which is often contrary to the actual facts. This conception of the transference is consistent with the fact that it is a state of "being in love" and thus represents an attempt to solve one's ego problems in an object. One must, therefore, in the analysis not only interpret all expressions of the

transference as a result of infantile relations referring in the analytic situation to the analyst, but must also make them intelligible to the patient as expressions of ego tendencies.

The following picture of the genetic development of the object relation may be regarded as somewhat average; both sexes will form and model the image of the parents from their own attitudes toward the good and the bad mother in accordance with their need of it for later object cathexis and ego unburdening. In general the boy, as we have said, has to find, in the Oedipus situation, the bad mother in the father, irrespective of whether the father is or is not strict. The boy must, so to speak, make the father bad, in order to keep the picture of the good mother clear. This enables him later on to develop a proper love relation to the woman. This process is complicated not only by the child's actual relation to the parents and their real characters, but also by the fact that the original mother relation has left behind its sediment in the ego and thus determined the ego's relation to other libido objects. We have already noted how the original use of both mother images in the ego decides the formation of a more narcissistic (positively inhibited) type or of a more neurotic (negatively inhibited) type. In the boy, for instance, a specially intense disappointment in the mother will have as its consequence an inability to make an adequate displacement of the image of the bad mother on to the father. But then in life also he will continually have to look for and find the bad mother, which may lead to his being repelled by women and attracted to men. Playing the part of the good mother himself he will either love himself solely and narcissistically or will look for the good mother in other men. The same thing is true for the girl, who as a result of holding on too tightly to the depriving mother, comes to playing the ideal mother toward other girls (in whom she loves herself). Individual character types and behaviour can thus be explained according to whether the individual himself plays in life the good mother or looks for her in the object, or plays the bad mother or looks for her in the object. This point of view throws light also upon those forms of behaviour which one might designate as "negative object relations", that is, those in which hatred, anxiety, and especially the guilt-feeling predominate. The guilt-feeling betrays the important role played by the ego in object relations, part of it being present in all love relations.

All these negative emotional relations, which play such a large part in the love life, are intelligible only as attempts to solve conflicts in the ego, which seeks to free itself from inner tensions and inhibitions. But at the same

time such attempts at freeing bring a new secondary guilt-feeling reaction with them, since the ego cannot bear the idea of making use of "one object" (in the Kantian sense) as a means to an end. Sexual gratification also in many human beings seems to bring about the same reaction, because they cannot bear to use the other (the other sex) as a means for narcissistic gratification. It is, therefore, no wonder that the guilt-feeling is typically attached to the orgasm which represents the climax of sexual gratification and hence something forbidden. This prohibition can be regularly traced back analytically to the earliest maternal deprivations of narcissistic pleasure gratifications on the individual's own body and reaches its climax in the masturbation conflict. This conflict proves to be a conflict in one's own ego, which is now independent of outside deprivations and prohibitions and is intelligible only genetically in connection with the early biological privations imposed by the mother. The projection of these ego conflicts explains also why frequently, in crises through which the ego passes, the love object is made the representative of inner inhibitions, as it were, of one's own conscience (scapegoat). We find the same attempt to solve an ego conflict on the object in analysis in the relation of the patient to the analyst. This explains the strong guilt-feeling that necessarily develops from the analytic situation. The getting rid of this guilt-feeling involves many great difficulties.

Again we learn that every relation to an object consists rather of projections of parts of one's own ego and ego conflicts than of the mere vegetation of a biological situation. Certainly this ego which is projected into the object relation is originally built up and developed on the basis of an object relation - mainly on the biological relation to the mother, the development of which we have already sketched as far as the Oedipus situation. The primary deprivations imposed by the mother caused the child to go back again to its own ego and so create "narcissism", which, in later object relations, is again split up into its original components. The degree of narcissism is a decisive factor in these later object relations, since it determines whether in them the original object is sought and found, or one's own ego is objectified. This not only leads in extreme cases to homosexuality, but also determines whether the heterosexual relation represents rather a re-establishment of the original object relation or an attempt to find again one's own ego. I have stated elsewhere that in every object choice and love relation, the two components, the object and the ego, are operative side by side.* I should only like to add that the

* "Sexualität und Schuldgefühl", chapter on Ideal-formation and love choice (1923).

greatest difficulties in the real love choice are to be explained by the working against each other of these two tendencies, and also that such love conflicts arise from the fact that a development of the ego disturbs a previously gratifying object relation.

Postponing the discussion of this highly complicated influence of the ego development on the object relation, let us turn back to the simpler situation of the original object relation to the mother. We shall try first to work out certain typical consequential phenomena of this relation as manifested in character types. One masculine type retains the negative attitude to the mother, and side by side with this paternal over-ego develops later an inadequate paternal super-ego. He is narcissistic either in the positive sense of wanting to be loved and thus playing the child who looks outside for the good, ideal mother, but never finds her, or he himself plays the good, ideal mother to other human beings, whom he loves, whom he must save (saviour phantasy). His sex life is rather a protest against the strict mother than a re-establishment of the libidinal relation to the protecting mother, and accordingly suffers from the restricting influence of guilt-feeling. The other type builds up the paternal inhibitions over the maternal prohibitions and so identifies himself rather with the father than with the mother, but at the same time he deposits everything negative on to the father. He is more manly, active, heterosexual, in contrast to the first type, who often enough projects his negative attitude toward the father back again to the mother and in this way arrives at homosexuality or impotence. In such cases it is the task of analytic therapy to bring the patient to recognize this primal image of the bad mother, whom he tries to deny by himself playing the part of the ideal, good mother. This succeeds only if he can work off the suppressed revenge toward the strict mother in the analytic situation, instead of in the real relation to the woman (Don Juan, impotency, homosexuality).

This disappointment in the mother is an essential factor also in the boy's later negative attitude to the father and the girl's to the man. It rests on all the deprivations from birth, weaning, training in cleanliness, to the Oedipus situation, and it is essentially aggravated through the advent of brothers or sisters, who interfere with the relation to the mother. In this pre-Oedipal phase, in which the other children and not the father interfere with exclusive possession of the mother, the mother is, as it were, made responsible for the additional children as well as for all the deprivations suffered at her hands. At the stage of the training in cleanliness this fact often comes to light in the infantile theory of the "small" child. From analysis one

gets the impression that the whole "anal-birth theory" belongs to this pre-Oedipoean stage in which the father as procreator plays no part, the father's deed being perpetrated by the mother alone. The idea of the anal child often also has the implication that the child can be thrown away as a worthless waste product and so no longer disturb one.

The later disappointment of the boy because the mother has no penis is neither his first nor his most important disappointment in her, indeed it is possible only because of the earlier disappointments. She is, first, a narcissistic disappointment, because the boy, who for a long time accepted her as a part of his own ego (identification) now finds her strange to his ego, that is, unsuitable for identification and the narcissistic ideal formation based on it. Again, as we have already noted, it is not only fear of the father that holds the boy back from the mother, but also his own fear of ego difference (lack of penis), which he gradually has to accept as he has all the previous disappointments. This kind of disappointment he learns to recognize at the genital stage as a consequence of the anatomic difference in sex. At the same time the father is recognized as the owner of the penis and his part in the procreation of children is imagined or learned from experience. Then the mother's "lack of the penis" can be felt as an advantage in a double sense. On the one hand it absolves her from the sole responsibility for the advent of other children; on the other hand, the recognition of her relative sex role frees her from the ego (and identification) and so she can become a real object in the sense that she can be possessed sexually. This is the progressive side of the Oedipus situation, although, to be sure, the powerful father is at the same time recognized as possessor of the mother.

At this stage the boy completes his real biological adjustment, because he definitely gives up the mother as an ego object (part of the ego) and accepts a real (libido) object in harmony with his later sexual role. This change and adjustment he has to effect independently of the father, and the father, in playing the inhibiting part, rather helps on the process by making it possible for the boy to project a great part of his disappointment in the mother, as well as his own inner difficulties, on to the father; in other words, the boy makes the father responsible for all these disappointments and frustrations and so it is no longer the strict, punitive mother who keeps him from herself and sex, but the father, who represents all external and internal hindrances. This makes it possible for the boy to desire the mother again instead of fearing her.

But even at the biological stage of the sex object relation, the woman cannot be taken purely as an object. This new object relation is made possible only through the establishment of a new ego relation, which we recognize in the complicated psychical process of being in love. This "being in love" is an ego problem pure and simple and seems to have the function of bringing the demands of the biological sex role into harmony with the ego tendencies. This becomes particularly clear in an analytic study of so-called homosexuality, in which psychoanalysis long ago recognized a narcissistic ego problem. But here again, psychoanalysis stopped with the "libidinal" explanation characterizing the homosexual object choice as "narcissistic", that is, one loves oneself in the same sex, as the mother loved one (or should have loved). But this is only one form of narcissistic object choice. The ego mechanism lying at its base is just as active in the heterosexual object relation. In order to understand this, however, one must go beyond the libidinal explanation and take up the genetic, evolutionary point of view. It then becomes evident not only that one always looks for or hopes to find the ideal mother or the ideal ego in the love object, which is always chosen narcissistically, but that object relations in general are a kind of dumping-ground for outworn phases of one's own ego development. Depending upon the experience and the mechanism that comes into play, at one time it may be a matter of wanting to find again the original object or one's own ego, at another time of wanting the idealized object or ego, or even the depreciated object or ego. This last case, that of seeking the despised object or ego, which is so important for an understanding of pathogenic development, makes it clear that all object relations represent attempts to solve ego conflicts. That is, the object relation, in every case, serves as a dumping-ground for some former phase of the ego, which has to be given up, which one wants to keep in the object or in the relation to the object, and from which, on the other hand, one tries to free oneself by objectifying it. This explains most of the conflicts connected with object relations, which become more complicated and destructive through the fact that this process of ego deposit continues throughout the whole course of the object relation, so that the real depreciation and the final renunciation of this part of one's own ego development is accomplished only through a depreciation and renunciation of the object itself.

This mechanism of the ego deposit is clear in homosexuality, which involves a second self who represents sexually as well as in other ways one's own ego (or higher or lower self). In the heterosexual object choice the same mechanism is operative, but there it is complicated by the fact of sex differentiation which disturbs the ego tendencies. Psychoanalysis has attempted to account for this

by means of the "castration complex", but without taking into consideration the important mechanism of the ego psychology involved. For the girl, in accordance with her infantile adjustment to her biological sex role, the man has the importance of an ideal ego, which she wants for herself (envy of the penis) and with which she can identify herself in a positive sense if she is able to "deposit" her ego ideal in the man. But if she herself is or wants to become this ideal, that is, cannot sufficiently project this part of her wish-ego, then all the conflicts and difficulties that psychoanalysis has included under the concept "masculinity complex" will follow. As for the man, we have already seen how he learns to give up the mother as ego object and to accept her as sexual object if he is able to renounce narcissistic identification with her and to accept a love object that obviously is different (castrated) from his own physiological self.

But the psychological problem is - How can the human being with his narcissistic disposition and development, love another sex different from his own, i.e. from himself. The answer would be very simple if its practical application did not encounter all the difficulties that we find in the love conflicts of mankind. The answer would be, namely, that man arrives at a sexual object relation because of his biological sexual role and the natural attraction of the sexes for each other. This would be the case if man did not have to make such interminably complicated detours and to build up such elaborate justifications in order to fit himself psychologically for his natural part and to adjust himself to it without conflict. It is his ego and its development that oppose the demands of his biological sex role and that need the complicated apparatus of love to justify sensuousness, to compensate for sadism by tenderness and finally to admit, in the unavoidable guilt-feeling, that the whole thing is a highly egoistic affair, which is resisted by one's moral ego.

For the man, as a condition and a result of his acceptance of the woman as a love object, two possibilities are open, similar to those that we have already described for the woman. But while for the woman the more favourable possibility generally results, namely, that she accepts the man as ideal ego, the man seems more inclined or compelled to objectify the woman as a kind of "lower self" (previously described). This has its foundation not only in the idea of castration, which causes the man to identify the woman with the anxiety-charged part of his own ego to see in her, as it were, his own feared fate. But this disappointment, that is, the woman's lack of a penis, is, as we have noted, only the last in a series of earlier disappointments which go to form the picture of the bad, destructive, objectionable mother. So

the woman's object choice, considered from the point of view of that ego, represents rather an idealization, a finding of the desired ego ideal in the other sex. This is only partly the case for the man, since, although he also desires the ideal mother, because of his ambivalent attitude to her he can no longer find her. To the girl, on the other hand, the father appears irrefragable, so to speak, though this ideal attitude, too, can be interfered with through the "envy of the penis" roused by the brothers.

In this whole process of ego finding, ego projection, and ego depositing, two possibilities offer, each of which in turn involves three possible mechanisms and outlets. From the mother-child or object-ego relationship, in conjunction with the "narcissistic" ego cathexis, one may project and objectify either more of one's own ego or more of the original mother object. In either case, one may project as true an image as possible, an idealised image, or a depreciated image. In both men and women, the various types of object choice and of relations of the ego to the object depend upon which of these possibilities eventuate. But the development of this ego relation to the object determines also the type of character of the individual whose "object choice" is only a symptom of his ego development. Thus from the beginning the libidinal object relations, in every form and at every stage, are attendant phenomena and sediments of the development of the ego. This explains not only changes in object relations, but also the difficulties involved in and attending such changes. In the most favourable cases the ego grows and develops, so to speak, in biological harmony with and for the children, in whom one deposits large parts of one's past (depreciated) and future (ideal) ego development. At the same time the parents enable the children, through identification, to develop their own egos and to build up their own ego structure. But, on the other hand, every object relation holds destructive elements within it, since the deposit of overcome and renounced ego phases always involves a relative breaking up and reorganization of the ego-structure, which we know and fear as the destructive side of love.

Section III.

THE FUNCTIONING OF THE PSYCHIC MECHANISMS

Chapter I.

Projection and Object Relation

In what follows we will consider from the point of view of the ego the psychical mechanisms that underlie the ego's relations to the object and to reality. At the same time we will try to present the clinical effects of these relations as manifested in specific mechanisms and their various forms of expression.

The real object-choice passes from the narcissistic cathexis of the good mother through the transient phase of genitality to love. Its essential mechanism is the one to which we have been accustomed to apply the descriptive term "projection", but which, from the dynamic point of view, is more properly designated "unburdening of the ego". The second, more fundamental process is that of the "structure of the ego". This leads from the primary narcissism (egoism) by way of the strict mother to the super-ego, and its essential mechanism we are familiar with under its descriptive label, "identification". Considered from the dynamic point of view it is found to rest upon an inner damming up of the aggressive-sadistic impulse, which is then objectified in the image of the strict mother; thus it may be designated as inhibition of an impulse. The inhibitions thus formed are partially released in the object relation and are compensated for by tenderness. The third stage leads beyond the narrower object relationship to the adjustment to reality. This represents the extreme degree of withdrawal from egoism and narcissism, and it is made possible only by means of a mechanism which, in terms of the libido theory, we have learned to know as "repression". Looking at it from the standpoint of ego development, I have called it denial. There are at all three stages, besides the possible normal outlets in love, character formation and sociability, pathological deviations and maladjustments which depend upon quantitative and qualitative factors.

If in the structure of the ego, because of inner trends or external conditions, the impulse inhibitions become too strong, then extreme anxiety and guilt-feeling follow and in their train all the disturbances that we have been in the habit of designating descriptively according to their symptoms as "psycho-neuroses", but that would be better characterized as "emotional disturbances" (Eitel's "Disturbances of the impulse and affect of life"). If, on the other hand, in establishing the object relationship, too much of the ego is transferred to the object, there will follow the disturbances

of the love and sex life that we have been accustomed to include under the term "sexual neuroses" (better called sexual neuroses) and perversions. If, finally, in the general adjustment, reality is felt by the ego to be too painful and is therefore too strongly denied, we have the disturbances in the relation to reality which are described in psychiatry as psychotic disturbances and which, in terms of the dynamic psychology we explain as the complete renunciation of the ego's function of adjustment to biological sex and reality. So the psychoses represent an exaggerated ego-fixation to the disadvantage of objects and reality; the neuroses an exaggerated object fixation to the disadvantage of the ego - that is, a too strong object fixation in the ego (identification); the perversions, finally, an exaggerated ego-fixation in the object.

We have attempted to show that every object relation is the manifestation of an ego development, that is, that it represents a definite phase of ego development which is overcome by projecting it on to an object, but which at the same time is conserved in the object relation. Psychologically considered, every phase in the ego development leaves its sediment in an object relation. This process is at once the counterpart and the prerequisite of what Freud has described as the process of identification, which process is itself the sediment of a renounced object relation. For this reaction of the ego in the renunciation of an object relation can be understood only genetically, that is, in connection with the first object relation to the mother, which in its essence was an ego relation. Hence the ego after renunciation or loss of an object, reacts, as it did after the renunciation of the first object (the mother) and returns again to itself, but not necessarily, in the regressive sense, to a primitive stage, but only to that ego phase which the object represented. It is impossible to leave this ego phase behind without help from an object. This developmental step, then fails because one is not in a position completely to replace the lost auxiliary object in one's own ego. Identification in the case of loss of the object, which was familiar to us analytically as the determining mechanism in patho-genetic conditions, thus, genetically considered, is the logical termination of a healing attempt, whose final aim was the re-establishment of the original unity of ego and object. In the neurotic this attempt is not successful enough; in the psychotic it goes too far, is, as it were, too successful! Hence the neurotic always remains too dependent upon the object-relation (transference), while the psychotic establishes no object-relation at all. Identification with the object, which in the psychosis goes to the extreme of complete introjection becomes manifest only when the object is lost; but

the identification with these objects based all one's object relations rest originally on such "identifications" with one's own ego. For the object relations themselves are possible only because of a previous projection (deposit) of a part of one's ego or ego phase in the object. Finally, this projection is an undermining of the ego, an attempt to establish again the original narcissistic mother-child relationship which existed before the first privations imposed by the mother had compelled the construction of a narcissistic ego and an inhibiting ego.

Normally, the process of ego deposit and re-identification with the object takes place only once, in so-called love, which, in spite of all experience to the contrary still retains its reputation for immortality not only in the assertions of lovers, but also in our customs, habits and laws. This indicates that there is a strong biological tendency to conserve instead of to develop the ego. The happiness of love, apart from the narcissistic desire to be loved, lies chiefly in the redemption of the ego from the acknowledged object relation to the mother. This redemption is realized to an even greater degree in one's children. Not only are one's own infantile ego stages re-established in them, but in their growth and development one's own ego development is deposited, so that no other object relations are no longer necessary. If, however, further object relations do become necessary, the fact is indicative of a crisis in the ego's development, from which either a new object choice or a regression to one of one's own earlier ego stages is the only possible outlet. In both cases more or less severe conflicts arise, which we characterize as neurotic or psychotic respectively. In these conflicts we regularly see two opposing tendencies at work; the influence of the original and libidinal mother situation tends to hold one to one object and to the ego stages established with it, whereas the advancing ego development tends toward a series formation, not, however, in the sense of a series of mere repetitions. As I have already said once before, the ego ideal* desires variation of the object instead of change in the ego. But this striving against the ego-change arises in relation to the object, and so, for instance, a cooling down of the love relation corresponds to the gradual renunciation of the ego stage that it represents. Criticism of the object is nearly always criticism of the ego, of the old ego to which this object corresponds. The melancholic, whose self-reproaches Freud explained as reproaches against the object, shows this mechanism clearly,

* "Sexualität und Gemüthsleben".

Irrespective of whether such a love choice occurs once or several times, it is in every case the expression of an ego crisis. For some of the crises in human life there are certainly biological crises. Apart from the psychical crises in the Oedipus situation discovered by Freud, there is the crisis of puberty, which must be met by the first biological object choice. This is the normal outcome since the biological development serves not only to form the basis of the ego development (growth, age), but also to guarantee a normal issue for it by means of the object relation. Indeed it is perhaps just that rudimentary part of the biological ego which we normally try to find again in the other sex. At least phylogenetically the opposite sex represents a past stage in the development of one's own ego.

This mechanism of projecting or depositing in the object an outgrown or idealized part of the ego can be best studied in the dream, in the interpretation of which we are accustomed to consider all figures as finally representing one's own ego or as personifications of the split ego. But the same mechanism determines our emotional relations to objects in reality also and is the reason why they can be used in the dream as representatives of the ego. In the psychosis this state of affairs is directly manifest; only there we lack the insight into their mechanism that we can get only from an analysis of the ego structure where it is accessible to us.

This mechanism is most difficult to recognize in that admired form of its manifestation which in normal persons we designate as being in love. Here, again, it is the pathological forms first of all that give us an insight into the mechanisms underlying the normal state. From these we will pick out two, characterized as perversions, homosexuality and masochism. We have learned to regard homosexuality as a kind of sexualized ego development which is distinguished from heterosexuality in that a part of the ego conflict has to be solved on an object of the same sex. This attempt naturally fails and leads to new conflicts. If, in this form of unburdening, the fault lies in the quality of the object, in the case of masochism the quantitative element is the determining factor; in other words, masochism represents an exaggerated attempt of the ego to unburden itself on an object, even though it is the biologically correct object of the other sex. The masochist, that is, wants to unload the whole sadistic strictness of his super-ego which originally rests on the

sadistic identification with the strict mother, upon the object, and thus falls again into the part of naughty child who wants to be punished, perhaps for his (sexual) naughtiness, perhaps for distinctness, if it is a question of coprophilic tendencies. The homosexual object relation is thus positively narcissistic; it seeks the unburdening of the ego by projection on to the same sex, while one's own ego plays the part of the (good or strict) mother. The masochistic object relation is negatively narcissistic, the ego representing the naughty child, while the strict mother, that is, one's own super-ego, is sought in the object. The so-called normal heterosexual object relation represents, as it were, a compromise between these two extreme tendencies. It is less narcissistic than the homosexual relation and less invested with prohibitions and guilt-feeling than the masochistic. On the other hand, the homosexual often shows definite masochistic traits, while the heterosexual is more likely to show sadistic traits.

It seems that the object choice is determined not only by the kind and degree of the sado-masochistic disposition, but also by its later development. Before all else it depends upon whether one objectifies and seeks outside for oneself the good mother or the bad mother. This would explain also the change in the sex object that we see so frequently in pathological crises of the ego, in which the ego, in consequence of its inner conflicts, needs another object relation for their partial solution. Therapeutic re-adjustment to the normal biological sex role can be effected only if one penetrates beyond the manifest sex-symptoms to the mechanisms of the ego, which are manifesting themselves in the object relation.

From the study of such states, one gets the impression that perhaps the whole mechanism of projection and identification is determined by the sado-masochistic relation - is, so to speak, the psychical superstructure over this biological disposition. According to this view the normal process of development in the man would be the objectifying of the mother (projection) and her sadistic subjugation at the genital stage without guilt-feeling, whereas too strong an inhibition of sadism leads to guilt-feeling and masochism, in consequence of which one either seeks the strict mother as an object (masochism) or plays the part of the good mother and loves oneself in another (homosexuality). Normally, in the case of man, the desired and kind mother coincides with the strict depriving mother, whose sadistic overcoming, however, is guaranteed through her readiness

to (masochistic) surrender. In the case of the more aggressive (sadistic) man, projection (of the mother) plays the greater part, in the case of the more passive woman, identification (with the man) is the essential mechanism of her object relation. But this involves far more than the so-called envy of the penis, which in a certain sense is merely symptomatic of the whole conflict between the biological sex role and the psychological ego mechanisms.

On the other hand, masochism clearly reveals the same fact that we see in the love conflicts of the human being, that normally it is the so-called guilt-feeling which enables the woman completely to surrender to the man, i.e., to subjugate herself. The guilt-feeling thus has not only an important social function, namely, the inhibiting of our sadistic and egoistic impulses, but also an auxiliary biological function in that it makes possible adjustment to the sexual role against which the ego strives. Thus being in love (for example, with an unattainable object) is in many cases not the cause of the guilt-feeling, but an expression of it. That means that it has become possible only as a result of the guilt-feeling, which requires dependency, a subjugation to a stronger ego, for the solution of one's own ego conflicts. Here belong those object relations which one may designate as negatively being in love. In these relations the object becomes the representative of one's own guilt-feeling (the bad mother) instead of a libidinal object, (the good mother). One might say that the normal person protects himself from a regression to his own ego. But the beloved being is not only a substitute for the consoling, loving mother, but also for one's own ego or a desired part of the ego, which one will not renounce (lose).

On the other hand, especially in psychical conflicts, the higher ego elements can be placed at the service of the impulse gratification, which is rationalised by means of this mechanism. Thus, for instance, the guilt-feeling that manifests itself in cases in which the love object is abandoned is an expression of anxiety (at the separation from the mother). But the return is no longer directly (libidinally) desired, but is morally rationalised by the ego. The guilt-feeling itself is justified insofar as it is an expression of the fact that one has used the partner only as a means to an end, as an object for the solving of one's ego conflicts, a fact that puts one to shame. The guilt-feeling that first makes possible the real subjugation to love is, on the other hand, a symptom of the revival of

ego conflicts, which remain unresolved by the object relation. This relation is no longer libidinal, but is invested with anxiety or guilt; instead of being positive, it is negative; instead of gratifying it is disappointing. The social anxiety (father) also can appear as guilt feeling in the service of the libidinal tendencies. The ethical ideal, even social opinion, demand that the object be not left. "I dare not leave the other" means only "He dare not leave me", i.e., "He ought not to leave me because this would make the ego suffer". So identification with the abandoned object is added to the object or part of the renounced ego, a mechanism by means of which one commiserates oneself as the abandoned object in the other. On the other hand, one will also revenge oneself for the abandonment and as a reaction against it appears the guilt feeling, which is often expressed as compassion, one wants to save just as really one wants to be saved, i.e., to be loved. .

(Chapter: II.)

Identification and Ego Construction

"We begin to love a woman because we deposit our soul with her bit by bit. We double our own personality and the beloved who, hitherto, was indifferent, neutral, begins to wear the garments of our alterego and finally becomes our double."

Strin "Lara"

Identification and Ego Construction

We have seen how projection, the mechanism by means of which the ego endows itself of the narcissistic mother-child relation, determines later object relations, their various forms and deviations depending upon what elements in the mother-child relationship are projected and to what degree they are projected. Identification, on the other hand, is the underlying mechanism, not, like projection, of object choice, but of the construction of the ego. It leads, not to the objectifying of the mother, in the sense that one either seeks her outside oneself or oneself plays her part (toward a kind of second self, the ego) but to a further development of the strict mother within oneself, the discovery of the father as an object and finally to the establishment of the paternal super-ego ("father-identification"). This super-ego is based upon the original maternal inhibition in one's own ego. So identification must be understood genetically as a biologically founded mechanism for the re-establishment of the prenatal mother-child relation. The formation of the paternal super-ego is based upon this biologically founded mechanism of identification, which is used psychologically as a means of social adjustment.

Identification in the psychological sense of the term, is really always a secondary process; it is, so to speak, a re-identification with a part of one's ego that was originally or became, a part of the mother. In the man this appears as we have already shown, in the relation of the ego to the mother's breast and then to the hand (finger) and to the penis, which as the greatest stage again partially takes possession of the woman. In the case of the woman, this mechanism is revealed in the identification of the mother's breast with the male genitalia, together with the woman's own identification with the man (owner of the penis) in whom she finds her ideal ego. So in both cases the object is first identified with a part of the ego, becomes, so to speak, part of oneself before one can love it as oneself. Every object relation is ultimately narcissistic and maternal; and the various combinations of these two elements, the relative degrees of intensity of the one or the other determine the various forms and deviations of the human love life.

In making a closer study of identification and its various forms we must remember that this concept denotes the result of a mechanism whose origin and function we must study before we can really understand it. It manifests itself in two main forms, which we can briefly designate as love and

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hate identification, or as positive and negative identification. Probably both are always in operation, but it seems that originally this mechanism, since it is narcissistic in nature, leads to the love identification. This means not that the love identification is the result of a privation but that it is in evidence (frequently becoming even pathological) only in case of a privation. But its mechanism involves more than a simple loss of object with a consequent drawing into oneself of the libidinal cathexis; it presupposes that the object has already been loved as an original part of oneself (narcissism). Like projection, identification, both positive and negative, is bound up with the sadomasochistic impulse. The love identification is more masochistic, representing a surrender of the ego to the object, whereas the negative or hate identification is more sadistic, representing a introjection of the object into the ego. In the one case, the ego, so to speak, is displaced, as in being in love; in the other case the object is displaced, pushed out of the way. But both rest upon the narcissistic relation (projection) to the object; in the positive identification one seeks and finds in the object admired (or idealized) ego, in the negative identification, the hated and despised part of the ego. The affections and the condition of being in love are built up on the first; the emotions of hate arising from the sadistic and egoistic impulses are built up on the second.

Both these forms of identification are again bound up with the attitude of the infantile ego toward the good and the bad mother. This explains how in relation to the same object, one form of identification can be replaced by the other form, the object representing first a part of the ego that is still loved and later the same part of the ego overcome, renounced, and hence hated. Positive identification is bound up with dependence on the object, indeed is the basis of the so-called love fixation; negative identification aims at the annihilation of the object, to the end that one may be free from the part of the ego represented by the object.

This may throw light on the fact that every love is bound to change, grow cold, be extinguished, since from the beginning it aims at the overcoming, the discarding of the part of the ego deposited in the object. Being in love is, so to speak, the symptom of an ego alteration, the overcoming of a phase of the ego development in the object. At the same time the object relation, through its tendency to conserve the ego phase deposited in it, is an obstacle to

the dissolving of this ego phase. Conflicts first arise when this ego phase is destroyed, so that the object is no longer loved, but is felt as a hindrance to the overcoming of the ego phase. This will, objects are auxiliaries to the development of the ego they can very easily become hindrances to that development. The statement so often made that an object relation furthers the development of the ego is only partially justified, and our belief in it is again only an expression of the projection tendencies which the object relations themselves have brought about.

The matter is still further complicated by the fact that in every human relation, especially in the love relation, a twofold identification takes place, with all the possibilities that we have described. This results in a fixation of the ego on the object from love or admiration, and a fixation from hate or revenge and jealousy. In also the projection on to an object may be a projection either of the admired and loved part, or of the hated and despised part, of the ego. The first is founded on adoration and is masochistic; the second is founded on competition and is sadistic. In the case of the woman at the sexual stage, it is bound up with envy of the penis, in the man with fear of castration by the father. Negative identification is thus an expression of competition based on a comparison. In this competition the woman wants to excel the man, the son to excel the father, instead of allowing the ego to play its own part or to project its own ego ideal into the object and to identify itself with this. In the masochistic identification in love, one wants to be excelled in order to admire the other and to be able to love oneself in him.

Here we see how negative identification passes from the bad mother to the image of the bad father and from that to the super-ego. When Freud says that the super-ego is constructed from identification with the inhibiting father, he is merely describing a result in terms of the libido theory. The mechanism of this result is intelligible only from the standpoint of the ego psychology. If identification is in its nature a libidinal, that is, a narcissistic, process, then the formation of the super-ego is in its nature an anxiety process, that is, is negatively narcissistic. Anxiety, as we know, does not arise from outside sources; it is a product of our own ego development and is only projected on to the father. Genetically speaking, the construction of the super-ego from identification is as follows. We have, first, a love identification with the mother (breast) as a

narcissistically level part of the ego. The imposing of the first maternal privation, to which the inner inhibitions correspond, results in a (sadistic) hate identification with the privating mother as a part of one's ego, which must be given up. On this latter, in the case of the boy, is constructed hatred of the father and the fear of castration, which Freud described as the formation of the super-ego based on the father identification. But this mechanism is in the last analysis narcissistic, for even the paternal super-ego invested with anxiety represents only an exaggerated objectifying of the inner maternal inhibitions. And so Freud, in the mechanism of "identification" with the strict father is really describing only a secondary psychological process of the ego in terms of the libido theory.

If to love means to feel someone as part of one's own ego, as the mother was originally, then the first step toward the love relation is what might be designated as positive identification with this objectified part of one's own ego. But negative identification which has been described in terms of the analytic psychology as "introjection" and which finally leads to the formation of the super-ego, is likewise narcissistic although in a negative sense. The ego becomes narcissistic, in the real meaning of the word, first perhaps, through the admiration and pampering of the mother, from which pampering, indeed one may say out of love for the mother, the child learns to love itself. The ego formation proper follows, first with the gradual renunciation of the mother as an object of narcissistic libido gratification. As to the relation of the biological phases of development to the ego formation, one might say that they follow it "traumatically". But normally this traumatic effect of the ego's growth is nullified through the fact that the ego compensates itself narcissistically for the loss of gratification by the object. But if the mother is renounced not only as a result of biological growth, but also because of anxiety, there follows what might be called a negative ego development, which is expressed in the form of guilt, inferiority, and all the neurotic inhibitions and disturbances of the narcissistic libido gratification and the positive ego development. In this case the ego is not enriched through the loss of the object by providing for itself narcissistic gratification in its own further development, but it develops the inhibiting forces of the super-ego, which prevent a narcissistic self-enrichment.

To take the Oedipus situation as an example, we find in it various possibilities of and tendencies to

identification, the nature and further development of which are determined and influenced by the pre-Oedipoean situation. The best known process is the identification of the son with the father, in order to win the mother. This identification is a negative one, since it presupposes the removal of the father, in whose place the son wishes to step. If fear of the mother or of the father or of both prevents his doing this, then he may keep the mother in a regressive sense, in that he remains the son and so preserves the infantile attitude toward the mother. If he regresses still further, he may again identify himself with the mother in order not to lose her, and this can happen in two different ways, by means either of the positive or of the negative identification. Probably all these mechanisms work together in the Oedipus situation, as also in earlier or later object relations. They finally lead to some kind of an outlet, which we characterize according to its nature as normal adjustment, neurotic inhibition, or antisocial tendency.

A further complication is added in that pre-Oedipoean influences come into play in the Oedipus situation and even after it has been passed. Thus, for example, the boy's relation to his father does not fall into the same category as his relation to his brothers. At the very least, as psychoanalysis assumes, the two may be considered as a historical succession - first the relation to the father, next the relation to the brother. Experience, however, teaches that the original relation to the brothers in the pre-Oedipoean situation may lead later on to a super-ego, or ideal formation, which is not only independent of the paternal, but often directly contradictory to it. In cases of strong opposition between these two tendencies, we get the image of a split personality, at the base of which lie two different super-ego formations.

If certain extreme forms of ego projection, extreme either in quantity or quality (kind of object) lead, as we have seen to be the case, to biological sex maladjustments, to the so-called perversions, then in the mechanisms of identification that normally lead to the structure of the ego, we must recognize certain factors the faulty development of which we have designated as psycho-neuroses. They develop during the process that in normal cases leads from libidinal identification with the mother (breast) as a part of one's own ego to the construction of the maternal inhibitions and the paternal social ego. A disturbance in the foundation, that is,

in the mother inhibitions that rest on the libidinal identification will, in accordance with their primitive character, lead to those disturbances which Freud has described as narcissistic, neurasthenia, hypochondria, melancholia. A disturbance in the social superstructure of the father ego will lead to the various forms of anxiety-neurosis; while the compulsion neuroses and the psycho-neuroses proper, lie between the two. We find that the first mentioned group of disturbances, according to their narcissistic character, correspond rather to a "negative" of the perversions, just as the second group corresponds rather to a "negative" of the social. And indeed the first group of disturbances, including the compulsion neurosis, bears more clearly the character of self-tortures and self-punishments which correspond to the primitive maternal code. The suffering they involve betrays the wish to be again lovingly tended by the mother, for whom the patient wants to substitute the doctor. On the other hand he transfers to the doctor also his hatred against the evil mother, who has left him and whom he can replace neither in the ego nor in the object. Only in masochism, which, as I have remarked in an earlier chapter*, lies between perversion and neurosis, the self-torturing tendency of the primal mother identification finds gratification in the object. This unburdens the ego of the self-destructive tendency, which in the narcissistic neuroses ranges against one's own ego.

As for the group of anxiety disturbances, this, as is well known, was the starting point of Freud's therapeutic endeavours and theoretical investigations. Having already stated my view of the anxiety problem, I shall here concern myself only with the pathological mechanism of the anxiety-defence. The statement that the libido has continually to be summoned as a protection against anxiety and to cover up anxiety is to be understood only genetically, in connection with the development of the ego and of the super-ego in their relation to libido and anxiety. The nucleus of the ego, the primal ego, is without doubt absolutely narcissistic. It preserves, however, a certain flexibility which makes possible its later object relations through so-called secondary narcissism. This secondary narcissism is a sediment of the primary narcissistic identification with the mother as part of the ego. The nucleus of the primal super-ego is anxiety, which later on is moulded into the guilt-feeling and the so-called higher ethical and esthetic inhibitions which we know as shame, etc. In this sense one could represent the relation between the ego and the Id, described by Freud as the relation between libido and anxiety. Thus the super-ego is a mixture of both, with a preponderance of the inhibiting

*Perversions and Neuroses.

factors. We must not overlook the fact that the human being narcissistically values these inhibiting factors as an ethical possession. But the super-ego is not only a product of the anxiety used up in the ego, but also has the function of permanently binding all newly arising anxiety insofar as this cannot be covered up by libidic gratification. In accordance with my concept of the birth trauma, the concept, that is, that the anxiety experienced during birth prevents regression to the narcissistic primal condition, the super-ego later on is also bound to work against regression. But it works in various finely shaded forms and standards, which it treasures as ethical and esthetic qualities. The neurotic, on the other hand, has not completely developed this super-ego and hence reacts on both trivial and important occasions, whether they are the result of outside circumstances (traumata) or of influences from within (impulse claims) with the old primitive anxiety, which produces the symptoms and equivalents well known to us.

Anxiety was regarded as the nucleus of all neurotic symptoms, in the original Freudian concept of the anxiety neurosis and anxiety equivalents. There are to be found all the phenomena, from the physical (disturbances of heart action, respiration, digestion, vasomotor system, etc.) to the hysterics and phobias, the compulsion neuroses, and even to psychotic symptoms. But Freud, from his therapeutic experiences, has drawn the false conclusion that the anxiety symptoms are the result of ungratified (repressed) libido, whereas they now prove to be the result of various forms of unsuccessfully mastered anxiety. In other words, these symptoms represent unsuccessful attempts of the ego at various stages of its development, to defend itself against anxiety. The normal ego construction allows of variously graduated reactions. Thus, besides anxiety there are also shame, conscience, intellectual criticism, a sense of reality, etc. If these defense mechanisms, which are also derivations of anxiety, prove to be insufficient as a protection against too strong a development of anxiety, then symptoms appear instead of the corresponding construction of the ego. Instead of shame, we have the phobia of blushing (erythrophobia); instead of esthetic feelings, disgust or vomiting; instead of moral inhibitions, guilt-feeling; instead of conscience, anxiety. Thus the symptom corresponds to a hypertrophic ego construction. That is, the defence against anxiety is attempted in an exaggerated way, at an incomplete stage of the ego development. The result is an anxiety reaction instead of a reaction of the super-ego.

The anxiety neurosis seems the most primitive form of reaction to an external trauma, corresponding to the primal trauma of birth or to an inner conflict, which is displaced outside as an anxiety state. The phobia, as Freud has stated, is a secondary defence whose object is to prevent the development of anxiety in general. The compulsion corresponds to a tertiary defence, in that it tries to break through the phobic inhibition by means of the compulsive impulse. Hence the active narcissistic character of the compulsion, which tries to overcome anxiety by a forceful return to the mother, that is, through narcissistic gratification, which is, however, inhibited by the hypertrophied super-ego. The various forms and mechanisms of the psychoses show these attempts at defence against anxiety in an extreme degree. They either project the whole conflict outside or displace it completely within the ego. These two extreme forms of defence against anxiety lead, according to the clinical picture, to paranoia and to schizophrenia, respectively. In the case of the first, the entire anxiety is thrown outside the ego; that is, it is motivated through an external object, the pursuer. The impoverishment of the ego (ego construction) resulting from this projection is compensated for by megalomania, which is a narcissistic ego enlargement. The paranoic in his megalomania, loves himself as once the mother loved him. Nevertheless, he cannot compensate for the loss of the mother in his ego because at the same time he is compelled to project on to his pursuer his hatred against her. In schizophrenia, in contrast to this, the identification with the lost object that should overcome anxiety is pushed too far. One's own ego, incapable of this, must be replaced by the strange (mother) ego. The schizophrenic plays the part of mother and child in one person. The paranoic plays the part of child pursued by the mother and hallucinates her threatening, scolding voice. In both cases we see clearly that the narcissistic cathexis of the ego (mother identification) serves the purpose of a defence against anxiety, that is, that narcissistic self-love also can be used to disguise anxiety.

In all these pathological reactions, but especially in the psychotic, the original role of the object becomes clear as part of the beloved ego and as a means for further ego development or ego unburdening. The neurotic in general clings too much to the object, seeks an extreme of ego unburdening in the real object (mother) and hence lets out all affects on to the object. This means that he is afraid of the object and fears for it, that is, he wants to be loved and so tries to cover up anxiety. The psychotic, on the other hand,

goes too far in the other direction in that he wants to solve even the object conflict in himself, whereas the neurotic tries to solve the ego conflict in the object. This difference between neurosis and psychosis is only one of degree, as in general the boundary line between these states cannot be sharply defined. The final status is determined through the coming into force or preponderance of mechanisms which are permanently effective. The normal person has the same ego conflicts as the neurotic; only in the psychosis do these conflicts appear undisguised. On the other hand, the psychotic does not lose the object relation, but keeps it, although in a negative sense. The disturbance of the relation to reality is only relative, for even the neurotic does "mad things", not only in thought, but in deed (compulsive actions). The essential difference seems to be in the relation to the love object (the person standing nearest to one).

I say "seems", for ultimately everything is done for the ego, in the ego's interest. All object conflicts are ultimately ego conflicts, everything is projection or introjection, starting from the primal situation, the relation between mother and child. Besides the anxiety moulded into the ego, the object also is a protection against regression, whether it is because one is loved and so saves narcissistic ego expenditure or covers up anxiety, or whether it is because one projects anxiety on to the object and so unburdens inner inhibitions. Both go back to the mother in her primal role of narcissistically gratifying the ego or as inhibiting, feared object of the outer world. Subjectively anxiety and its higher defence mechanisms in the super-ego prevent regression; objectively, it is the bond with the object, the mother. Paradoxically, one might say that the normal person protects himself through object love from regression to the ego, which in the exceptional state of love comes to expression in an irresistible desire for the object.

Chapter III.

Denial and Affirmation to Reality

" 'That I have done', says my memory, 'That have I not done', says my pride and remains inexorable, -- memory yields."

Nietzsche

Denial and Adaptation to Reality

In studying the earliest beginnings of the psychological development of the ego in the deprivation of the maternal breast to which it is subjected, attention has already been drawn to the mechanism of denial which appears to play the major role in the adaptation to reality. If narcissistic identification leads to the building up of the ego, and if projectional ego-unburdening leads to the finding of the ego in the object, so the mechanism of denial determines the relationship of the ego not only to other egos but to the external world in general. The original gratification yielded by the maternal breast is not as a rule remembered by the adult; it is forgotten; it is not "repressed", however, but rather replaced - replaced by far more satisfying sources of pleasure, such as sexuality (inter alia).

In the beginning the child finds in masturbation a substitute satisfaction for the deprivation of the mother's breast; in other words, it finds this substitute satisfaction in its own ego; hence independently of the object (the mother), which therewith ceases to be a part of the ego. No "repression" is involved in this process, but rather the libido-energy is displaced along the pathway previously described in connection with the genesis of genitality and also finds a more or less complete substitute gratification. The concept of repression is too purely descriptive and too static, in that it has nothing to say about the process but is a statement only of the result, which itself is not altogether clear. Repression presupposes that something - that which is repressed - continues somewhere to exist - that is, in the "unconscious". One may quite well leave this mystical localisation out of account, for that which continues to exist is the impulse itself, which later on is expressed in various guises, at varying stages, and in varying degrees. It is more or less inhibited - which is not the same thing as repressed; more or less "sublimated"; more or less "displaced". This displacement is possible, however, only on the basis of denial, which was originally the psychological accompaniment of the real privation (the loss of the mother's breast). The ego, by virtue of saying to itself, the breast no longer exists, is able to set in motion and to carry through the processes which we term "displacement" and which has to do with the achieving of a substitute.

We have sought to show, then, how the denial of

an object as a virtual part of the ego gives rise to a substitute therefore in the subject's own body, and how this mechanism is illustrated by the nipple, finger, hand and genitals. Denial is therefore just as much an ego mechanism as are projection and identification, but it possesses still closer relationships to reality and it is accordingly of great decisiveness for adaptation to reality. Denial emphasizes anew the independence of the ego from the object whenever a renunciation - or, psychologically, expressed, a disappointment - overtakes the ego, but it likewise emphasizes the pronounced dependence of the ego upon the object, as we saw to be in a positive sense the case in the mechanism of projection and identification. This dependence originally takes its root from the situation of biological helplessness, but later is become psychologically fixated and magnified by means of the narcissistic cathexis of the objects which are in the last analysis ego-creations. It is this very independence which denial emphasizes by proclaiming, so to speak: I do not need the object, for it is nothing else, indeed, than a part of my own ego. The original denial of the mother as a pleasure-yielding object makes the return to this object at a later stage both difficult and complicated and conditions an ambivalent attitude thereto in every case.

Whereas denial, therefore, relates from the very beginning to a portion of reality, repression in the Freudian sense is, so to speak, the psychological antithesis thereto, in that the latter relates to a purely internal process. But what Freud described as repression is only a later and specialized instance of the more universal mechanism of denial, which is from the very beginning the concomitant of the reactions of the ego to the external world and which defines its relation not only to the latter but to the subject's own impulses. In this sense one might say that repression is the denial of instinct - parallel to the more primitive process of denial of the object. While repression effects a change in the ego and in consequence of this an altered reaction to the external world, denial aims radical alteration of the outer world, and the intensity of the denial is in the upshot decisive for mental health or illness. Repression thus creates what we call character, but that is something which is static; the denial tendency determines our sections, often inconsistent with and often directly opposed to our character, even to the extreme of psychotic phenomena non-assimilated by the ego. In this matter it is not at all a question of a so-called release of repressions (an irruption of the unconscious), nor simply

of a regressive return to the more primitive mechanism of denial which is always operative and which was operative at a time when there was as yet no such thing as repression and which always manifests itself where there can be no repression because the question is one of a relation to the external world. Thus it is only the mechanism of denial, as I pointed out many years ago, which is capable of establishing a true psychology of the ego and of furnishing the explanation of its aberrations, particularly as encountered in the psychoses. *

* It is only recently that Laforgue employed this conception in the elucidation of certain manifestations of schizophrenia; see his article Verdrängung und Skotomisation (Internat. Ztschr. f. Psy., XII, 1926); and also Ueber Skotomisation in der Schizophrenie (ibid.) Freud also, in one of his most recent works, was compelled after the appearance of my Trauma der Geburt, to acknowledge the cogency of this concept of denial in addition to that of repression. (See Studien zur Psychoanalyse der Neurosen, p. 189 to the end.) In Hemmung, Symptom und Angst he attempted (in the section Verdrängung und Abwehr, p. 121), to define the concept of denial. Very recently Ferenczi, developing Freud's speculative treatment of "denial" (ibid. p. 199) attempted to solve Das Problem der Unlustbejahung in a biological sense by illustrating it with the reactions of the nursing. The actual psychological problem of denial, which has until now been neglected because the investigation of its relation to "repression" has been avoided, I have attempted above to deal with.

Denial therefore emanates from the ego, repression from the super-ego. The common factor in both is renunciation, which is external in the former, internal in the latter. Denial is actuated by libidinous motives, by the desire to avert Unlust, while repression has until now remained unexplained in Freud's theory of the libido. If one explains it, however, as the effect of anxiety, as Freud now does on the basis of his new theory of anxiety, (Hemmung, Symptom und Angst, p. 22 seq.), it ceases to be "repression" and becomes inhibition of impulse (through anxiety). The concept of denial leaves no room for doubting

that an ego-mechanism is thereby concerned, for "I deny something", whereas one would say "it represses". Denial bears an outspoken relationship to the object, and is traceable, like every object-relation, back to the mother, whom one cannot deny, however, because she was herself originally taken as a part of one's own ego. Repression, on the other hand, is more definitely connected with the father-relation, especially in its relationship to anxiety. Again it is apparent that the entire Freudian psychology is erected on the foundation of the relation to the father and leaves out of account all the reactions and mechanisms which are involved in the earlier relation to the mother. Repression in the strict sense of the word can therefore theoretically come about only after the construction of the super-ego; the conception loses all significance if anxiety is taken to be the cause of repression, for this has no purport other than the individual is afraid to do something (or think something) - which fails to explain what happens to this something. Denial is thus not only the primitive initial stage but also the very mechanism itself of that which Freud has described as repression, just as the maternal inhibitions in the ego constitute not only the preliminary stage but also the nucleus of the super-ego.

The point at which we can actually speak of repression is the situation in the description of which Freud has for the first time employed the term Repression; namely, in the repression from consciousness of a painful idea. But this, as already mentioned at the beginning, is only a repetition of the original mechanism of denial upon a higher intellectual level, where indeed it is a matter of recollection rather than of something actually experienced. Denial is successful only when the ego, simultaneously with the acceptance of the fact that the pleasure-yielding object no longer exists, is also able to say: It never has existed; whereby it often enough says as well: It will never again exist. If, however, there occurs the memory that the pleasure-giving object did once exist, as is inevitable if the substitute is compared with the original, the memory itself as a purely psychological process will be denied, and this process one may correctly term repression, in contrast to the way in which it was originally used. This explains also why all memories which appear in analysis bring about a change unless we achieve another kind of reproduction which puts an end to the original denial and brings the patient to the recognition of a psychological reality, instead of placing the emphasis upon the accurate recall of the

situation actually experienced. The therapeutically effective revelation of the denial tendency is possible only through the medium of the technique of setting a termination to the analysis. Thus recollection in the analysis is to be conceived in particular as a resistance against insight into the denial; that is, the patient reproduces on a higher intellectual level instead of on a purely emotional one. In this sense the fact that denial has occurred in a given situation is often more important than the content of the corresponding memory of the situation, which one can about as easily elicit by questioning as "resistances" analytically. Repression is therefore to be conceived only as the symptom of a more deeply lying denial, to penetrate into the mechanism of which is of greater importance therapeutically than to await the content of the repressed memory.

Before we illustrate the action of the mechanism of denial in the life of the child with typical examples of our own, I should like first to try to make clear what happens in denial and what the reaction of the ego to it is, or in other words what manifests itself as the result of denial.

In the first place, denial consists in the rupturing of a nexus of cause and effect, such as Schopenhauer acutely recognized in the passage discovered by me regarding the causation of insanity.

The ego in denying the existence of the unattainable, for the purpose of consoling itself for the loss thereof, seeks and finds not only a substitute for this loss in its own ego but must also hold itself responsible for the inevitable pain of the loss. The result of denial is thus to bring consolation in that the pleasure can be attained independent of the object but this of necessity brings with it at the same time the recognition of the ego itself as a source of pain. The secondary settlement of this undesired and painful result is compounded by the projection of this inward pain upon the object in the form of hatred, but this does not banish the pain, for to hate is in itself productive of pain. The eating of the formerly loved object is and remains painful. The hatred, however, does not cause the pain, but is in fact an attempt to free oneself of the inner pain.

In addition to this projection of pain upon the object which emerges in the form of hatred, there is still another species of defense against it which plays an important part, moreover, in relation to the mechanism of denial; namely, the tendency to justification. We observe

so frequently that mental pain which arises as a by-product of denial is not projected upon the hated object, but is vindicated within the ego itself, in that an organic pain, that is a disease, is produced. This rather typical process is nothing but a continuation of the mechanism of denial; it is not the object which causes me pain, nor do I cause myself pain in that I deny the object, but the disease is the cause of my pain. We can and must demonstrate to the patient in each instance, however, that it is after all his own ego which is the cause of the organic pain. The reverse of this picture we find in the well known phenomenon that in the cases where physical injuries occur as the result of a shock (as for example in the war neuroses), the formation of psychological symptoms is at a minimum.

The mechanism of justification which we have just mentioned leads us directly to a description of the phenomena which follow in the train of denial. One might indeed describe this mechanism as the antithesis, or at least, as the positive counterpart, of denial. The ego cannot, that is, be satisfied with denial because the latter is never successful (just as is true of repression, which is but a temporary and momentary process and is successful only so long as it is active but unsuccessful when no longer active). We have already intimated the reason for this by pointing out that simultaneously with its purpose, which is the elimination of the objective source of pleasure, the undesired painful affect arises. The ego then strives to justify the denial, that is, to demonstrate that what it has done was well done. Often enough this attempt miscarries, however, and we then see how a whole life may be constructed on the principle of demonstrating, in a kind of secondary denial, that this attempt at justification was successful. The painful component in this frequently becomes manifest as a masochistic self-abasement. This is the antithesis to the projection of hatred upon the object; since the ego thereby demonstrates, not that it has done well and the object was bad, but that the object was innocent and it is the ego which is bad. With this conclusion, which comes nearest to the actual psychological truth and on this very account is so hard to correct, the process of denial comes to a standstill which we designate as neurotic.

A third and perhaps the healthiest reaction of the ego to denial is the narcissistic investment of fortifying of the ego. According to our experience there can be no doubt whatever that the mechanism of denial is most strongly marked in those individuals who from the very beginning have a

particularly narcissistic predisposition, whatever this predisposition may consist in. On the other hand, there can be no doubt in the light of my experience that the permanent use of the denial mechanism may strengthen the narcissism in the same way, as in the instance, just cited of the failure of the mechanism of justification, this use may weaken it, that is, may lead to feelings of inferiority and guilt, to masochistic or organic disorder. Why the mechanism of denial is especially strongly marked in narcissistic persons is explicable by the fact that their ego is so strong that it cannot admit its dependence upon the object, still less that the object is capable of causing it pain. Such persons would rather inflict pain upon themselves than admit that anybody else is able to do so. The secondary narcissism in these individuals arises, as I believe, as a condensation product of denials which their primary narcissism commands in order to prove their independence and their strength. Insofar as the denial is successful, it naturally strengthens the ego and its narcissism, while on the other hand the narcissism thus reinforced then acts as a more powerful mechanism of defense. But the more narcissistic the ego is or becomes, the less it endures any form of dependence and the less able it is, likewise, to endure the consequences of denial, while the ego itself is even more insistently, through its narcissism, driven to denial. Perhaps this point of view furnishes the possibility of understanding the relation of (primary) narcissism to the self-regarding impulse. The mechanism of denial is in the last analysis, that is, a protective mechanism which functions in the service of self-regard, if you like. Occasionally this goes too far by trying to deny the object, even where the latter subserves self-regard. Roughly speaking one might say that the self-regarding impulse becomes narcissism itself by making use for its own ends of the mechanism of denial. That is, a protective mechanism originally intended to prevent pain is employed for the obtaining of pleasure on the part of one's own ego - a transformation which manifests itself as narcissism.

Perhaps the most important psychological consequence of the denial of reality is the reaction of the ego which we term behavior and which, after all, decrees our fate. I might call this the positive aspect of the mechanism of denial, which does not merely say: it does not exist, or never has existed, but in the search for a substitute must finally acknowledge: it does exist and differently from what I expected, at that, and better! This does not only explain idealization, such as we find for example, in the state of

being in love, wherein we unconsciously place a higher value upon the present object than upon all previous ones. It explains likewise the mysterious mechanism of hallucination, which Freud has most properly linked with the regressive re-investment of the libidinal system, but without recognizing the mechanism of denial which underlies it. The normal manner, however, in which the mechanism of denial influences our behavior, such as follows a middle course between overvaluation of reality (idealization) and undervaluation (hallucination), seems to me to be the following. The primary mechanism of denial exhibited upon giving up the mother's breast shows that the portion of reality thus denied is found again in more real form in the subject's own body. This makes it reasonable to suppose that later on the portion of reality which has been denied also becomes absorbed into the ego - a process which has been described as identification (or introjection), but which we have understood as the result of ego-projection. It is difficult to follow the process at the primitive level. But at the higher levels of denial we see quite definitely the same process going on and can therefore perhaps construct a view in retrospect of the earlier stages. In the conscious repression of the memory of an experience, this experience itself (or part of it) is regularly preserved as, so to speak, a "secret". This secret then forms an isolated portion of the personality, yet influences inevitably not only the thoughts but also the actions of the individual. This secret is the psychological counterpart of that which I would consider as the preservation in the ego of the traumatic experience which led to denial. This secret has, moreover, a very direct relationship to denial for under normal circumstances it is scarcely possible to bring the ego to an acknowledgement of this secret, which, when the individual himself is taxed with it, is generally denied in the most emphatic manner possible. I have already demonstrated this situation with reference to infantile masturbation*, and may now say that it is typically encountered in all situations which are the result of the denial. That masturbation is one of these is sufficiently intelligible from previous considerations, for it is originally a substitute in the subject's own ego for the denied mother. In the light of this conception one may say that all our behavior, certainly at any rate all our affectively significant behavior, is of the character not of actions but of reactions - is to be interpreted dynamically, that is, and not as "repetitions" of a scheme acquired in childhood,

* Sexualität und Schuldgefühl, 1911, pp. et. seq.

not even in fact as a biological urge to repetition.

All this can be better set forth by means of illustrative material, and accordingly I turn to the portrayal of a few typical reactions on the part of the child. In the purely biological traumata suffered by the child, such as those of birth and of weaning, we now recognize in the denial necessitated thereby the very moment which can render the trauma pathogenic in its after-effects. Therefore it is not the biological developmental episode nor the objective experience which has a traumatic effect, but rather the reaction thereto on the part of the ego which may carry such a traumatic effect in its train. This traumatic effect does not, however, as we have already mentioned, make itself immediately manifest; and this not because the effect itself is only a result of the constant denial, the deleterious influence of which always exerts its pathogenic effect only subsequently. A further infantile trauma, which is responded to typically with denial, is the arrival of a brother or sister and the typical reaction of the child thereto, the thought that the stork ought to take it away again or that it ought to die - wishes which are but an external indication that the very existence of the newcomer is denied. Here likewise is exemplified that which we have previously thought of as absorption of the denied reality into the ego. For it is often to be observed that the child identifies itself with the denied brother or sister, putting itself in the latter's place. Such an "identification" is not accomplished and adhered to once and for all, however; on the contrary, the original denial is continued into later life in such a way that it comes to light again in particular in decisive situations (rivalry, jealousy). The so-called "death-wishes" against siblings (or parents) are thus the most obvious expression of the denial; they ought not to exist (they ought not to be, as Freud says). Without taking the denial mechanism into account, it is also impossible, in my view of it, to understand those reactions of the child regarding the recognition of the difference between sexes which Freud has described as the "castration complex". The boy denies the female genitals because they are foreign to the ego; the girl tries to deny the male genitals and thus attains the penis-wish, that is, reabsorbs the portion of denied reality into the ego. Likewise the boy does the same, since (expressed in Freud's terminology) he does not accept the mother (that is, the female genitals) as "castrated" but instead of this identifies himself with the mother, that is, he castrates himself. Again, it is not the fact of the perception of the

anatomical difference between the child which is pathogenic in its affects, but the reaction of the ego, which attempts to deny this biological difference because it is foreign to the ego - just as it attempts to deny birth or weaning because these are disturbing to the ego (i.e. painful). There is in truth no reason why the fact of the biological difference between the sexes should in itself act as a trauma, while other biological traumata, such as birth and weaning, should not act in this way. The explanation lies in this, that it is not the biological facts themselves but rather the circumstance that the ego cannot really accept them, but is compelled to react to them with denial.

These infantile denials appear as necessary reactions in the service of self-regard, self-assertion and self-development, especially insofar as stages of development are involved which are attempted to slough off first by means of denial, before one can adapt oneself to them. In the constant denial of this, however, one only grapples them to oneself, and this creates the appearance of fixation or regression. So that there comes about that secondary denial within the subject's own ego, already mentioned, which we call repression. For after all, realities can only be denied; they cannot be blotted out. On the other hand, they can only be accepted or respected if they are brought into a positive relation to the ego, and thus considered as a part of the ego. But little as it is possible to deny reality away, just as little can the memory thereof be successfully repressed. Both processes lead to reaction formation and to substitute formation both in the subject's own ego and in the external world. The mechanism of denial, which is connected directly with the relation to the mother, leads to substitute formation in the subject's own body and furthermore to alteration of the external world, that is, principally to the creation of libido objects which shall act as surrogates for the mother and shall preserve the ego from denial. Repression is a later mechanism in the paternal super-ego and leads in its up-shot to psychological substitute formation in the ego, perhaps - if one recalls the analytic study of the compulsion neurosis - to thinking as such, which is certainly a dynamic process, therefore manifests itself as reaction. Herein may appear the positive feature which I have previously mentioned as performed in the denial mechanism. Complete denial asserts; it does not exist in this way (such that I cannot have it), but it exists in some other way, better, and independent of my ego.

This creative aspect of denial, as the pathological

extreme of which I previously cited hallucination, finds its normal expression in the life of phantasy, which flourishes so luxuriantly in the child's mind. The child continuously comes ever and again into contact with new portions of reality which it constantly attempts to deny and which it must therefore equally constantly compensate in that dynamic form of thinking which we call phantasy. It would be an alluring task to consider the typical human fantasies in their quality of the products of denial, and for many years

I have had the intention - following up a hint of Freud's - of pointing this out by means of examples of the most magnificent human phantasies formation which we possess, namely those of the Romantic epics. Here it must suffice, however, to refer to the fact that it is not only the typical phantasies of adolescence, such as for example the so-called "family romance" (which I have treated in the Myth of the Birth of the Hero), which are definitely the products of denial (denial of the parents, that is, denial of the subject's own origin). All the so-called infantile theories of the origin of children, the difference between the sexes, the meaning of the conception of death, etc., are, as I have just pointed out, the result of the denial of actualities which the ego is unwilling to accept. More than this, I believe that the entire "wish-fulfillment theory", so-called, which signifies nothing else but "phantasy", is to be explained dynamically on the basis of a denial of unwished for actualities and its compensation by substitute satisfaction. Those dreams which arise out of bodily stimuli and those which attempt to make denial through hallucinatory wish-fulfillment show this definitely. Now I have also found the same mechanism in operation in relation to the most complicated dreams of the neurotic type, by comparing these dreams with the simultaneous phantasies, identical in content, which the patient indulged. In this way an astonishing insight was obtained into the relation between dream and phantasy, which I shall speak of elsewhere as the occasion presents itself.

From the comparative study of these phenomena as well as of the previously mentioned speculations of the compulsive neurotic, which occupy a middle position between phantasy and logical thinking, one arrives at the conclusion that even thought itself and the thinking processes are not merely a psychological substitute for actualities, but in a dynamic sense grow out of the denial of these actualities and must so be understood. If one approaches from this point of view the phantasy productions and thought productions of the psychoses, they become much more intelligible than if one

holds to their typical content, which indeed is identical with the content of our emotional life. The paranoid denial, as Freud has already noted, the character of his affective relationship ("I do not love, I hate"); the ambisexual denial all affectivity, that is, he says instead: "The object (or the whole of reality), which disappoints me painfully, does not exist, my feelings (with regard to it) do not exist. This is the most radical form of denial, which leads, however, to destruction, because the patient employs the original mechanism of denial of realities in the intrapsychic sphere of his emotional life, where normally the milder process of repression holds sway. This radical process has moreover the corresponding effect of involving the entire sphere of the emotions, so that no disappointment can touch it further. I have just now described the mechanism underlying the paranoid's denial of affect as a reaction which projects the subject's pain of disappointment in the form of hatred for the object. Narcissistic ego-involvement as a consequence of the denial mechanism is likewise definitely in point with reference to delusions of grandeur. The prototype of the persecutor of the paranoid is therefore not the homosexual object (the father), as Freud has it, but the subject's own ego, which after all is once again identified with the first object to be denied, the mother.

While the reactions of the paranoid and the schizophrenic type are represented as the unalterable results of the denial mechanism expressed in its extreme form, there is a widely distributed disturbance of the affective life which permits an insight into the changing dynamics of the denial mechanism and which has been correctly described as a phenomenon standing on the border-line between the neuroses and the psychoses. It is the reaction of the so-called manic-depressive type, at the basis of which figures in an essential way the mechanism of denial, while its outward manifestations range from daily moods to the outspoken psychotic picture of melancholia. The manner in which the denial mechanism is expressed in the manic-depressive picture is as follows: we deal in this case pre-eminently with outspokenly egotistic types such as react with denial of the actual source of pain to even slight unpleasantness (Unlust) or disappointment. Their strongly narcissistic character compels them thereupon to make use of this denial with regard to internal unpleasantness (pain), instead of reacting with the milder defense reaction of repression. These types have as a rule an extraordinarily good memory; in other words, they

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remember all painful experiences instead of repressing the memory of them. On this account they deny the painful affect which these experiences have created, and project this affect as hatred upon the object. Still a third effect of the denial mechanism, and one characteristic of this particular disorder, is that the denial comes to no definite termination, as in psychotics, nor yet is it employed, as in normal individuals, as a constant protective against painful stimuli. What is here characteristic is, rather, that the denial is continued internally, without there being an attempt at "justification" made. Thus there is a perpetual interplay between denial and denial of denial. This process of denial internally carried on explains also why this type reacts without any or without adequate external cause as though it were a question of a severe traumatic influence from without. Hence one can often help these patients, by actually supplying them with this external trauma, and that in a harmless or therapeutically effective form, while they themselves often attempt the same thing instinctively in a destructive manner. These are the individuals who in the manic state must continually engage in activity - in other words, they wish to alter the environment - in order to accommodate it to their ego. These are also individuals who often achieve tremendous success, which they themselves, however, later destroy, that is, have to deny. In the depressive phase, on the other hand, they are absolutely incapable of any action, they cannot do the slightest thing - in other words, they inwardly deny that part of their ego, of their personality, which is active in the manic phase. The splitting of the personality which here becomes manifest is the result of a denial which is displaced from reality upon the ego. This internalization of the entire process of denial with all its sequelae is presented very crudely, in the picture of melancholia, which Freud has already explained as an ego-disturbance, since it was not intelligible in the light of the libido theory. In the melancholy stage of depression, then, it is not only denial which is turned within but also the hatred which normally serves as a defense against pain; and thus we obtain the picture of the self-hating, self-accusatory, self-denying melancholiac.

If these reactions are to be fully understood, it is necessary to examine the sadistic components in these individuals in addition to the egotistic predisposition which they have. The question broached earlier, as to whether projection (ego-unburdening) does not depend in nature and degree upon the fate of the original sadistic impulses,

attains a new significance, practical and clinical, in relation to the manic-depressive type. For this type, with its strong tendency to denial, is not only basically egotistic but also at bottom strongly sadistic - two characteristics which perhaps go hand in hand. Egotism (or the later narcissism) compels the ego to strong denial of all unpleasant experiences, while sadism compels the ego to the very seeking for them in reality. Thus from the beginning we see the fate of this type determined by the continuous play and counterplay of its original predisposition. Successful attainment of pleasure and narcissistic expansion of the ego is only achieved where the sadism is able to provide the ego with pleasurable gratifying experiences from the external world, and the ego in its turn is able successfully to deny all unpleasant accompaniments of this tendency. The slightest disturbance on one side or the other will inevitably lead to disorders which are inadequate in relation to the external cause but not so in relation to the strength of the impulse (sadism) and the sensitivity of the ego (narcissism). These are the men who - unlike Napoleon - count only the battles they have lost, but not those they have won. It is indeed a question whether the ego is strong enough to deny the lost battles in reality and so remain master of the situation, or whether it must deny the battles that have been won because the ego denies that part of itself which has won them; that, however, is egotism and sadism. This seems to be connected with the earliest development of the sadistic impulse, which is either directed toward the object (the mother) and the later substitutes therefore, or is dammed up within the ego. This depends in turn upon the strength of the original denial, which, pushed too far, extinguishes the object, so that it cannot be used for projection and the sadistic hate has to be directed against the subject's own ego.

This type must therefore in consequence of its strongly egotistic and sadistic predisposition retain the correspondingly strong but primitive defense mechanism of denial, and accordingly also remains in its super-ego development at the state of the primary maternal morality. This means that this type has more inhibitions than anxiety, is more "feminine" than masculine so far as the structure of the super-ego is concerned; for in the Anlage of its sadistic impulses it is absolutely masculine. The sadistic stringency against itself creates the illusion of a highly developed super-ego in these cases, which is however only a pseudo-super-ego, in contrast to the compulsion neurosis which in its scruples of conscience exhibits an hypertrophied super-ego.

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The coming to a standstill at the primary stage of maternal inhibitions explains also not only why this type so strongly denies everything of an unpleasant nature, but also why it must deny that which is pleasant (success) when this is attained, since it reacts, thereto, with the primitive maternal prohibitions. It has therefore completely - i.e., in both a positive and a negative sense - preserved the original substitution of the mother in the ego, and accordingly reacts throughout life in a manner primitive in a double sense: towards reality with denial, towards its own ego - i.e., its impulses - with inhibitions.

We can actually observe these mechanisms in operation if we study the variations in the clinical picture of these conditions. This is most conspicuously the case in melancholia, which I might term a "crystallization" of the depressive state. For while in depression all actions are inhibited, in melancholia this inhibition is limited to certain specific actions. One might say that in melancholia the patient reveals (especially in his dreams*) what he would like to do but cannot, while in depression he can do nothing at all in order that he may not do that which he would like to.

Principally these are egotistic and sadistic actions, and in fact in melancholia the patient attempts to torture his environment rather than himself (as witness the "reproaches"), while in mania he is often enough outspokenly sadistic. In melancholia he inhibits these sadistic impulses, yet not from social father-anxiety but from narcissistic inhibition at the mother-stage, in the last analysis, therefore, out of love for himself, in order not to cause himself pain, as it were.

From this standpoint the progression of the disease from depression to melancholia is also a partial attempt at healing in the same sense as Freud has demonstrated for the paranoid mechanism of projection. The melancholiac is already partly manic, that is on the road from depression to mania, and must accordingly protect himself with stronger measures, the melancholiac inhibitions, against the breaking through of the manic impulses. Occasionally one can through active interference with this process bring the patient out of a deep depression of considerable standing into a not too pronounced manic phase, if one can first drive him through a

*Schilder has very well demonstrated that the dreams of melancholia are often agreeable and pleasure-giving, what I would call "manic" - which is not at all true of the dreams of depressives.

mild melancholic phase. In melancholia one can definitely see, and possibly show the patient as well, against what impulses he is defending himself. If by corresponding changes in the environment one can induce him to admit to himself these impulses instead of denying them, he will occasionally give in to them in the subsequent manic phase but can be brought under favorable circumstances into a more or less well balanced mode of behavior. If left to himself, he will immediately after the period of manic activity again establish the maternal inhibitions in a subsequent depression - a situation which explains the cyclical character of his disorder. The manic phase corresponds to uninhibited activity, melancholia, to the inhibition of action, depression is the protection against the activity. As the action is sadistic, so is inhibition masochistic (auto-sadistic).

This type may be termed the "impulsive character" (Reich), since it tends to translate its impulses into actions instead of living them out in phantasies, as the normal individual does in part and the neurotic to excessive degree. The phantasy life of this type is accordingly relatively poor, as its emotional life is relatively flat. This is evident also in the sexual life or the sexual impulse of this type, which is confined to purely sensual gratification and is either quite incapable of tenderness or converts this into guilt feeling towards the object, such as may produce a kind of hypertrophied tenderness. This problem of the "divorce between tenderness and sensuality" so-called by Freud, is here demonstrated as closely linked with the original egotistic-sadistic predisposition on the one hand and with the consequent abuse of the mechanism of denial on the other. This type denies (originally with regard to the mother) that the object can cause him pain, he therewith denies at the same time, however, that the object can afford him pleasure, because he has to deny the very existence of the object. He thus denies, after all, his emotional relationship to the object and limits the attainment of pleasure, which he cannot renounce, to the purely sensuous, hence to a sphere where he cannot be disappointed in an emotional sense, i.e., is protected against unpleasantness (Unlust). His sensuous gratification corresponds to a sadistic revenge upon the mother, while in the depressive phase he inhibits his own self (as the mother) sadistically and punishes himself (masochistically) in suffering. In the manic phase, on the other hand, he is at the same time the indulgent mother. The Freudian formula, that in mania the ego and the super-ego become one, we might allow

to hold true rather of the two maternal egos. The manic phase would then represent a coinciding of ego and object in the original narcissistic sense of the mother-child relationship, thus an identification with the indulgent mother. Depression or melancholia would then represent this same ego-object relationship in the negative sense of identification with the prohibiting, punishing mother. In the first case, of identification with the indulgent mother, the bad mother is found in the object and sensual pleasure is obtained as sadistic revenge. In the second instance, of identification with the strict mother, the good mother is found in the object and is invested with hypertrophied tenderness, to the exclusion of sensuality. In both cases the one or the other mother=imago is denied, and it is the one with whom the subject identifies himself.

But this brings the entire process back to the ego in that, as we have already mentioned, the imagines of the "good" and "bad" mother are only projections of the subject's own ego-attitude. The projection of the subject's own narcissism creates the picture of the "good mother" who loves the subject as he does himself; the projection of the subject's own sadism creates the picture of the "bad mother" who causes the subject as much pain (punishes, tortures, hates) as he himself would like to do. Thus the "coinciding" of ego and super-ego in the manic phase corresponds in particular to a lifting of internal inhibitions, inhibitions against sadistic-egotistic tendencies at the primitive maternal state. The present ego can thus coincide completely in a narcissistic way with the earlier ego (objectified in the mother) without having to surrender or objectify itself. Biologically this occurs in the normal sexual act, which is in fact a manic state, an elimination of the ego, as indeed depression usually takes place post coitum. It is noteworthy that in sexual tension the type described feels depressive beforehand and "manic" afterwards. This brings up again the question of the divorce between sensuality and tenderness which is connected with the fate of the sadistic impulses. The fact that the manic state is associated with sexual activity, the depressive with sexual passivity, might even speak in favor of a biological foundation for the mood swings in the periods of oestrus.

Just as the sadistic instinct component represents the most important urge to direct activity, the specific driving power for the mastery of the environment and the obtaining of pleasure, so the mechanism of denial is the

specific driving force in the mental and emotional sphere. All the dynamics which we find operative there and which finally influences our actions and our thoughts is derived from the mechanism of denial. Sadism in its uninhibited form would be destructive, certainly in a social sense, perhaps even in a biological one. At any rate, whether it expresses itself directly or is inhibited within that ego, it causes the individual suffering which he tries to do away with by denial. In this sense we speak of denial less as a mechanism which is set in motion in a role of defense against a definite unpleasant stimulus, than as a psycho-biological tendency to self-protection which eo ipso is on guard lest anything happen which might cause too great pain.

Guilt feeling, the origin of which we can by no means explain in individual cases of neuroses, has at bottom no other significance than that of a repudiation of these tendencies in ourselves. Its existence is a result of the unsuccessful denial of the sadistic-egotistic impulses, and as such the existence of guilt feeling is independent of all experience or specific events in the life of the individual, to which it becomes attached only a posteriori. This explains the mysterious "wrong-doer from consciousness of guilt", as Nietzsche has portrayed him and Freud has described: the individual does something forbidden in order to feel guilty, that is to say, in order to have something concrete to which to attach his feeling of guilt. So long as we do not distinguish between the general capacity to produce guilt feeling and the tendency to render it concrete, all our psychological seekings for the origin of guilt feeling will end in a blind alley, as indeed has been the case to date. There is no "infantile source" for guilt feeling, for guilt feeling is only the expression of the denial of egotistic urges and sadistic impulses. One says: I am not as bad as I am. Thus the entire structure of our ethical systems, and even in large measure our entire psychology, at least prior to Nietzsche, is perhaps a denial of our true nature, that is of our biological ego which is at bottom egotistic and sadistic.

But there are other mental mechanisms as well which receive their motive power from denial in the sense of the latter as the psychological drive Kat' ezovev. Projection and displacement, in particular, which so frequently are involved with guilt feeling, are only denials carried to a further degree. If in feeling guilty, itself the strongest expression of denial, the ego attempts to hold others responsible; then for that purpose we project and attempt to

destroy the chronological connection by displacing upon new objects. If projection is a direct result of denial, then identification appears to be an attempt at the suppression of denial, in that the ego recognizes as its own, so to speak, that which has been denied by means of projection (in the sense of the Hindu "Tat Twam Asi"). Thus all that we have described as the representation of the ego in the object emanates fundamentally from the mechanism of denial, and actually means: "Not I, but the other", while identification reduces the whole situation again to the ego. It is not repression but rather denial which is thus the psychological correlate of flight, a kind of running away from oneself, an ostrich policy, based upon the axiom: out of sight, out of mind.

Denial produces also, however, as already mentioned, positive reactions in thought and action - above all, compensatory performances within the ego itself, such as we may group together under the term "narcissism", and to which also the life of phantasy belongs. This may lead on the one hand to the production of works of art, if the artist is successful in indulging in denial in the form of an idealized projection and displacement. In clothing his personal conflict in a descriptive form the artist says: "It is not I who have had this tragic experience but other men in other times." If on the other hand the denial is not detached from the ego and projected in this form, pathological lying is the result, in which the individual attempts to convince himself rather than others that this or that did not take place in a way undesired by his ego but in a different, better and more acceptable way. But the same thing happens normally with object-relations, which one always created as substitutes for a denied object, whereby the new object is always endowed with stronger ego-qualities in order to guarantee its dependence upon the ego and provide a protection against disappointment. As already mentioned, this tendency frequently goes so far that the object has to be an actual replica of the subject's own ego (homosexuality) or an idealized ego.

What we call reality is in the sense of the foregoing considerations not merely something given once and for all, to which we must adapt ourselves, but something which we utilize for development of the ego and for psychic unburdening by allowing us to release a good deal without, instead of within the ego. We are frustrated in our adaptation when we do this to too slight an extent, as is the case in extreme form in

the psychoses, or to too great an extent, as occurs in extreme degree in the neuroses. In between lies the normal object-relation which we call love, in which without doubt we employ the object for ego-expansion and ego-development, yet at the same time must give to the object so large a part of our own ego that we can accept this enrichment without consciousness of guilt.

BOOK II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONALITY

Introduction

Beyond Psychoanalysis

"No greater word has been spoken by mortal man than this saying of Kant, which contains his whole philosophy: 'Determine thyself from thyself.'"

Schiller

Introduction - Beyond Psychoanalysis

Psychoanalysis has rediscovered in the so-called "nervous" patient the significance of the emotional life but has attempted to conceive it scientifically from a purely materialistic point of view. This attempt could succeed only to some extent. For the problem of anxiety, which Freud first came up against in his patients is not to be explained entirely biologically in the human being. Still less can the problem of love be thus purely biologically explained, although Freud attempted to trace it as well as anxiety back to the sexual impulse. The fault lay in the method, namely, in the attempt to explain everything finally from the materialistic viewpoint. Even if we assume to be right the presupposition that everything has developed from the primitive biological, then this concept has only a heuristic value in the sense of a genetic comprehension, whereas it is insufficient as a principle of causal explanation. From a definite moment of development all these human phenomena which are built up over the purely biological attain a life of their own and a significance of their own. By reducing them to the original biological, even if this always succeeded in individual cases, little more is gained than would be the case if, for example, one wanted to understand an individual's entire life merely from his heredity. Psychoanalysis tried to avoid this error in emphasizing the individual's personal destiny. Only in doing this it has fallen into a similar error in believing that everything can be reduced to the individual's past. Thus even in actual experience psychoanalysis has emphasized the repetition of the individual's past and has not correspondingly valued the individual's own present life and its own actual significance.

Nearly all the divergencies of opinion within the psychoanalytic school as well as a great part of the criticism of psychoanalysis in general go back to this one cardinal point, namely, the tendency to reduce everything to the biological. The fundamental importance of the biological shall not here be denied. The question is only whether that in particular which we comprehend under the name "psychical" entirely lends itself to such a way of consideration or whether for a full understanding and estimation of it, it does not rather need a supplement which only a philosophical manner of reflection might offer. Freud's great merit was the overthrow of the medical superstition that the psychical is a matter of nerves, which indeed only represent the

instrument on which the human emotional life is played. His error was that in place of the medical theory of nerves he wanted to put the biological sex theory which was supposed to entirely explain everything. As the physiological nerves afford the instrument, so the biological sex provides the material for that which makes up our emotional life.

Thus Freud has dethroned the medical materialism with regard to the so-called neuroses, but what we really want to thank him for is, that he failed in the attempt to set up in its place the purely biological and so involuntarily has brought the real psychical into its own again. Finally, the psychoanalytic theory itself has led to the acknowledgment of the fact that along with the biological principle there is operative in mankind an equally strong ethical principle. The unconscious, incidentally a purely spiritualistic concept, cannot be entirely reduced to the impulse life. Indeed it is even shown that in many human beings the inhibitions manifesting themselves as anxiety and guilt are stronger than the impulses, that these inhibitions themselves, so to say, operate "as a driving force" although in a different way from the biological impulses. In a word we see that the psychical has become a force at least equal to the biological and that all human conflicts are to be explained just from this fact. Freud's later work has been a constant struggle against admitting this, and so he tried to apply biological concepts as a means of final explanation in the psychical sphere where they are inappropriate. For just as the guilt problem can be only fully comprehended from the ethical side so the complete understanding of the love life is to be found only beyond the sexual impulse in the ego.

Hence Freud, with the right instinct, has given his discoveries mythical names, such as the OEdipus Complex. In doing this he believed to have explained the myths themselves, which indeed are mental products and hence are not to be understood from a purely biological viewpoint. To want to explain the OEdipus myth simply from the biological relationship of the child to the parents is just as unsatisfying as to expect to understand the childish emotional life from this mythical nomenclature. Those Freudian concepts show the right feeling that these psychical processes are to be grasped and understood only mythically, that is in other words psychically. This unspoken insight is Freud's great accomplishment, for he himself is a myth creator in the grandest style, in Plato's sense a real philosopher. According

to his own admission, fascinated by the natural scientific world view, he interpreted everything "mythical" - not merely in tradition, but in the human beings themselves - biologically, and on the other hand called biological discoveries by mythical names. So he could not correctly interpret what was in between, namely, the purely psychical, and fully estimate it in its own significance.

Freud's work which appeared with the name of "psycho-analysis" is only in small part analysis of the psychical, which according to its nature represents an elementary entity. It is much more interpretation than analysis, and analysis only insofar as it attempts in the chemical sense, a reduction to the final (biological) elements, which indeed ultimately lie as the foundation of all phenomena. In the psychical sphere the fundamental biological facts are not so important as their interpretation, first of all by ourselves, then by others. The former we call rationalization, the latter explanation or interpretation. But these phenomena themselves represent a part of the psychical. In other words, the psychical itself is only to be understood phenomenologically. One might say that in the psychical sphere there are no facts, but only interpretations of them. On that account the dream has been justifiably called the psychical phenomenon par excellence. In the dream we ourselves interpret physical and psychical states (facts), but this "interpretation" is as little "analysis" of "facts" as is our analytic "interpretation" which represents only another kind of symbolization and rationalization.

Psychoanalysis as developed by Freud is thus only to some extent a method of finding out the biological facts lying at the foundation of the psychical life. It corresponds rather to a definite way of interpreting the psychical. It started as a biological interpretation of the psychical but finally led Freud himself to the threshold of acknowledging another kind of interpretation, namely, the ethical, by postulating the concepts of the super-ego and of the consciousness of guilt. But we did not need psychoanalysis to make us aware of these facts. Since Breuer's first attempt to cure a patient by the cathartic method the only really new fact that psychoanalysis has given us is the analytic situation. And from this one fact Breuer fled. Freud, on the other hand, succeeded in interpreting it, by justifying it as a repetition of an earlier situation which he called OEdipus situation. However, this was only another kind of flight from the fact of the analytic situation, an

intellectualized stage from a fact in which the interesting and valuable is just that which is new, that which lies beyond the "transference", that is, beyond the repetition of the Oedipus situation.

After the possibilities of interpreting the analytic situation had exhausted itself (in Freud's Libido Theory) in projecting back to the infantile, I began the analysis of the analytic situation itself as a new fact. From this I hope finally to understand and to develop synthetically and constructively new psychical values. The first which the analytic situation presents and teaches us to understand is the emotion of love. And it presents this as an actual relationship of sentiments and not merely as the transference of the child's attitude towards the parents. It is the origin, development and passing of this human relationship of sentiments which the analytic situation artificially produces and teaches us to understand. The analysis of this transference process gives us insight into a part of the ego-psychology, but that is simply psychology, for what we designate as "ego" is ultimately nothing but our psychological ego, our psychical, in contrast to the biological which represents only material for the psyche.

What we secondly can develop from the analytic situation besides the understanding of the love emotion, is the ethical. By that I do not mean any specific ethics, but simply the ethical, given in the relation of two human beings as portrayed in the analytic situation. Whilst the mechanism of being in love can be studied in the patient's ego, the ethical element cannot be developed without the analysis of the other person which in the analytic situation is the analyst. This analysis of the analyst I intend to give elsewhere as part of the analytic technique. In contrast to the ego-psychology as revealed to us in the state of being in love, one might designate ethics as the Thou-Psychology (Du-Psychologie). It is a kind of "mass psychology" in a constructive sense of which the sexual ethic represents only a specific part. Freud saw in the analytic situation only a repetition of the infantile Oedipus situation, and so in the state of being in love he saw in essence the biological and libidinal moment - not the ego side; similarly the ethical also remained purely external, namely, a primitive father morality as incorporated in the Old Testament Jehovah who punishes and rewards his chosen people. This is not merely a comparison; for religion itself is the primitive external preliminary towards an ethic and places

the responsibility on the god who operates with rewards and punishment. Hence also the surpassing part which the castration threat plays in Freud's theory.

Thirdly, what the psychoanalytic situation presents to us is a new approach to the theory of cognition which gives a new understanding of the relation of the ego not only to fellow beings but to reality in general. The insight to be gained here is so fundamental and so far-reaching that I must keep it for a separate presentation. I can here only indicate its special application to the analysis and to the understanding of the analytic situation itself. I mean the ideas alluded to by me for the first time in the Trauma of Birth, that that which we consider the analytic theory and therapy to a certain degree is nothing other than interpretation of the analytic situation. This is not intended to be a valuation but only a problematical question which a priori expresses nothing as to whether this theory or the therapeutic conclusions drawn from it, are right or wrong. One must only bear in mind that the situation permits of different interpretations which again correspond to definite attitudes towards it. One must also be conscious of the fact that one interprets specifically a situation typical and symbolic for the individual concerned, and so the general conclusions drawn from it may be of doubtful value. As in the case of the dream which itself represents an interpretation of (external or internal) stimuli, our interpretation corresponds to a further interpretation - of another kind; so the patient in his associations and reactions "interprets" the analytic situation which we then further interpret in the meaning of the analytic theory, itself again representing an attempt to interpret the analytic situation.

So from the analysis of the analytic situation there appears a kind of meta-psychoanalysis which has not only a general theoretic importance going beyond the narrower psychoanalytic sphere, but also essentially influences the technique. For the explanation of the difference one might use the following simile: the customary analysis corresponds to arithmetic where things have a definite material value; meta-psychoanalysis corresponds to algebra where all signs including the arithmetical have a definite symbolic value. They symbolize arithmetical quantities without operating with figures themselves.

Let us start from the technical therapeutic side from which this knowledge was gained. Then we see how the

patient - whether at the beginning or in the course of the analysis - uses the psychoanalytic theory itself as material for presentation (or symbolization) of his own emotional life. But when we understand the algebraic meaning and valuation of these presentations and operations then we need no longer go back in every instance to the arithmetical value. But we can solve the problem in a much more general way, generally in the meaning of the patient's destiny which we so to say reduce to a general denomination.

The use by the patient of the analytic material for a symbolic presentation of his emotional life is not only an inevitable result from the analytic situation which disturbs or complicates the process, but it can and must be made the basis of the whole proceeding if one does not want to fall into error. I would like to illustrate this in the form of an algebraic example: some years ago an analyst who was then analyzing a chemist once complained to me that he could not get anywhere with the work because the patient brought up so much material from his own science chemistry, about which the analyst did not understand. It seemed to him almost necessary that he himself should study chemistry in order to understand the patient. I remarked that this besides being impracticable, was too much to be expected because one could not possibly learn the psychological language of every single patient one treated. Today I would give far more consoling advice, namely, instead of which to let all patients learn one and the same language which the analyst himself speaks, thus they would easily understand each other. This language is the psychoanalytic theory - no matter of what school or coloring. The essential thing is that the patient speaks or learns to speak the same language as the analyst in order to make himself understood. And the analyst apart from what he is conscious of doing in any case instructs the patient in his language which the cultured patient of today already knows a little about before he comes for analysis.

So far this state of affairs would be comparatively simple if the analyst had been conscious of this fact and of the advantages which it offers him.

When the patient had learnt, for example, in the analysis the significance of the Oedipus or castration complex and repeated this in his reactions, then the analyst was content, even more than that, was delighted with this echo of confirmation, without understanding that the patient with it wanted to express something definite in the present analytic

situation. In other words, when the patient learnt more or less of the language and was able to converse in it tolerably well, then the analyst praised or blamed him according as to whether he correctly handled the theoretical grammar or used correctly the necessary vocabulary. Thus like the bad instructor he only laid value on the external, formal imitative, whereas the real content of what had been expressed in the analytic language had not been valued. After all it does not make much difference whether the pupil learns the rules of the language in a newspaper article or in a philosophical work. But with regard to the content it makes all the difference.

In other words in the course of the development of psychoanalysis, the analytic doctrine has already become material to be analyzed, just as much as every other kind of material whether chemical, philosophical or religious, which the patient uses. Still more important is the application of this viewpoint to the origin and development of the analytic theory itself - or more correctly speaking, to the analytic theories which the patient in the analysis uses as material of presentation. That is, even the analyst in the elaboration of the theory cannot avoid doing this. He is easily tempted to interweave the patient's presentation of the analytic material into his theory. And every investigator - obviously according to his personality and development uses something else. Freud uses the biological sexuality as material for the presentation of a psychological theory. Jung uses ethics. Adler and Stekel the social element.

So far nothing could be said against this inevitable use of material, if one is only conscious or ultimately becomes so of what really he is doing with it. When one like Freud uses biologic material, may one not draw the conclusion from this that the psychology constructed with it is biologically based? If, like Jung, one uses ethics as material may one not draw from this the conclusion that one has now produced a synthetic psychology such as he claims in his doctrine of types? The synthetic element is as much one factor in the psychical life as the analytic (Freud) or the constructive (Adler) and destructive (Stekel), but it is not the psychical itself, which only in its function is conceivable and hence is scarcely to be comprehended.

The psychoanalytic doctrine and movement has thus reached a point where it itself has become a psychological problem. At the same time - as such - it leads to a new

psychology and with it to a real world view which is pronounced as a statement from the solution of this problem. After the overcoming of the materialistic, ethical, and social ideology in the field of psychology, a psychological - or if one likes - a meta-psychological psychology must be constructed. This psychology would have to deal only with tendencies and their effects. On this account it should value the material necessarily used in no other way than in its psychological significance. In leaving out the different ideologies foreign to the emotional the psychological content itself crystallizes and in its turn then throws a new light on the biological, ethical and social aspects of psychology.

This natural process of development leads beyond the psychoanalytic theory. This ultimately proves to be a way - or more correctly a detour - a way back to philosophic theory of cognition. It concerns also the therapeutic aspect which finally led to the admission that the neuroses are not a medical but a social, that is, ethical problem. The two chief problems of philosophy, the theory of cognition and ethics, thus finally also represent the main problems with which psychoanalysis is really occupied, because they represent the chief problems of the human psychical life. Fundamentally, they correspond to a single great problem, to the contrast between the Ego and the Thou, between the Self and the world, between the inner and the outer. The theory of cognition attempts to determine the relationship between the inner and the outer, between appearance and Being, between phantasy and reality. Ethics tries to determine the more particular relationship of the ego to other similar egos, thus to the Thou. The psychological manifestations of these facts to which belong all philosophical and psychological theories as well as all individual expressions of our psychical life, may be treated under the title of an Ego-Psychology and of a Thou-Psychology.

The problem dealing with the inner and the outer leads us back again to the material of psychology. We can best of all discuss this in the two basic concepts of the analytic psychology, the problems of anxiety and of guilt. Anxiety originally related to something external, an object or a situation; whereas guilt is, so to say, an inner anxiety, a being afraid of oneself. Anxiety is thus a biological concept, guilt is an ethical concept. So the great problem of the inner and the outer in a scientific sense could be formulated as the problem of biology versus ethics (or the reverse), in other words, as the great conflict between our

biological and our purely human Self.

Psychical therapy of every kind operates only insofar as this conflict, manifesting itself as an ethical one, is partially or temporarily adjusted. We accomplish this by either strengthening or weakening the inner or the outer, in other words either by unburdening the inner conflict by externalizing it or by building up the inner, namely, internalizing the Ego. To these attempts at unburdening or reconstructing belong the individual analysis of neurotics, as well as the whole of psychoanalysis as a movement, or religion, or art, or war. Thus art unburdens in the catharsis (as an example tragedy) religion in the cult, analysis in the leader. On the other hand, all these manifestations have their constructive effects, namely, art in its development as an expression of personality, religion in its development towards ethics, analysis in its guidance to self knowledge and self responsibility.

In the whole development of humanity, as I already pointed out in "Der Kesseler" (1907) and later in the Trauma of Birth (1924) one can notice an increasing tendency to internalization, which is temporarily interrupted by reactions of externalization. These naturally are always of a social nature. They take on a more destructive form in war and revolution, in sects in the religious sphere, or a more constructive nature in the forms of technical inventions. In any case, these manifestations of externalization are always mass movements, whereas the tendency to project within has an individualistic character, proceeds from single individuals and aims at the individualization of persons. Psychology, in relation to this view, adopts a particular attitude. It is purely individualistic, aims at knowledge of the ego, of the individuality, but also uses in its material all data and facts concerning the external, reality, the Thou. Thus it is in essence a science of relations, which easily runs into the danger of overestimation of either the one or the other factor in itself, instead of dealing with the relationship between the two.

In psychoanalysis this has been the case to a very large degree. Psychoanalysis began as the psychology of the unconscious, which, however, was not directly inferred intuitively from one's own ego, but as it were by a detour through another. This other was a patient, that is, an individual in whom the one side of the problem entered strongly in the foreground, apart from the fact whether one saw in it

the biological (sexual problem) or the ethical (guilt problem). The strength of psychoanalysis lay in this starting point, but in the course of its development it has become more and more a science and has led to ever greater one-sidedness. From the viewpoint of our general statements it is perhaps no accident that parallel with the inward trend of psychoanalysis, with the advance in the knowledge of the individual, it has yet taken on the character of an external movement, if one likes, a mass movement. This externalizing trend was a counterbalance against the threatening danger of a too-far-reaching introversion. To this may be added the fact that the creator of such an inward turning tendency which aims at increasing individualization whether it may be of a religious, artistic or scientific nature, yet needs for his justification its entry to the group, to the mass.

Here we come up against the problem of guilt-feeling in the creative individual, and we already find it in its rudiments at a quite primitive organic stage. At that stage (as I already mentioned in *Der Künstler*) the individual's tendency to develop, striving for independence of the external world leads finally to division at the limit of growth. This division is equivalent to isolation, to disaster, to death. Thus Freud has revealed the guilt-feeling beyond the pleasure principle, that is, has gained the insight that in human beings it is not always the biological impulses which give the driving force, but from a definite point of development it is the inhibition, anxiety and guilt. If we analyze further we discover beyond the guilt-feeling, which seems insurmountable, the problem of individuality. In differentiation from the ego which is a purely psychological concept, I would like to designate the biological part of our personality, as the Self, whereas the third part of our personality, namely, character, is an ethical concept. Thus the development of the personality extends with the Self far into the biological, but the problems and conflicts with which we have to deal first begin there where this biological Self comes into collision with the ethical, the character, and that is the case in the sphere which we have psychologically designated as Ego.

At the biological level all deviation from the normal manifested as change, brings first of all a danger, the danger of nonsurvival or death, before it can be borne out in single individuals as development. At the psychological level this phenomenon manifests itself as anxiety - of danger, failure, death, in essence as anxiety of the other ego which interferes with the unfolding of one's own Self. At the third stage, the

ethical level, we see the same state appearing as the guilt problem, that is, as anxiety of one's own ego the free development of which seems to bring about to the other, danger, ruin or death.

But at this psychical level the significance of the emotional life becomes evident. Death at the biological level is the prototype of separation. Isolation also separates one individual from the other. But here there is already shown a uniting effect, namely, the trend towards group formation, the mutual and temporary protection against danger. But the guilt-feeling unites the ego to the other, as emotion in general, the reverse of which I would like to designate as that union which the human being with the fellow human being. In socialization this union takes place with the mutual guaranteed protection of all against all; in love with the pleasurable identification with the other. The more we individualize ourselves, that is, remove and isolate ourselves from others, the stronger is the formation of guilt-feeling which originates from this individualization and which again in turn unites us emotionally with the others. This is the psychological basis of our ethical socialization. But with the increasing tendency towards individualization this social bond is not sufficient. The individual needs a stronger, more individual personality relationship which on the other hand strengthens the guilt-feeling and so emotionally unites the individual to another individual. At this psychical level this uniting element is love, which finally in its fulfillment unites again biologically the individual with the other and thus with the species. But whereas sexuality in the biological sense signifies in essence growth and multiplication, if one likes the preservation of the individual in the species through reproduction, love has the function of uniting emotionally the individual as such, the personality with the other individual. In this way the feeling of the individual isolation leading to anxiety, guilt and conflict, is removed. In a word sexuality is a biological ego-expansion, love is an emotional or psychical ego-expansion. Hence we understand why in our love life the ethical is of importance equal to the biological. But only in this way also can we understand all disturbances, problems and conflicts which are produced from this and with the alleviation and solving of which psychoanalysis as a therapy is concerned.

For even the neurosis has been revealed in its ultimate analysis as an ethical problem. The individual separated chiefly by anxiety and bound to the fellow human being only by guilt, again has to be united with humanity

and the world biologically as well as socially, through the positive love emotion. This I consider the real task of psychotherapy. It is a long way from the medical therapy of nervous disturbances which Freud at first wanted to heal by a kind of sexual dietetics, to the understanding of the neurosis as a guilt problem. It is the fundamental difference between two opposite world views, the materialistic and philosophic, in a more specific sense the biological and ethical. Psychoanalysis has pushed forward far in both directions but it has failed to see the problem in its full bearing and significance, much less to solve it. But we are grateful to it for again bringing up this primal problem and for opening up new ways towards its understanding, perhaps to a better solution of it.

Character and the Self

This new series of lectures is meant to be the synthetic and constructive part of the "Genetic Psychology". In these lectures I make the first attempt to harmonize the biological with the ethical world-view. The arguments signify a step further along the line of communication leading from Biology beyond Psychology to Philosophy, including in it that which is emotional as well as mental, namely in ethics, the relation of the individual to others, and in the theory of cognition, the relation of the individual to reality.

In the "Genetic Psychology" (in the first part) I tried to remain purely psychological, although - as already seen in the Trauma of Birth - I went beyond the narrower psychoanalytic viewpoint in both the biological and the ethical directions. The constructive psychology which I here try to build up, is a step further in harmonizing the emotional and the intellectual viewpoints into a philosophic doctrine. In so doing, the biological as operating factor goes into the background and is considered chiefly in the part it plays in our emotional life.

In this first lecture on character formation a synthetic presentation from the results of genetic psychology is attempted. All the different problems occupying us are focussed in the doctrine of character. Psychology and especially psychoanalysis teaches us how character is constructed inwardly from the individual experiences and reactions. How character outwardly manifests itself in actions and reactions has been up till now, although in a somewhat onesided way, the object of investigation in the so-called Behaviourism. But above all, the whole problem of individuality is included in character, and with it also the problem of guilt-feeling, thus of the conflict (purely ethical) between the Self (the Instinctual-Ego) and the psychological Ego (Freud's Super-Ego). The concept "character" is mostly still used in a general sense, namely in the sense of the doctrine of types. Our concept leads beyond this to Personality, that is, to the individual character which lies, so to say, beyond the character-type, according to which we are accustomed to classify human beings, in order where possible to predetermine their reactions.

The importance of the love life which will be dealt with in the second lecture, lies in the emotional relation of an individual to another, of the Ego to the Thou. What psychoanalysis understands under the term sexual conflict

is only a special application of the general ethical problem, to the biological sphere of sexuality; of how the Ego behaves to the Thou, the human being to the fellow human being. From this point of view the emotional relationship which we call love proves to be a universal therapy against disturbances and conflicts in the sphere of the Ego. Love binds the individual not only biologically with the species, but also emotionally, in that it justifies the Self. In reciprocal love, one gets the evidence and assurance that one's own individuality is not destructive for the other, thus the self is justified.

The social adjustment of the individual has the same emotional effect to a wider extent, although not with the same intensity of gratification. It connects again the individual differing from others, with the group, that is the species, and indeed in the ethical sphere, just as sexuality binds the individual in the biological, and love in the emotional sphere.

To this synthetic presentation of the individual Self in its relation to the psychological Ego (character), to the biological sex-partner (love) and to the fellow human being in general (society) follows a presentation of the constructive factors as recognized in education, prophylaxis, and therapy.

Education does not so much create character, which is first of all a sediment of an inner development. But its task rather is to give to the individual character, to the personality, something common, uniting super-individual. Hence all education aims as a matter of principle at uniformity; we see this specially clearly in the educational systems of the primitive, as well as among civilized races. That is not altogether to be regretted. For the more the one inclines to individuality, the more he needs the universal means of help offered him in education in order to adjust himself in general to the specific social milieu in which he lives. Education has the task of influencing the individual character, the personality, in the sense of making it capable of a better adjustment, i.e. of typifying it. In this sense it is almost a kind of prophylaxis, in that it equips the individual with means of protection and help in the adjustment to a given milieu. Only the way by which education does this - obviously the only way it can do it at all - is not only by means of conscious teaching and learning, but much more by means of example and identification. That is

to say that in identification the individual also absorbs such individual characteristics of other people which impede rather than facilitate his adjustment. And since this identification with the educator rests on love and has love as a presupposition, also all conflicts which make the love problem so complicated become mixed up with it.

If education, according to its nature, is of an absolute conservative character, in that it places at the individual's disposal means of adjustment tested by others, so prophylaxis has a positive reformatory tendency. For only from the maladjustments of education, which come about through failure of the tested means in new situations or through the individual failing in the old milieu, is there the necessity and justification of a prophylaxis. This may concern either reforms in the individual, which we then call therapy, or reforms in the milieu, that is, in the social arrangements including the educational system itself. But education is, as already mentioned, in essence a spontaneous process which depends on the emotional relationship becoming effective chiefly through love (or in unfavorable cases through fear). Prophylaxis in opposition to this can be based only on the understanding and can operate only consciously and purposefully. It is a contemplated and artificial intervention, on that account so difficult and relatively powerless.

Therapy, at least the psychical therapy towards which psychoanalysis strives, unites both elements in it; the education and the prophylactic, the spontaneous and the conscious. Only again the first is far and away the more powerful, for the chief effect of psychical therapy is an emotional one, and the share taken by the conscious and the wished for is relatively little and weak. If education is a moulding, a forming in the artistic sense, then healing is a help in the social sense, thus an essentially ethical problem which has receiving and giving as a presupposition, love and guilt as its consequence.

But therapy therefore should not stop at that point if it is to be really ethical and not only prophylactic. To show and to allow the human being to understand how he has developed may perhaps lead to prophylaxis, but is not therapy. Knowledge in general, being only a subsequent insight in the development of the individual, has no therapeutic, but at most only a prophylactic, value. The effective therapy is to allow the human being to become and to be himself, without getting into conflict with himself and others, but that is without

experiencing the guilt-feeling. And only love where the Ego, the Self, seems justified in the other, the Thou, can bring this about.

In my genetic psychology, I have tried to show how the formation takes place of that which in ordinary language we call character and which from the psychological side appears as Ego. In the meaning of the psychoanalytic discovery, character in its essence is built up by identification. Hence I have pointed to the identification with the mother, which takes place already at the biological stage, the part of a pattern for this psychological process. This identification rests on the pleasure principle, namely, is at first a substitute in one's own Ego for gratifications denied by the mother; on the physical plane, sucking, which leads to masturbation and by this labour, finally back again to the biological relation; on the psychical plane, imitation of the mother in speech, thought and feeling. Hence from the beginning the mother represents for the child not only a source of pleasure but in the privations which the child experiences through her, also the disturbing and inhibiting external world. These privations start at birth and extend to weaning and to the training in cleanliness and are often enough reinforced by punishment or threats of punishment. Hence pleasure and pain, love and fear, are the two psychical basis factors which influence the child's instinctual-ego in the sense of character formation.

But if we approach nearer the problem of character formation from the standpoint of constructive psychology, we soon find that our knowledge is insufficient. Character does not, as the common opinion wants, represent the whole man. Genetically, we can indeed speak of the construction of the Ego which "behaviouristically" manifests itself as character. But already we notice here that the real Self of the individual is to be differentiated from this character as a typical mode of reaction. And this real Self we call personality. In psychoanalysis one speaks of a "neurotic character" as described by Alfred Adler, of an "impulsive character" (W. Reich), even of "character-analysis" (Alexander), without its ever having been explained what is really to be understood under the term character. Obviously every time it means something different. But in any case there is implied in general and in the concept of the word character, something which represents character as the outer side, so to say the behaviour-side of psychology; whereas the real psychical

problem lies beyond the so-called character in the individual, and manifests itself to a certain degree as conflict between the Self (Ideal-Ego) and the Ego (character). But if character as a designation of an individual's typical way of reaction is meant, then we must bear in mind that it is not as constant and fixed in the personality as it is supposed to be and as the Self alone is. For the origin of character can be genetically understood, analytically explained - as a sediment of identifications - and can be therapeutically influenced. Further, in the so-called neuroses and in all exceptional states - we have to deal just with the reactions of the individual which so to say fall outside his character. The human being thinks and acts contrary to the expectations of all who know him, indeed he himself is even astonished by his own reactions which he is unable to comprehend. In such cases we speak then of character or of the lack of such, in the sense of an ideal; hence something that the human being should have, so that possessing it his reactions may be constant, intelligible and predeterminable.

Thus in the individual we have to discriminate between a character formed from identifications and ideal-formations and an Ego lying beyond the character, which we may designate as Instinctual-Ego or Self. In contrast to this Self, character is built up from identifications which, according to Freud, are sediments of earlier object relations. In favorable cases the psychological elements inhibiting and limiting the Self from within, appear as character traits socially recognized - and hence also compatible with the ego. In cases of failure or maladjustment the same elements appear as symptoms socially not accepted and incompatible with the ego. The result seems to depend on whether the ideal formed from identification preponderates over that formed from one's own Self, or in how far the two harmonize or come into conflict with one another. The mechanism of the normal social adjustment is doubtless ideal-formation by means of identification. The more one resembles the other with whom one has to live the easier it is to live together, and to adjust. Hence the lover's feeling of happiness which rests on the restoration or setting up of a complete identity. But there is a type which guards itself psychologically against the common identifications and typical ideal-formations. This type sets up within itself and from its own Self an Ego-ideal in the literal meaning of the word, towards which it strives. This type of creative man is not only always in conflict with itself and its own Ego-ideal, but also easily gets into conflict with the other who expect in the creative-man a

character type similar to their own. The reactions of this creative type are just as unreliable as those of the so-called neurotics who represent failure in their own Ego-ideal formation. But the creative type somehow succeeds in objectifying and realizing this Ego-ideal formation. In the social sphere this creative type manifests itself as the hero or the criminal respectively. We see creation or destruction in the hero or criminal at the social level just as we see success or failure in the artist or neurotic at the psychological level. In both cases, however, exists the guilt-feeling following from their own Ego-ideal formation, thus from individualization. This guilt-feeling changes the positive creation into destruction, whether it is the destruction of one's own Ego (as in the neurosis) or of another (in the criminal).

Psychologically the different character types, which are innumerable, may be reduced to a few characteristics and ways of reaction common to all. For analysis has shown that the psychological character-type arises as a reaction. In other words that, for an example, the introvert under certain conditions or periodically can be very much of an extrovert, or vice versa. Indeed one might say that the one presupposes the other. In the classical way this is shown by the manic-depressive in whom this very change represents the character type. Thus the new psychology leads from the social types as represented in the artist, hero, neurotic and criminal, beyond the purely psychological types as attempted by Jung, with the introvert and extrovert, to the Ego's typical ways of reaction and response to specific environmental stimuli. Hence those reactions differ in different situations, as per example the already mentioned introvert who can become or react as an extrovert. Behaviourism says the reaction differs according to the stimulus, which is undoubtedly true, but our psychology proves that the change in reaction can be brought about from purely internal causes. This is just what brings the individual then into conflict with reality in making his reactions appear incomprehensible. In other words, there exists in us a mechanism of reacting and if possible adjusting to one's own inner world similar to reacting and adjusting to the external world. Whichever one predominates over the other, whether permanently or temporarily, decides the type of character or type of reaction respectively. This reaction of the ego to some kind of inner reality constitutes what we call conflict in the psychological sense. Its further study leads us beyond the problem of character formation to the dynamics of personality. So what we call character is merely

an index showing how far we have accomplished the inner adjustment in order to be able to react appropriately to the external, that means to really adjust.

This inner conflict reveals itself in its final analysis as the struggle of our impulses against our inhibitions, parallel to the whole ego's struggle against external interference. In other words success or failure in adjustment depends chiefly on whether the two parts of our personality are allied in meeting reality or whether they are so preoccupied in fighting against each other that they become unfit even to withstand reality. In studying human conflicts we then find that it is not so much the mere fact of our personality being divided into two parts, as the attitude which the one part takes towards the other. This may be either that of affirmation or negation. If the super-ego accepts the primal Self then results an Ego-ideal formation which leads to an integrated personality. If the super-ego rejects the Self then results a kind of negative ego-ideal manifesting itself in the well known symptom of guilt-feeling and inferiority.

In the genetic psychology we traced this affirmation of the Self back to two fundamental factors, namely Narcissism and Sadism. The inhibiting factor which causes the negation is the predominance of fear manifesting itself in the Ego as guilt-feeling. Narcissism is Self-affirmation. The defense against a too strongly predominating and hence isolating narcissism leads to the formation of a strongly predominating super-ego which turns within also a part of sadism favorably sublimated in ethics. The rest, whether it is directly impulsive, that is destructive, or sublimated-impulsive, that is creative, remains free for action. This impulsive type is able to objectify the inner, whether it is in the form of accomplishments, as in the man of action (heroes) or in the form of the emotional, as in the artistic creation. Conflict arises when the inner difficulties are carried out into action, which then becomes what we call fate, and again reacts back on the individual. With this type conflict arises after action and as a reaction to it. In contrast to this "impulsive character", which can express itself either creatively or destructively, the inhibiting character has inner conflict instead of action or creation, but not as a result of it. It acts so to say towards the inner and within and is strongly inhibited towards the outer or external. In it the Self, the Instinctual-Ego, is much more superimposed by

inhibitions, it has no very definite "character" but more conflict within and less action without. Where for example the impulsive type comes to a quick decision, which perhaps he afterwards regrets, the inhibited type has inner conflict instead of outer decision which he regrets not being able to make.

This super-imposition of the Self by the super-ego manifests itself in the character as inhibition, neurotically as conflict but forms normally social and ethical features of our personality. Projecting and objectifying inner conflict is a regular process in all human beings insofar as they have emotional relationships to others. Every intimate and intense emotional relationship has, as a presupposition or as a result, the unburdening of the ego from inner conflicts. It is well known how we always want to make an external hindrance in the sense of the primitive morality, responsible for our inner inhibitions, whether it is personal authority like parents, educators, friends, superiors or an institution (conventions, customs, laws). This mechanism is to a certain degree necessary for the establishing of character formation. And when established it can be maintained only insofar as this necessary unburdening of the Ego is allowed to continue to operate. If it is inhibited then the individual has to look for relief within himself and the result is conflict internally, therefore reaction different from the character externally.

But this unburdening tendency of the ego brings itself into effect not only negatively, in the sense of inhibiting our impulsive-ego, but also positively. Just as an individual psychologically can represent our inhibitions, so we can objectify our impulse-ego into another individual, as partially happens in love. There it manifests itself as the so-called type of tempter or seducer. This mechanism of projection and unburdening comes into effect quite generally and independently from sex relations. In relation to the sexes, however, it essentially involves the element which we call love and which signifies dependence, gratitude, idealization, but also all conflicts going along with it. Indeed perhaps this idealization of the loved one is just this process of transforming the non-ego, the Thou, into the complimentary part of our own Ego, which we have to project just for the unburdening of either impulse or inhibition.

The attempt to derive character purely from sex (as Otto Weininger has proposed) and as Freud lately tried,

must remain one-sided. The dynamic lies beyond that which follows from sex, indeed beyond the object altogether. For not only does the image of the parents influence the character formation and the love choice but just as decisively is the ideal formation influenced by one's own Self in its physical and emotional features. The ideal is also always a part of the abandoned Ego which one tries to preserve in the love object. It is mostly a mixture of that which one was (as a child) and of that which one wants to be (parents); but also of that which one really is, namely of one's own Self.

This brings us back again to the purely emotional problems of one's own Ego and Ego-formation, its consequences and conflicts. Whilst the process of projection and unburdening just mentioned, like that of identification, has the fellow being for object, the Ego-Ideal formation is a purely internal process. By the process of identification with others the character is formed psychologically; in projection the ego unburdens itself "characterologically". In the ego-ideal formation this whole process is purely internal. The extreme expression of the same would be complete introversion whereby everything goes on within and the human being produces no kind of object relationship. If, however, this introverted type succeeds in becoming extroverted, then this occurs again to an extreme degree so that the object is similarly over-estimated as previously was one's own Ego; this we designate as idealization of the object. In this way egoism becomes love, in that the object now made part of the Ego is loved just as much as formerly only the Ego was loved. It is well known that one cannot love when one is egoistic, but to be oneself is the presupposition of love, the essence of which consists in the fact that the other so completely accepts our Real Self as if it were his own. Also, whoever is egoistic, can never be himself, for that means, to give oneself (as one is), to express and unfold oneself, in other words, to do all that the egoist cannot do. Egoism is so to say an unsuccessful attempt to be oneself, a pretense at being a personality. Similarly the neurosis may be considered as an unsuccessful attempt to form a personality which is inhibited by guilt-feeling instead of by egoism. Love's state of blessedness, (but also all misunderstandings and conflicts which are a consequence of it) arises from the fact that in the primitive narcissistic way, one is compelled to look for and to find the image of one's own ego either physically or emotionally, whilst at the same time one has to

find in the other the characterological supplement of either the impulsive or the inhibiting self. Where both these coincide, the result is the maximum of gratification. Where they are not found together in one person, there arises dissatisfaction, conflict, and suffering.

What we have divided into the two sides of personality, namely the primitive Impulse-Ego, the Self, and the character (the Ego) built up from it, over it and in contrast to it, Kant has already differentiated as "empirical and intelligible character", a distinction in which Schopenhauer sees one of the greatest merits of this philosopher. In our meaning it could designate the difference between character in the psychological sense and character in the social sense; the contrast between psychologism and behaviourism, between the Self and the Ego, in other words the distinction between the biological, social and psychological strata of our personality.

The biological Ego is given. From the relationship to the mother the character is formed genetically from identifications in order to adjust socially to reality. In other words character means the ways of reaction towards the gratifying and inhibiting external world (mother) in the meaning of the pleasure-pain principle. To the biological pleasure-pain principle corresponds psychologically an Ego-non-Ego principle. Everything which is non-ego causes pain - Through identification the limits of the ego are removed or enlarged, and so pain is avoided. Simultaneously with it by means of identification something foreign to the Ego is absorbed by it and henceforth forms a part of one's character. Besides the mechanism of identification yet a second more negative mechanism of averting pain, namely, denial, is made use of. This ultimately strives to break off, to abolish identification, in that it tries to push out and to deny the object instead of absorbing it into the Ego. Pleasure and pain play the chief part at this biological stage of the Ego development, which by means of character formation (identification or denial) leads to social adjustment. Psychologically the pleasure-pain principle is designated by the terms "libido" and "fear". Everything which is ego or compatible with the ego gives pleasure; everything non-ego causes fear, unless we make it part of our ego through the mechanism of identification.

This leads to the second psychological stage, which partly lies beyond the characterological. Character as a

social concept, as the form in which the individual expresses himself externally, usually covers up what the individual really is. Here unexpectedly we get a definition of character which we recognize as a manner of reaction shifted from the biological to the social stage for a purposed adjustment. In this sense also the animals have a "character" as Behaviourism thinks. Only in their case we speak generally of a purposeful adjustment which in Man we would call "utilitarianism" because we demand from him and from ourselves in the Kantian sense that character should be ethically based. In the animals and perhaps in primitive man, the two sides of the personality which Kant so ingeniously separated, coincide. At this stage, what is useful for the individual, is also good (pragmatism). The extreme type of civilized man as represented by the neurotic in exaggerated form, turns this axiom upside down; what is useful to me cannot be good, for it is selfish. Here is the point where the psychological factor as the uniting but also disturbing element comes in between the biological principle and the social milieu, in the form of inhibitions rationalized as ethical demands. At this stage we find everything internalized. Where earlier we saw identification with the object, here we meet ideal-formation in the Ego; where earlier we saw fear as the ego boundary now we see guilt-feeling as a purely inner limitation.

This leads across to the third ethical stage based on the anti-thesis between the Self (Impulse-Ego) and the character (Identification-Ego). If the Self and character are more or less in harmony, then we speak of a successful adjustment. If they are in conflict, then this leads to the different forms of maladjustments which we will speak of in detail later. Here we want to bring into prominence only two general types; if the Self is stronger, then we speak of expressions of the impulsive character which can be either creative or destructive, but in any case directed toward the external. If the social ego is stronger, then we speak of the inhibited character which manifests itself positively or negatively but directed only towards the inner, namely, in a high ethical view of life or in neurotic self-destruction. At the psychological level we find the conflict between the Self and the Ego (empirical character) whereas at the next level the relation of the Ego-ideal to the Self is decisive for the result. If the ego-ideal outweighs the Self then this leads to the ethical character or, in case of failure, to neurosis (Compulsion type). If the Self is stronger than the Ideal-formation, then this leads to the impulsive character, which

may express itself in a social impulsive actions.

At the ethical level the circle of development is completed. For as the beginning of character development rests on identification with the parents, at the summit of character formation - the ethical - stands identification with one's fellow beings in general, irrespective of whether they represent a source of pleasure for the ego. That is the meaning of the Biblical command, "Love thy neighbor as thyself" and of the Kantian ethical axiom, behave to others as you may expect your fellowmen to behave to you. At the psychological level, identification is a means for avoiding pain in oneself. At the ethical level identification is a means against the causation of pain to others. At the biological level we have ultimately to do with the Self which, through the expression of Egoism and Sadism strives for the gain of pleasure in a positive sense.

From this concept, a doctrine of character results which includes two groups of types. These are the psychological and the ethical, both of which on the whole are common to man and together with the real Self form the personality. The first type is predominantly based on identification with the parental image, but chiefly by means of one's own image. In the latter case the ideal-formation again corresponds either to the original Self or to a better, longed for Self, or to a reaction against one's despised Self. To each of these possibilities there corresponds a type; if the Ideal is in harmony with the Self then a homogeneous "character", a Being free from conflict is the result. If this equilibrium is in any way disturbed then two possibilities follow: either the creative type, if the wish for the attainment of a better self is stronger, or the neurotic type, of criticism of one's own self is stronger, resulting in the feeling of inferiority.

The first character type formed merely from identification, leads to a primitive morality which being built up from external inhibitions is based on prohibition and punishment, praise and blame, love and fear. The second type of character built up from the formation of the Ego-ideal leads to the real ethic, which is constructed from inner inhibitions and is based on the concepts right and wrong, conscience and responsibility. At this stage the moral concepts of good and evil take on the ethical significance of right and wrong in the sense of an inner standard; right is everything which the self affirms, wrong everything which it

denies. If the primitive morality is originally directed against egoism and narcissism, then the ego at the ethical stage in a certain sense can again become narcissistic. For we want to be ethical because this is demanded as a general ideal and our narcissism does not allow that in this respect we should be inferior to others.

From this it follows that what we call character-formation at bottom is no purely psychological problem. Partly is it a biological or social problem insofar as it concerns actions and reactions towards the external world for the avoidance of pain and gaining of pleasure. Partly is it an ethical problem, insofar as it concerns the attitude of the biological Self to Ego or Ego-ideal. If we want to learn to know the true nature of man and his actual emotional inner life, then we must study him there where he acts not in accordance with his character but where he expresses his true Self. This is the case in only one single situation, namely in the love relationship and there it occurs spontaneously and is spontaneously received. We can observe it and study it only in the analytic situation which represents an emotional relationship similar to love, in which the person analyzed projects his Self on to the analyst who urges him insofar as it is possible to push aside his "character" and let his true Self express itself. The analysis of the analytic situation as attempted by me in my "Technique of Psychoanalysis" enables us to distinguish the character from the true Self and at the same time to understand the complicated emotional relationship which we call love and which unites within it the biological, psychological and ethical elements.

Chapter II.

The Significance of the Love Life

"As you spend yourself on me.
So am I valuable to myself,
Had you turned from me
At that moment I had lost myself."

Goethe

The Significance of the Love Life

At the end of the previous chapter we came to the conclusion that man's true Self, that which differs from character, expresses itself only in one sphere, namely, in the love life. There it is manifested quite spontaneously and in real love is just as spontaneously accepted and reciprocated. We are able to study this emotional relationship and with it also the true Self which is manifested in it only in the analytic situation. The phenomenon which Freud called "transference" reveals itself only in a deeper analysis beyond the sexual level as a phenomenon related to love. With this difference, that in the analysis it remains one-sided, i.e., is not reciprocated in the same spontaneous way. As a consequence there follows a somewhat distorted picture of the emotion, but at the same time we gain insight into the development of its different phases.

In the first part of the "Genetic Psychology" it was stated that in essence it is the mechanism of projection that determines the manner and intensity of the emotional relationship to one's fellow being. By the side of this or more correctly, at the same time goes on a process which we have designated "identification". This, however, I would call, not a "mechanism" but the result of the realization of projection. Whereas in the love relationship, as I have already said, these processes of projection and identification proceed and merge into one another from both sides in the same way and at the same time, in the analytic situation the picture seems displaced as follows; the person analyzed projects much more, I would say almost exclusively, at least in the first phase of the analysis. In the same phase, also almost exclusively, the analyst has to confine himself to identification being necessary in order to understand the patient, and, so to say, feel one with him. As soon as the patient feels this identification emotionally as something beyond being understood, he begins on his side to identify himself with the analyst. In other words, he can only then identify when he feels in the other something kindred, identical, which in this case is the identification on the part of the analyst necessary for understanding the patient. In the phase of projection as in all later projections, the patient betrays his real Self. In identification he seeks it in the other, i.e., tries to disguise it. This is the state of affairs which was described as resistance, especially as "transference-resistance"; as one can see, it is given in the nature of the situation and is unavoidable. The technique has

not only to decrease it by pointing it out, but also to paralyze it by avoiding a spontaneous counter-reaction. That means, the analyst has to further that kind of projection which leads to self reflection and self revelation, and has to decrease identification which serves the purpose of self-disguise. Where the situation in consequence of the analyst's narcissism is misunderstood or better, misinterpreted, then comes the so-called "counter-transference". This consists in the fact that the analyst, going beyond identification necessary for understanding, in his turn projects on to the patient, but identification with this projected part of the ego leads to the love identification which we call infatuation.

A correct technique and a normal development of the analytic situation allows the analyst to trace in the patient this phenomenon of infatuation. I will repeat how this proceeds: the patient projects his "repressed ego" which we call true Self on to the analyst not intimately known to him; he finds in the analyst not only the willing passive object for this projection, but also soon feels his active identification necessary to understand the patient. This, the analyst's necessary identification makes possible for the patient on his side, an identification based on projection which manifests itself in the forms of infatuation.

Thus what we can study in the patient in ways to be described still more in detail is not the love relationship itself but the first stage of it, namely, infatuation, which in essence rests on projection and which can finally develop into love only with complete reciprocity. As we have defined identification as the perception of projection, so one could designate love as the perception of an accomplished infatuation. In other words, having described infatuation as the first stage of love, love is the completion of infatuation, that is, the actual and not only psychologically accomplished identification. Hence infatuation such as ecstasy and adoration from a distance, does not necessarily include the physical union, the bodily identification but rests more on the emotional identification the mechanism of which we have described as projection. It is normally a pronounced phenomenon of adolescence, and describes, exactly as in the analysis, the first step in the emotional relationship to one's fellow-being. Infatuation is a phenomenon of preparation and transition to the more lasting state of love which with all the physical expressions is so to say much more concrete and real. Hence also it goes back to the

sensuous, physical gratifications really experienced by the individual from the mother in childhood. Thus in love there is, if one likes, more repetition of gratifying situations already experienced, whereas infatuation is much more of a new and imaginative creation of one's own individuality, of one's true Self. Therefore we find infatuation later on in life everytime when the individual's ego goes through a new phase of development, manifesting itself as a crisis, like puberty. Hence we may call infatuation a symptom of a crisis in the ego. By that I mean the ego creates this new love relationship by projecting one part of the Self on to the object and so can easily adjust to it.

If we study closer this process of infatuation in the analytic situation, we come up against two of its chief symptoms, the analysis of which compels us to a finer differentiation in relation to the mechanism of projection. It is not quite correct to say that the patient always projects his true Self on to the analyst, if we understand by the true Self the impulsive-ego. For just as often, but certainly in definite phases of the analysis - as at the beginning - does the patient project on to the analyst his inhibitions, thus what we call "character" in the psychological sense. But in reality it is a matter of a continuous change, often enough of a simultaneousness, in the projection of these two sides of the personality respectively.

The two extremes of this projection constitute normally the chief symptoms of the conditions of infatuation, they are bondage and jealousy. We are able to study their mechanisms in the pathological extremes which have been described under the names "masochism" and "delusion of jealousy". Masochism is the result of a too far reaching projection of one's own inhibitions on to another, the delusion of jealousy is the result of a projection of one's own impulses (temptations). In the first case namely, masochism, one projects one's own inhibitions on to another whom the ego raises to the position of lord and master, i.e., bearer and executor of its inhibitions which have to restrict and so gratify the remaining impulses. The idealization of the master going along with it is a result of projection and in the over-estimation of the super-ego, compensates for the humiliation to the impulse-ego. In the case of jealousy, in contrast to this, the impulse-ego in the form of sexual temptation is projected on to the other and what remains is the super-ego. This manifests itself as pathological guilt-feeling and inhibits all impulses which one ascribes to the

other. If the bondage of the masochist leads to submission to another ego, then the pronounced tendency of the jealous one leads to domination of the other ego, i.e., forbidding him temptations which one cannot inhibit in oneself. Whereas in the jealous one the impulse to possess is definitely marked, so the masochist shows a tendency to give up, to sacrifice. In other words in neither of those extreme manifestations is there the reciprocity characteristic to real love where a desire to possess as well as the ability to give up is equally strong in both and mutual. There is a simultaneous and mutual inter-mingling of projection and identification on both sides, which paralyses the exaggerated manifestations of a too far reaching projection or identification respectively leading to some kind of neurotic reactions.

The study of pathological masochism thus helps us to understand the normal bondage as an accompaniment of infatuation just as the delusion of jealousy explains the jealousy of the infatuated, which indeed is proverbial. These are the necessary accompaniments of the process of infatuation already described. Projection of one's own inhibitions on to the loved one gives free rein to the demands of the impulse-ego; projection of one's own impulses on to the other justifies their uninhibited expression, as we find them again in the other. Thus there takes place already in the first stage of infatuation an enormous unburdening of the ego from inhibitions and freeing of impulses as the accompaniments of which we find bondage and jealousy in the above mentioned sense. If projection whether of inhibitions, whether of the impulses goes too far, then the just described pathological symptoms will follow, namely of masochism on the one side and delusion of jealousy on the other. In the analysis of both these symptoms we come up against the guilt-feeling, which we now want to explain in this connection.

The bondage of the lover corresponds more to an emotional dependency, as if so to say one needed the other only for projection. Real masochism like love carries it on to a more concrete physical level, only that - as in love - it goes back to infantile experiences (such as being beaten, etc.). The guilt is added later on at the ethical stage and has as its tendency the justification of dependency, submission, and humiliation. It is as if the individual would say: I will not lower myself to my impulse-ego, but I deserve this humiliation (as punishment). Naturally, the humiliation itself again increases the guilt-feeling and so

is formed the circle of projection, love, gratification, and guilt-feeling. To summarize as mentioned, it is a matter of a projection of all higher inhibitions of character on to the other. So with the guilt-feeling and the desire for punishment the ego falls back again to the primitive and lower stage of morality. Physical punishment which was originally imposed on the ego becomes ethically motivated through the guilt-feeling as an impulse gratification. From the primitive formula; the uninhibited impulse gratification destroys punishment, comes the ethical formula; I want punishment because I deserve it.

As the analysis of bondage has led us to masochism and finally to the guilt-feeling, so we come from jealousy to sadism and narcissism which both strive against submission. Sadism strives against it again in the physical sphere by inflicting pain (beating), jealousy, at the emotional level, and narcissism at the third level in that it places one's own ego above the other ego in an anti-ethical way.

Until now we have spoken of love and infatuation without mentioning sexuality. This was not on purpose, but only because the phenomena which we have hitherto dealt with, lie beyond the biological sex problem, and are rooted in the ego. Not only the analytic infatuation which one has described as "transference", but also the actual infatuation with or without physical expression is possible as is well known just as much between persons of the same sex and indeed with the accompanying phenomena such as bondage and jealousy. But also the attempt to explain even the pathological manifestations of these symptoms from the sexual role alone is unsatisfactory. Without doubt, the sex role of the male is active, that of the female passive. But in psychology we do not get further with this simple formula not even if we take for our help the biological bi-sexuality. The man can be just as masochistic as the woman, indeed it is a well known fact that the pathological masochists are recruited from men who want to be dominated by the strong woman. But this is not so much a change of the biological sex role as added a psychological activity and passivity which either harmonises or comes into conflict with the biological. In any case it is the psychological activity-passivity problem with which we have to deal. It manifests itself characterologically and can be therapeutically influenced, whereas the biologically given activity or passivity, i.e., masculinity or femininity is an unalterable factor. But activity and

passivity in the psychological sphere are no longer strange to use, for we can easily recognise in them the two sides of our personality which we have characterologically described as impulse-ego and inhibition-ego. The impulse-ego is active, the inhibition-ego is passive both for man and woman.

The sex differentiation, i.e., the biological sex role becomes important insofar as the woman's biological passivity strengthens the inhibiting character and so leads to a more passive inhibited type. But if this goes too far, as frequently happens, the consequence is that the woman becomes incapable of real love. She is to say, so passive that she cannot accept love or devotion. The reason being that in consequence of her inhibited activity she is unable to give love in return, as this give and take is the pre-supposition of love. In extreme cases this inability to accept manifests itself pathologically as guilt-feeling and leads to the typical symptom of frigidity. On the other hand, in the man, the biological sex role as a rule strengthens the impulse character and decreases the force of the inner inhibitions. But in its place the man has more external inhibitions, which we may summarize as social anxiety. If in the case of the man the strengthening of the impulse-ego by the biological activity goes too far, then follows the uninhibited "impulse-character". In pathological cases we see the necessary re-establishing of the inner inhibitions taking the form of complete incapability of action, manifesting itself as depression. But normally we see the wholesome constructive effect of this mutual influence of the biological and characterological activity and passivity. The man with a stronger biological activity will perhaps strengthen his inhibition-character as a self protection or for the purpose of adjustment. The woman with a stronger biological passivity or femininity will strengthen her impulse character in order, not to be too passive or in other words in order to be capable of love. At the same time it is apparent, how with all these complicated and subtle mechanisms the borders can easily be crossed in either the one or the other direction. Then the individual is either too little or too strongly inhibited. This can manifest itself equally in the sexual as in the social sphere.

But here the psychological and characterological importance of the sexual life in general and of the love life in particular becomes valid. In the conflict between the biological ego and the characterological ego which we try to

harmonize and to balance in our personality, the love partner plays a part which we might designate as "assistant-ego". By means of the described mechanisms of projection and identification we are able at least temporarily to establish a better equilibrium. A plus or minus in characterological activity or passivity which disturbs our equilibrium, we can throw on to the other by means of projection or find in him by means of identification. And when the emotional need of the other corresponds with our own, then the two "assistant-egos" supplement one another and form a complete harmonious Self. That constitutes the happy state of love or rather the process of mutual intuition, projection, and identification leading to it which we have described as infatuation.

In the development of the ego we can differentiate the following phases in relation to its attitude to the love object; in childhood, identification with the parents predominates in the meaning of education and adjustment. Adolescence signifies the great effort to free oneself from the parents, namely in the first real infatuation which has no kind of a prototype in relation to the parents but is the first strong expression towards the development of the personality in the form of projection. The first creative self expression of the personality at the same time corresponds to a freeing from the yoke of parental identification. In maturity finally we see a phase following on, which tries to unite harmoniously and lastingly the two extremes, of a predominant identification in childhood and of an exaggerated projection in adolescence. This is the lasting relationship to a person founded on infatuation, a relationship which we might designate as marriage apart from whether it leads to a legal state of matrimony or not.

But with the further development of the ego, as already mentioned, there become necessary new adjustments which in the case of matrimony lead not easily to the change of object, but to a lasting and increased effort of adjustment to the same object. But this is possible only in the simultaneous parallel development of the partners which does not always spontaneously take place. Indeed as a rule one finds in the partner at first resistance to any change, which may be only gradually given up. As in every lasting love relationship, also in marriage the partner from being a protection against temptations, becomes the representative of one's own inner inhibitions, and eventually an external hindrance, a fetter. This is felt especially strongly in the case of matrimony. But psychological analysis shows that the

emotional bondage in cases of free unions or alliances is much stronger, because just everything rests on the feeling of inner responsibility, a burden which in the case of matrimony is borne by the law and so signifies a strong emotional unburdening.

So much for the constructive side of the love life, so to say for infatuation as a therapeutic means for the healing of ego-conflicts. But like all means of cure this also has its dangers. A too strong dose of it creates again new symptoms which can no longer be healed by the same medication, although, if attempted again and again, the fact of its becoming habitual leads to a kind of neutralization which finally makes it ineffective. We cannot therefore be surprised at the fact that when it fails, the results, namely emotional conflicts, prove to be just as much if not more complicated than the state of infatuation itself which caused them.

Hence we cannot here follow in detail the different conflicts and symptoms in which the new dissension of the ego manifests itself after it has once been exposed to the love therapy. In any case the conflicts are as a rule more difficult afterwards than they were before because they have become complicated by the addition of a new element. If formerly they were purely internal, yet during the infatuation they did not cease to exist; they were only projected externally and paralyzed by this kind of distribution. When, however, the balance is disturbed the difficulties increase because the real conflicts now react back again on the internal ones. The common mechanism which intervenes in the mutual relationship between the internal and the external is that of self-protection. Regardless of whether the love partner is a representative of our impulses or of our inhibitions, in either case the projection on to the love partner is a protective measure against a complete abandonment of the Self. I mean that by this method of projection we unburden ourselves of some of our impulses or inhibitions which otherwise would be unbearable in ourselves or would lead to pathological expressions. This protective role of the partner designated by the term "assistant-ego" can very easily pass over into the role of hindrance, especially if the equilibrium was established by the "assistant-ego" and if we think we no longer need it. In this case, the partner, from being a representative of our ego becomes a real hindrance to it, against which the impulse-ego defends itself with all its power, as earlier it defended itself against its own inner inhibitions.

In such situations one generally calls up a new or second "assistant-ego" in order to protect oneself against the first and if possible to take it in exchange for the first. These are the well known triangular situations, which not only exist between man and woman, but also between the same sexes, indeed do not even presuppose a sexual relationship at all. Tracing back such triangular situations to the Oedipus situation signifies then not much more than that the child has already been accustomed to work with such assistant-egos. From the viewpoint of the ego psychology the following mechanism is effective. Inasmuch as the first "assistant-ego" changes from a protection into a hindrance, the second "assistant-ego" becomes a protection against the first and at the same time a representative of the temptations of the impulse-ego. In other words, the desire for a new love object seems to be impeded through the hindrance of the earlier one, but is in reality determined just through the fact that the earlier one has become a "hindrance". Such triangular situations are the indication that inner transformations and displacements are taking place, these necessitate also an external new distribution, that is, a new projection. Thus they correspond to a transitional stage, are a new stage in the ego development and are a means to this end.

This explains why this new attitude is always accompanied by the guilt-feeling, which is the more intense the more the other individual is used in the part of assistant-ego. At the biological level this state of affairs is designated by the term "sexual-object", which signifies that the other is a mere object for the gratification of the sex instinct. But even at this level we must apparently justify the sex-instinct, in that we interpret as a means for the propagation of the species, for the begetting of children. At the psychological level in relation to the love object, the justification seems to be given in the development of one's own personality in the creation of one's own ego, instead of in the creation of children.

As one sees in the emotional life, sexuality receives various symbolic meanings and finally is even interpreted psychologically. So for example, masculine and feminine are connected not only with active and passive, strong and weak, superior or inferior, but as mentioned, are interpreted also psychologically. In this an important role is played by the idea of that which is intellectual being

masculine, that which is emotional being feminine. We find then at this stage, in place of the biological relation of impulse and inhibition, the psychological relation of emotion and intellect. The inhibitions are no longer directed against the impulses, but against their psychical representatives, the emotions. Only these become still more carefully suppressed and concealed as impulses because their uninhibited expression leads rather to disappointment and causes much stronger inner pain as a reaction. The impulse gratification on the physical level is more mutual than on the emotional level, where it can be one-sided. But even dissatisfaction at the physical level is never so painful as a disappointment on the emotional level. This explains most of the difficulties and conflicts in the human being's sexual life. The sexual impulse is no longer purely biological but serves such more the purpose of the ego strivings than it does in the case of the animals. Hence perhaps also the important difference between the animal and the human sex impulses; in the animal it is definitely restricted to periods in the so-called rutting-season; the human sexual need on the other hand is determined more by emotional factors which are rooted in the ego. It is well known how many human beings out of a disappointment in the ego take refuge in masturbation as consolation and substitute; but the same often enough holds good of sexual acts with another person, and for example can be plainly seen in homosexuality, especially in men. But such a use of sexuality exclusively or predominantly in the service of the ego is for most part unsatisfactory and indeed both for the ego as also for the sexual impulse itself. For the ego, because sexuality in this case operates only as a temporary sedative; for the sex impulse it is unsatisfactory because there is lacking the essential factor in sexual gratification, namely reciprocity and abandonment in the object.

The chief symptom in which this dissatisfaction manifests itself is the guilt-feeling which then produces secondarily the most varied symptoms, earlier described as "neurasthenic". Thus it is not as Freud first thought, the suppression of the sexual impulse which causes guilt-feeling and anxiety, but is the ego's false use of, if one likes the misuse of sex. Here also as everywhere, the guilt-feeling proves to be an ethical index for the degree of egoism which has gone too far. At the biological stage it is fear or anxiety which corresponds to the guilt-feeling, likewise being an index of the danger into which the ego enters or finds itself.

If we consider these general biological, psychological and ethical reactions of the human being separately for each sex, then we can make the following rough distinctions which, naturally may not always appear as clearly in every single case. For that purpose we have to go back to our differentiation between the biological activity and passivity and the characterological, formerly described as impulse-ego and inhibition-ego. With regard to man and woman respectively we can then say: In the woman the conflict between the two parts of the Self will generally be greater than in the man and therefore more difficult to harmonize with the other. The reason for this being as already mentioned, that in the woman the activity of the impulse-ego is inhibited or paralyzed by the passivity of the biological ego. Normally, in the relationship with the active male partner the woman finds her complement; but this is becoming gradually more and more difficult in our cultural milieu, because the increasing social claims and demands on the man inhibit him more and more characterologically. As a result of this we see eventually man and woman meeting as two passive egos which inhibit rather than supplement one another.

In other words we see that in the human being the biological ego is overgrown by the characterological ego and is so dominated by it that the simple biological sex role is no longer gratifying. Something else has to be added in order to make the sex life acceptable to the characterological as also to the ethical Self. And this necessary addition is love which, so to say, harmonizes the biological and the characterological demands emotionally and justifies them ethically. In case this fails we see anxiety and guilt appearing at the biological or ethical level respectively. In simple words, conflict arises from the fact that man and woman have grown more alike with regard to their ego psychology, that means with regard to general character traits, emotions, and ethical ideas. This only emphasizes the biological differences. To the extent that the emotional and the characterological in the human life have become more important than the biological, to that extent man and woman as individual, as personalities, are becoming more and more alike. This characterological similarity makes it more difficult to harmonize the two individualities biologically at the sex level. Hence all the conflicts in the sexual and social relationships between man and woman are increasing.

This explains in my opinion the whole movement of feminism, the so-called endeavours of the woman to become masculine, so much discussed and fought over in the present day. The slogan is: the woman wants to be like the man, to be a man. It seems to me that both sides are neither right nor wrong, because they entirely overlook the real problem. I think that the woman has already actually become like the man in the above-mentioned sense. Therefore I think that the masculinity tendencies are only expressions or rather symbols of the already existing psychological similarity. The whole problem takes on a different aspect and turning it one way in feminism the establishment of a fact instead of a claim to it. In other words, it is not we want to be like the man, but we are like him and therefore we claim the same rights. But these rights are actually emotional, not social ones, that means the woman has the same emotional rights because her emotions are governed by the same psychological laws.

This concept, psychologically well founded, has its support in another phenomenon of our times, which is as conspicuous as feminism but not so much discussed. I refer to the fact that so many men nowadays are definitely becoming feminine and ape the woman no less than the woman is supposed to ape the man. But with the effeminate man where there is no possibility of rationalizing this impulse socially with regard to privileges, it becomes obvious that this striving for equality is an expression of this existing similarity of which we have spoken.

This concept throws a new light not only on the social side of the sex's relation one to another but also on certain manifestations in the sexual sphere itself which are characteristic for our time. By this I mean the noticeable increase in so-called homosexuality. Of course, I am using homosexuality not as a psychiatric term denoting pathological aberration, but by it I mean the living together of two persons of the same sex in a union which has all the characteristics of a marital relationship. I think we can understand this undeniable tendency in the sex life of our times, in the light of this my concept just presented. Man and woman have become psychologically too much alike, so that they no longer supplement but rather inhibit one another biologically. Whereas before the biological difference formed a strong complimentary attraction, now it is felt as a hindrance to a complete equality also on the biological level, and so

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this complete equality is almost always found in the same sex. Such relationships are therefore sometimes much more satisfactory from an emotional as well as from an ethical viewpoint, than are the heterosexual ones. But they are far from being free from conflict, which here arises from biological dissatisfaction, whereas in heterosexual relationships the conflicts are more apt to be caused by emotional frustration.

In our discussion of the love life and its problems, we could scarcely avoid introducing historical viewpoints in referring to some phenomena in our sex life as being characteristic of our time. This historical aspect becomes necessary because love, as we understand it psychologically proves to be a rather late development in the human life, quite in contrast to sexuality which belongs to the biological fundamentals of our existence. We cannot be concerned here in pointing out when and how love originated. Certainly there was a long period covering most of the ancient times, when love as we understand it was practically unknown. From what we have said about the mechanism of infatuation, it seems to me that it is the same development towards individuality and personality leading to the psychological similarity, which compels the individual to this modern emotional expression which we might call romanticism. As we have said before, the essential mechanism of this romantic infatuation is projection. Projection is, however, nothing but a desire to find one's own Self in the other, to create it even if it does not exist there. If we succeed in this the result is the maximum of happiness. The other is now allowed to supplement the ego biologically because the partner has first been made part of the ego by projection and identification. In case of failure there result all the severe disturbances in the emotional equilibrium manifesting themselves as maladjustments in the sexual or social spheres of our life.

Social Adaptation and Creativity

In the genetic psychology I have attempted to show how the Ego develops genetically from the relation to the object, and what typical forces and ways of reactions or mechanisms it constructs within by reason of this development. This has finally led us to a synthesis in the doctrine of character, which we have considered as the border line between genetic and constructive psychology. Character as originally formed from identifications is a product, the result of the Ego development. On the other hand, character in its manifestations works objectively, thus determines and influences the attitude and reactions of the Ego to the external world.

In the lecture on the significance of the love life, we have made the first attempt to show how the finished character of the human being, the fully developed personality, behaves towards a definite object in the external world, in the love relationship. Therefore we no longer went back as we did in the genetic part, to the first relationship of the individual to an object, namely the mother. But psychologically we took into consideration only the characterological sediment of the mother in the Ego. To justify this I would like to bring to your notice two factors. First, that the fully developed character of the personality involves in it much more and something else besides the sediment of the maternal relationship; namely above all the development of one's own characterological Self from the ideal formation. Secondly, that hence also the sediment of the maternal relationship in the Ego is preserved not purely as such, but is diluted, displaced and elaborated.

But in emphasizing the purely characterological and especially the share that our own Self has in it, we emphasize at the same time the constructive side, if one likes, the creative side in ourselves. For the relation of the Ego to the Thou is no longer a mere repetition of the child-mother relationship, but is a new creation of this relationship through a definite temperament. This individual character itself was formed first of all on the basis of this childhood's relationship, but works creatively in the love relationship. This is only one side of its function, however. One could designate it best of all as the creative side because it actually newly moulds the Thou according to the Ego, that is tries to make it like the Ego.

The love life in which we tried to show this creative function in its different phases is not only the best example for it, but also the only one that relates to reality whereas otherwise the creative function of the Ego is restricted to the phantasy life, to art.

In this sense one could designate the love life as the sphere in which the ego's creative impulse normally attains its end, whereas art is a related but not generally accessible outlet of this creative impetus of the Ego. To both expressions is common the creative element which psychologically we can define as the tendency to transform the object, the world into an expression of our Ego. In artistic creation this impetus can spend itself uninhibited, because the object and the material are scarcely restrictions to the personality's artistic endeavour to imprint on everything the complete stamp of its Ego. In the love relationship it is more complicated in that the object represents just such a personality as one's own Ego and has the same creative endeavours as one's own Self. However, under favourable conditions, as stated, there remains enough scope for the gratification of the creative Ego-needs. On the other hand, however, it is much more difficult to change the love object if it does not subject itself to the creative will.

In both cases, in art and in love, it is a matter of the pronounced creative functions of the Ego, i.e., an attempt to imprint the stamp of one's own personality on the object; in one case on the material, in the other on the living object. In both situations adjustment or the will to adjust is lacking. It is completely lacking in art in which we find the so-called free play of creative phantasy. It is lacking in the love relationship where, similar to the artist, we have the choice of a suitable object and in the case of this not being sufficient, we have the possibility of another choice, of a change. In both cases, however, it is a matter of changing reality, the external world, by our Ego in the meaning and in the service of our personality. The underlying tendency is to make the object, the world, a part of our Ego, similar to it and like it.

Quite otherwise is it if we go from art as an exceptional sphere and from love as an exceptional state, back to the so-called normal relation of the individual to others, and to the world of reality in general. Here we have before us a process which represents just the very opposite

from that just described. And in this process indeed our own Ego is forced into the role of an Assistant-ego with regard to the world of reality. It is a question of persons or objects or situations in reality in general, whom and which we can neither choose nor change as we would like. A matter of factors which occasionally, indeed as a rule, are stronger than our ego, in any case are not subjected to it nor can be influenced by it. Often enough they try even to influence our ego, to alter and to restrict it. These are the factors such as Milieu in general, and strong personalities in particular who want to imprint on us their stamp, but in any case to compel us to adjustment.

As one can easily see, everything which falls into the category of education in particular and of the hard school of life in general, belongs here; everything beginning from the first external privations and weaning up to life's experiences and destinies of the mature man. Likewise everything which we shall describe later on as a means of help to better adjustment. But in order to understand the psychological and constructive importance of this social adjustment, we must first of all study its mechanisms again in a definite situation, where it is manifest indeed one-sidedly and distorted, but on that account quite clearly. This is again the love relationship, that according to its nature aspires to a minimum of adjustment, but as mentioned, is not so successful in this as in art, because in love it is a matter of a second personality, who demands a particular kind of adjustment.

The simplest case comes under consideration in the purely biological relation of the sexes. Here adjustment is nothing other than the pursuance of the sexual role for the one, and acceptance of the sex role for the other. But immediately we leave the purely biological sphere - and that we have to do in the human being's love life - this relationship becomes complicated in the ways described in the lecture on the love life. But whereas in our former consideration of the love life we emphasized the purely subjective creative side, now we want to stress the other side. This we designate as adjustment and follow it in its effects on the Ego and from there in its reactions on the object. In this we shall have to show also how the union of these two elements, the creative and the adjusting, leads to that which one designates as the relation between the Ego and the external world, thus, to the foundation of our social life and our attitude to the world in general.

It is then the establishment of the relationship or better of a definite relation between the ego and the object which determines success or failure in adjustment, in extreme cases illness or health and not least of all happiness or unhappiness. What kind of relationship is this now, and how is it established. To answer this question we must go back to the two fundamental facts of our emotional life, described as projection and identification. With reference to the problem under discussion, of the relation of Ego and object, one might say that the two mechanisms just mentioned are themselves representatives, indeed exact manifestations of this dualism between the ego and the world. Projection is a pronounced Ego-mechanism, identification a pronounced object-mechanism. So far the state of affairs would be simple - and is also under primitive conditions - if, with the development of the human individuality and likewise the human intellect, these processes did not become more and more complicated. As is well known the primitive man projects his ego or part of his ego into the world of gods, spirits, and heroes, as a reality worthy of belief. This does not in the least disturb his adjustment to reality, on the contrary it seems to facilitate it. We have not only the same need for projection, but with the development of personality has grown the need to imprint things with the stamp of our ego. On the other hand our intellectual development blocks the way to a naive projection on to the heavens. And so nothing else remains for us but art in the form of a conventional fictitious world, in the reality of which we do not believe. Besides this, there is another less pleasant way which leads us back to the problem of success or failure in adjustment.

This solution or rather, this detour, is the following. On the one side there is the individualistic ego's increased need for projection, and on the other, the blocking of the primitive outlet into a fictitious reality. This forces us to new ways of expression. With the exception of art, we now project our ego into the actual world of reality. But, there the conjunction with realities foreign to our ego creates conflicts which demand new solutions. This throws a light on the significance of technical means in general as being means of subjugating to our will the opposing reality. Here we leave this interesting theme on one side and want only to refer to the fact that Man in his technical discoveries and organizations to an incredible degree projects his own ego physically and emotionally.

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What we want to follow further here is the projection of the ego on to the fellow being in general and on to the love object in particular. This apparently takes place in human history that where the idealization of the ego in gods and heroes became impossible through intellectual disillusionment, the need still existed and was then projected on to the fellow beings in whom one wanted to find one's ideal. This led to the love relationship. The Greek humanizing of the god-ideal, as seen in the Homeric description of heroes, was the beginning of the twilight of the gods. This only culminated centuries later in the christian Man-god. In a similar way the last human projection, namely love, may eventually be unmasked by the new psychology likewise as an illusion.

But for the present the love problem itself is in a state of "twilight", that is, in other simple words, we have to deal with all the difficulties and conflicts in adjusting to the love object and hence to reality in general. In order to understand these we turn back to the fundamental schemes of projection and identification. First we ask ourselves concerning the mutual effect of these two mechanisms, the factors representing the inner and the outer for the attainment of adjustment. We see then two things: the ideal aim of projection is to make the object absolutely like the ego and so dispense with superfluous adjustment. The aspiration of identification is to make one's own ego like the object and in this way to establish the desired identity, which at the same time also requires a minimum of adjustment. But naturally neither of these two ways is ever completely successful. But in both tendencies we can again clearly recognize the two types already described; projection corresponds to the active impulsive masculine, sadistic type; identification to the passive, inhibited, feminine, masochistic type. This differentiation explains at the same time in what cases projection or identification fails and leads to maladjustment.

Both mechanisms as already said have the tendency to smooth down the differences between the two individuals and to establish an identity. But in both cases there is a certain degree of equality or similarity in the other, the presupposition for projection or identification. This presupposition is clearer in identification which according to Freud's first definition of this process rests on something really common existing between the two. But on the more or less of what is really common to both depends the manner, degree and success of the identification. The ego is absorbed in a too complete identification. If too

little is in common then, what is missing will be supplemented by projection. But this is an uncertain factor as the love life clearly shows. For with an alteration, a development of the ego, the projection also changes and with it totters identification resting on it. Hence in the mechanism of projection a plus or minus is more dangerous than in identification. In other words if the relation rests only on identification the need for projection remains unsatisfied and seeks other often pathological outlets. On the other hand, if there is nothing in common and something first has to be created, then this leads to pure illusion and soon to complete disillusion.

If now after this description of the constructive and destructive effects of these mechanisms, we follow their genetic development, we get the following picture. In the child with its weakly developed ego there is scarcely any projection but very much identification. In other words, the child has potentially every possibility in itself to develop the powers and capabilities it sees in the adult. And it accomplishes this by means of imitation or identification. The child's adjustment is thus in our meaning a passive receptive one, resting on identification. It is the weaker one's way of adjustment and might be called "masochistic" because it does not strive for the mastery of the object but for subjection to the same. In other words, the ego is made similar to or like the object.

Adolescence with its symptoms of storm and stress, is the individual's first attempt to free itself from the yoke of the identification mechanism, the symbol of which is the parental image. Hence the revolt accompanying adolescence in the social and sexual spheres. Hence also the first infatuation or falling in love, which as stated is by no means a seeking and finding of the parental image, but a seeking and finding of one's own rebellious Self in another ego of the same age or better of the same youthfulness, frequently enough even of the same sex. In the adult finally, with the complete development of the personality and its striving for expression, we find a compromise in the love relationship which unites the old parental patterns of identification with the new creative individualistic urge towards expression, chiefly in projection.

At this stage of the mature, fully developed love life we find, however, the projection and identification mechanisms operating in a new constructive way. Identification is no longer - or at least should no longer be a copy

of the infantile submissiveness to the object. In other words, it should no longer be a dependent or forced identification but a spontaneous voluntary identification corresponding to the Self and sanctioned by the Ego by means of projection. But also projection is different from that occurring at sublimity. Whereas at the same time that there was too much projection, as in childhood too much identification, now at the mature level projection is based on a real identification just as identification is sanctioned by projection.

The constructive development of projection and identification as representations of the ego and object towards a mutual love relationship, manifests itself also at different stages of the emotional life as well as in other human relationships. In a word we can describe this process of development as progress from the identification character to the formation of personality, or from adjustment to creation. If earlier the unconscious aim of pure projection was the establishment of an identity, now in its relation to others the result is adjustment. Instead of wanting to transform the other in our meaning, to make the other like us, we are now able to accept the other as he is, that is, to adjust ourselves by means of identification. The result of this endeavour is the establishment of the "relationship". The means to it at this conscious level is the understanding which rests on intuition and corresponds to unconscious identification. This acceptance of the other is only possible when we first of all are able to accept ourselves, i.e., our true Self, instead of having to throw it out of ourselves, namely project it on to the other.

Instead of that we can choose at this stage the real object so that it corresponds to our inner need without demanding too much expenditure of projection or identification. Herewith result three possibilities. Either the object supplements our ego in the sense of impulse, or in the sense of inhibition, or it is a copy of our whole personality, impulse as well as inhibition. It seems that the relationship to the complementary ego yields more possibilities of friction and conflict but also that it forces one to a permanent adjustment and hence on the whole operates constructively. This may also be the case because the adjustment to the complimentary ego fits into the adjustment on the biological level, being as it were the adjustment to the complimentary biological self. The relation to

the idealized ego is more creative, perhaps more pleasurable, demands less adjustment but may easily operate destructively. In particular cases, however, where it succeeds in paralyzing the task of external inhibition and the corresponding adjustment by inner criticism and development of one's own personality, such a relationship can also work out creatively.

Here we touch the problem of the relation of the character-type and love-object to work. In other words not only to adjustment, but to social accomplishment, which under certain conditions can be most creative. If we start with creative work which is more easily accessible to our investigation, we find that this relationship is not so constant as one would expect. Perhaps this comes from the fact that the negative type in general is much more dynamic and hence in its relations, whether to love or to work, is less constant. Nevertheless it may be constant that in creative work, similarly as in the love relationship, it is a matter either of a necessary projection of a part of the ego or of projection of the whole personality. Presumably that distinguishes the two creative types which one has distinguished in the artist who creates from inner need and the artist who creates from a super-abundance. The first so-called romantic type must project itself in its work; the other classical type expresses itself in its work. But on the other hand, these types again correspond more to the subjective projection type and to the objective identification type.

In reality, however, these types are not sharply defined, but as in every type it is a question of the more or less. In any case there is manifest a clear correlation between life and work. So for example, a definite creative type with a love object not merely complimentary but contrary, can be disunited in love with romantic content. In other words his work betrays the disunion hidden in his personality, because the love object is neither identical nor complimentary and so the whole personality-projection goes into work. The opposed type would be the disunited in personality, strongly projective type in the love life, who finds his ego content in work and expresses it in classical form. In other words he finds in his work that union which is lacking in his personality, whereas in his romantic love life he seeks not the compliment but identity which he does not find in his work. By using the concept of the ideal one might describe the state of affairs

thus: the romantic type seeks his ego ideal in work and his ego in the love life; the idealized type gives his ego ideal to his work and his ego to the love life. Hence the love life of this idealized type is more ideal and bourgeois, his work on the other hand is negatively glorified. The romantic appreciates his work as little as his ego, but on that account glorifies the love object.

If we pass from this consideration of the extreme creative types to the average social accomplishment, then all the mentioned compensations disappear or become indistinct and we should not know how the so-called social adjustment of the average human being occurs if we could not study his disturbances in the cases of maladjustment. Then it shows that the fundamental mechanisms are the same in all cases. In the simple worker as in the intellectual worker the occupation is at least an expression of the striving of the personality as it is in the creative artist. Also the relation between the love life and the occupation is dynamically determined in the same way. Only the creative type in general involves more contrast, compensations, whereas in the average person it is more a matter of parallel between the social and love life. But again this difference corresponds to a preference of projection in the artist and of identification in the average person.

In other words, the occupation and love life of the average human being is on the whole formed on identification. The son often enough actually carries on the father's occupation, continues as it were his work and family life. Still more clearly does the daughter carry on the mother's life. This type never gets beyond the development of this identification character, but as a consequence is better adjusted to reality. But if this adjustment once loses its balance, it is almost impossible to help them, because they have not the possibilities of a personality within themselves and they can hardly develop one. In most favourable cases one can give them a new identification which, however, even if it works at all - is not very productive. Many of the so-called "nervous breakdowns" are actually such breakdowns of the old identifications which could not be substituted within by the formation of a personality of one's own.

But just as many of the so-called neurotics belong to the other type, i.e., no matter what occupation they may practice - are the creative type in the sense that they have

failed in the formation and development of their own personality. One cannot help these by driving them back to the old identifications or by offering them new possibilities of identification. One has to help them to get beyond the deadlock in their personality and in the process of finding themselves. I think that the so-called inner crises in the human being's life correspond to the stage of their development in that the old identifications break down under the burden of their own strengthened ego before this ego is strong enough to bear the whole burden of the new personality. Hence these crises occur so frequently when the individual has attained in life a certain success which he justly ascribes to himself, to his own personality, as it is not due to identification alone.

However this may be, in any case in these common emotional crises we see also the relationship in the love object wishes, and the individual looking for new solutions. Here it is sufficient for our purpose if we again only single out the typical situations and estimate them in their relation to our theory. According to our statements the human being's object-choice can occur in three ways; the love object is either a mother substitute, or an ego substitute or finally an ego supplement. The mother substitute and the ego supplement are related insofar as they represent two opposite types which also successively stand at the beginning and end of the individual's development, the mother substitute is libidinal, thus a positive ego supplement. The ego supplement is characterological, thus a negative ego supplement. The mother substitute corresponds to an adjustment in the primitive infantile sense of subordination to the object, of identification with the same, the ego supplement corresponds to a real adjustment in the constructive sense, in that by means of mutual projection and identification a real supplement is attained. Between these two possibilities of adjustment, the positive libidinal and the negative characterological lies the object-choice in the sense of a complete ego substitute which requires no kind of adjustment at all.

Normally the ego develops historically from the need of a positive mother substitute conforming to childhood, by way of the parasitic ego substitute conforming to puberty, to the characterological ego supplement conforming to the mature personality. Naturally in reality it is a matter of transition and mixed forms and the crises in the development from ego to personality are characterized

just through the fact that either one cannot become free in one's own inner being from the earlier type or the difficulties of the new adjustment lie in the object.

To this threefold possibility in the emotional relation to the love object corresponds a threefold possibility in man's general social relationship. As stated the mutual relationship between these two, namely the social and love life, can be either parallel or contrary. Here we wish to consider the social side alone. As then we, as already mentioned, find the average type reacts more as himself than the creative type more on the development and cultivation of one's own self or ego-ideal. In the purely social sphere we find the creative type as leader. This type is represented in mythology in idealized form as hero. Here we will consider the leader only as a psychological type, apart from whether he exhibits himself in the political sphere or in any other kind of sphere. The leader type in this meaning is a creative self-asserting type, which one would call a man of will or man of action, and who wants not only to preserve his ego and his personality, but also wants to impose it on others. For the average human being the significance of the leader in this sense, is so to say, a compromise in that the leader spares the average human the formation of personality, that is, makes it possible through identification. If the leader type were not driven by his inner need towards the development and expression of his personality, one could almost say that the average type orders the leader to accomplish this difficult and painful task, for example, as expressed in the Christ suffering for all mankind. But the genuine social leader, whether a politician or general or employer or any kind of a "master", as a rule is well paid for this position through which the others profit by means of identification. In other words, he uses the others and their love to strengthen and further his own ego. In the social sphere it is obviously those who work for the leader who play the part of "assistant-ego", and the whole class war bears witness to this fact. But the whole class war is as hopeless as vain, because it takes into consideration only the physical and mechanical labor on the one hand and the leader's material profit on the other hand. But the study of the other human relations as, for example, the love-relationship, teaches us to recognize the emotional side also in the leader problem. In the love or friendship relations we let the other emotionally work for us and our development benefits from it. When we can supply for the other a similar service then this relationship is ideal. But often enough it is as degraded as that

of leader and led, or of master and slave. But even in the relationship to the leader it is not so much one-sided as it seems to us. The leader himself needs the adherents or supporters not only for the physical or emotional work, but first of all for the psychological or creative work in the one hand, and as material for the same, on the other hand. Just as the sculptor needs the clay, or the painter the canvas and colors, so the leader needs living material. For the average person, then, the subordinating himself to the leader, the physical or emotional effort represents the price he pays in order to buy the identification with the leader's personality, and to be able himself the painful effort toward development and creation.

The discussion of the leader problem in its social and emotional relations leads back again to the psychoanalytic situation and from there to the problem of education. If formerly the analyst was compared on the one hand with the partner in the love relationship, on the other hand with the parental type of educator, recently he has been compared (by Fromm, for example) with the leader. I think this comparison is as confused as were the previous ones. The analyst does or at least should represent a union of all this, and at the same time something else beyond it, which does not correspond to a combination alone of these different roles. But in the analytic situation we can study the psychology of the love relationship and of the leader relationship as well as the relationship to the educator. From this we can derive new constructive viewpoints for the emotional side of the educational relationship.

In the pedagogic situation we see the problem of the educator in the parental complex, especially manifested in the prototype of the same, namely in the parental relationship. In it, from the very beginning, is the natural state of affairs of the situation, those who are in the position of the weak and the state of affairs in the pedagogic situation. The child, before the child in the Oedipus situation attempts the first revolt against the lasting establishment of this primal state decreed from the beginning. Even in situations where it is not a matter of premature physical labor or of direct cruel actions on the part of the parents, the child is in every case an emotionally exploited object. Yet education itself, in the narrow as in the broader meaning, is nothing else than an attempt of the educator to enforce his personality and his views on the child's ego. Thus the child's part is that of an assistant-ego for the parents. The parents continue the biological procreation of the child in the pedagogic situation and development.

Hence if we want to completely understand the pedagogic situation then we must introduce a new concept referring to the parents in order to complete the picture. To the child's Oedipus complex which is stated represents the first revolt against the subjection of one's own ego, we must contrast the parental complex which best of all we could designate as the Prometheus-Complex. Not only in the meaning of the Greek emotional life, but also in our own emotional life, this Prometheus complex is as important if not more important than the Oedipus complex. But whereas in its nature the Oedipus complex is founded on identification, indeed - at least in the meaning of psychoanalysis - symbolic identification, the Prometheus complex is not only the symbol of the creator's need or desire but it arises also in the individual creatively, that is, spontaneously at a crucial point, and not in identification with the parents. Its first appearance is indeed just as crucial as the Oedipus complex, but unlike this it is not condemned to failure and disappointment. It takes place in puberty, is the expression of the first period of storm and stress, and like the Oedipus complex is overcome only by the mature being. The overcoming of it occurs in the creative work. The Prometheus pressure,

wants to form men in his own image. He attains this in and for himself in the meaning of developing and unfolding his own personality.

In introducing the concept of the Prometheus complex, it is necessary to state how we understand it. Prometheus in the Greek mythos symbolizes the development of man which we have described as the first step in the transition from naive projection to identification and creative accomplishment. Thus Prometheus symbolizes a threefold role. First he assumes that he can create men just as well as the god; thus he himself is a god or better, a god-man, a hero. But his identification with the creating god is nothing else than the projection of his own projection by means of which the gods themselves had been created. Thus it is the dethroning of the gods created by men, and in place of the gods, man now installs himself with his fully developed personality and his need to create.

Secondly Prometheus creates men after his own image just as earlier men had created the gods. In relation to the creation of men this is indeed again a mechanism of projection but is different from the earlier creation of gods. It is a matter of real men, who after their creation by Prometheus, live their own life to which he himself has to adjust by means of identification. Thirdly and lastly, Prometheus creates not only men in general after his own image, but also the love object; in the Prometheus-Sager, Pandora is created as a wish fulfillment. This stage corresponds to the creative tendency of the personality in the love life, namely the creation of the love object by projection in the sense of the wishes of our Self. But at the same time Pandora (as also the other creatures) is a mirror in which Prometheus wants to imprint his own characteristics, and we understand this to be the case in the pedagogic situation.

Herein lies the justification for the punishment of Prometheus whose chaining represents an inhibiting of these presumptuous tendencies in his personality. Not because he stole the fire from the gods, the fire being after all human property, is he punished. But he is punished because he wants to practice with it the same misuse which he himself has learned from the gods and into which creators of men, parents, educators, or therapists can so easily fall. This misuse is namely, to impose on the

creature one's own personality and so to make it first of all a willing object and in the future the successor of one's own ego.

If we turn back from this symbolic fundamental scheme of the pedagogic situation to the analysis of its elements, we find that the two mentioned complexes are again only representative of the more passive submissive adjustment to some sort of identification (in the Oedipus complex) and of the more active dominating creation by means of projection (in the Prometheus complex). We then see immediately the fundamental difference between the infantile situation, the symbol of which is the Oedipus complex, the pedagogic situation, the symbol of which we have introduced as the Prometheus complex, and the analytic situation which is a union of both and at the same time a Something beyond. The difference reduced to the fundamental scheme, is the following: In the infantile situation, the child identifies, and the parents chiefly project on to the child. In the analytic situation we allow the patient to project in order to let him recognize and find his true self, whereas the analyst restricts himself to identification which is necessary to understand the patient. The pedagogic situation is so stated, as a rule a continuance of the infantile situation, only that in place of the parents is installed the teacher who plays or should play more the part of a leader.

What we can now learn from the analytic situation which as we have already seen should be a correction and not a repetition of the infantile situation is the following for the understanding and constructive improvement of the pedagogic situation. In the pedagogic situation the pupil should be brought from the Oedipus complex to the creation of his own personality. I would like to discuss in what follows somewhat in detail this purely psychological and schematic formulation. The Prometheus complex is an emotional reaction to the Oedipus situation. By means of the Prometheus complex the individual wants to transfer the same oppression which he experienced from his parents on to his children, his associates, his subordinates. Perhaps it is necessary for the individual to pass through this phase at which most human beings remain if they have come out at all beyond the Oedipus complex.

The ideal aim of education which we can deduce from the constructive understanding of the analytic

situation, includes, however, not only the overcoming of the Oedipus complex in the Prometheus complex, but also the overcoming of the Prometheus complex in the formation of one's own personality which I would like to designate in a more constructive way as self-guidance. If we introduce the two-fold complex of character, instead of the symbolic concepts formerly used, then we come to a finer differentiation of the pedagogic situation on the one side and of the educational situation following from it on the other. We then recognize again how the threefold fundamental scheme of the projective type manifests itself in the pedagogic situation. To the simple possibility with which we have operated formerly because of easier understanding, is added a more complicated mechanism which embraces in it what is really constructive but which has also destructive possibilities. The projection of one's own personality on the child especially when it is a question of the parents, might be called almost natural, but as can be easily seen, is a very primitive form of education which can be successful only in simple relations. It is quite different when the educator himself is a dis-jointed and neurotic personality, which is projected either as a whole or in its complimentary parts on to the pupil. In addition comes the danger that such a "neurotic" personality in general will incline much more to projection and in particular to the projection of the parts of his personality which are rejected or despised because they are inefficient and useless.

But also when in the light of our conception we consider the constructive possibilities which doubtless lie in the nature of the pedagogic situation, there result possibilities of failure, but also of constructive improvement. Let us take the simple and well known case in which the educator does not impose on the pupil his own Self, nor yet project on him his repressed Self, but where he trains him to be a representative of his better higher Self, in a word wants to make him his Ego-ideal. This is doubtless a constructive attempt in the pedagogic situation, but which in reality does not always lead to success. The difficulties can come from both sides, from the educator or from the pupil; as a rule it is a question of a mutual conflict in which the one reacts on the other.

Let us first consider the difficulties on the side of the educator, or what we might more correctly say, the leader, as these difficulties usually extend beyond the

pedagogic situation into the social spheres. The educator or leader who in the pupil or scholar wants to objectify and attain his Ego-ideal, mostly fails at the point where his endeavour seems to be crowned by success. This does not alone depend on his own ambition and on his envy and jealousy of the younger one, but has a still deeper cause. The attainment, the realization of one's own ego-ideal is always bound up with a disappointment, no matter whether we see this ideal realized in ourselves or in another; the disappointment is perhaps stronger in the second case from the reasons mentioned. The reason for this disappointment is the fact that psychologically only the striving for the ideal is transferable insofar as it unburdens the ego. The attainment of one's ego-ideal therefore means at least the projection, that is, a form of unburdening the ego.

Let us now consider the effect which projection of the educational ego-ideal has on the pupil. Inasmuch as it seems to depend on two factors, on the strength of the leader's personality, on the capability of the pupil to form his own personality, and on the relation of both personalities to each other. In other words, if both are strong, then the educator's influence will succeed only against resistance, but even where it is successful, the educator's projection will only then operate constructively when it can be accepted by a suitably adjusted personality of the pupil by means of identification. If the personality of the pupil in comparison to that of the leader is not strong enough, then this identification can become permanent. But it does not then correspond to a continued development of the leader-personality in the meaning of ideal formation, but more to the biological prototype of a continuation of an ego extension, not an ego development. Thus where the educational relationship passes into a real further development in the sense of ideal formation, two states are possible. We have already mentioned the one, it is the disappointment of the leader in the attainment, the realization of his own Ego-ideal. The second possibility is that the pupil develops himself beyond the master, which can result either in a direct continued development or in a contradictory or in contrary ways.

After having briefly described the dynamic elements of the psycho-social situation and having emphasized with it the constructive sides of education's task, we

want again to consider the genetic viewpoint of the development of our personality in the light of the pedagogic situation. The original kernel of one's own Self is certainly the biological organism, its given disposition and impulses. But in the years for which psychoanalysis has described as a rather necessary way to goal.

Urthruel, genital and oral character. Yet one might add, that these character types do not develop purely from the impulse disposition, but also are formed under the strict educational influence of the parents, emotionally and fundamentally of the mother. In the earliest phase of the training in child-rearing we see the first powerful projection from the side of the mother, and in the child's submission, the first effort towards identification and the accomplishment of her aims. The same holds good, although perhaps in a less degree, for the oral zone and to a still less degree for the genital zone. In other words that come from a certain order of gradation of the erogenous zones and their functions seems to exist in reference to character formation and development of personality. Whenever the mother's conscious aim and endeavor is applied to the control of a specific erogenous zone or its function, the sooner will develop a character trait as a result of the impulse or in the sense of an inhibition. This is obviously the case most of all with the anal zone, hence all the so-called anal character types, which are the most difficult ones (such as stubbornness, etc.) as we see in the analytic picture. But with the urethral function, the fuss in training is less, and this is of importance later for the genital function which makes use of the same organ. Hardly any conscious educational endeavour is made to restrict the normal function of the oral zone; it occurs automatically and gradually through the weaning process. Only the purely pleasurable and playful function in finger-sucking is directly prohibited. In the weaning stage this prohibition is not so frequent as one might be inclined to assume by reason of the "castration theory". Most parents overlook all manifestations of the sexual impulses in their children, and yet if they cannot deny it, then they do not speak about it, not even in the form of a prohibition or threat. I think this is good insofar as it prevents a premature inhibition of the sexual impulses. If the psychoanalytic theory gives the impression that the sexual prohibition or, as the term is, the "castration complex" is universal, this arises from the fact that in analysis we see just those types of human beings who have experienced in some kind of

form a premature inhibition of the sexual impulse.' As I have already stated, this need not necessarily be a direct prohibition from without. It can just as well be a transferring to the genital zone of the prohibition concerning the anal and several zones, a transferring which the individual experiences as a sense of the guilt-feeling.

But in every case we see on the one hand, a quite direct relation between the anal zone and the character development in the form of identification or reaction formation, and on the other hand between the genital zone and the development of one's own personality. The sexual organ especially the male, and the sexual function in general are much more closely bound up with one's own personality than any other organ. The mouth alone has a similar and important role; less in the meaning of the development of personality than as a means to express one's personality namely, in speaking. This relation of the sexual organ and of the sexual impulse to the ability to develop and express one's own Self, one's own personality - in contrast to the acquired character - we see in the most varied forms. Its best known and emotionally most important manifestation is masturbation. The constructive importance of masturbation for the development of one's own Self has not been sufficiently estimated. In this sense, masturbation is not only a result of the Self against a command imposed from without or from within, but it is also an act of one's own, performed on one's own initiative and on one's own responsibility. In other words, it is that physical function which is influenced least of all by education and least of all in "liberal". Experience shows - and it may be on account of this - that it is that function which plays the greatest part in the development of personality. We see this connection positively in great personalities, men of science or artists, whose sexual life as a rule is richer and freer than that of the average man. We see it negatively in the so-called neurotic in whom the failure to develop personality and the failure in the sexual life represent the two most conspicuous characteristics. The way to help them in both respects seems to me, however, not to be that which the analytic therapy has hitherto attempted, but the reverse. That is, it seems to me more difficult and is certainly less successful to attempt the therapeutic work of adjustment in the sexual sphere. According to my experience, one gets much better, more lasting and more useful results when one

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strives for the freeing of the self, the development of the personality. As a rule this automatically brings with it the sexual adjustment.

With regard to the educational task, it seems to be an advantage as far as the development of personality is concerned, that the sexual impulse, was, so to say, excluded from education and as it were consigned to the Ego for education and development. It was almost the only sphere over which the individual was left in control and it seems that modern education wants to deprive the individual himself of this only and last domain of free self development and self decision. One ought not to refer in argument to the numerous and sometimes severe conflicts which develop in the individual in this sphere of self direction, as for example, the typical masturbation conflict. These difficulties and sufferings are not spared the individual in the other spheres where parents and educators take the initiative and bear the responsibility. On the other hand, in self decision and self direction as characterized in the expression of the sexual impulse in childhood and puberty, are so many constructive elements that one should well reflect before seeing in the sexual enlightenment the only salvation of the future generation. This attitude again comes from the study of neurotics, who apparently have suffered from lack of sexual enlightenment. But that means only that their individuality was not strong enough to balance this lack through self accomplishment. But this does not mean that a sexual enlightenment in childhood would have made them healthier, stronger and more successful.

Sexuality thus seems to be the only ground on which education has not yet set its foot and in consequence of this a kind of natural park is left in the human emotional life. Hence we also see men in situations where the external pressure is too great or the corresponding inner inhibition too intensive, seeking and finding in sexuality their self expression which they could not find in other spheres. The most extreme and concrete expression of this endeavour is the biological and educational creation of one's own child. The child thus before it is born, is an expression of the urge of personality, insofar as the sexual impulse, the sexual act itself are already expressions of the strivings of personality. But not only biologically, also psychologically and characterologically is it inevitable that we continue our personality in the child,

since the child needs us for identification and for the development of its own personality. The best which we can do for the child besides providing the necessary identification in order to enable it to develop its own personality, seems to me to be the emancipation of the sexual impulse. Under the emancipation of the child's sexual impulse, a child must have first of all, the lack of a sexual education or sexual enlightenment in a systematic way. It must be a sphere in which the child can investigate, experiment, experiment and discover, without being controlled or examined by parents and educators. Naturally I do not mean that one should be mysterious and hypocritical in sexual things. But I also do not think that one ought to go too far in sexual education and enlightenment if one does not want to barricade the individual from this sphere of personal self fulfilling. In this connection it is worthy of note that most children react negatively to sexual enlightenment. That is, they do not accept the explanation, they do not want to learn from adults in this sphere, however eager to learn they otherwise might be. They prefer in this sphere the difficult but apparently more pleasurable way of self investigation or they prefer to get their knowledge from more natural sources than that of a systematic sex education.

Finally I would like to emphasize yet one more constructive element of the present situation. It seems to me of great importance because it is valuable for the development of the child as of the parents. The child certainly has to learn from adults whether it is by means of identification or by means of a more conscious systematic assimilation. But it is just as certain that parents and educators can learn from the child, indeed must learn if the child is to be a living valuable factor in their life and not merely an object for the gratification of egotistic impulses. Indeed there is no doubt that the child essentially influences our personality and its relationship to others, especially to the love object. It is for the parents to make the child's influence favourable and constructive on their personality and their relation to one another.

Before mentioning what we can learn from the child, I would like to say how we can learn from the child. By this I mean, the only way for both sides the best way, namely that of identification. Also here from the

understanding of the analytic situation we can learn something for the improvement of the pedagogic situation. When and insofar as we are able to identify with the child, shall we be able first of all to understand the child, but then also at the same time to avoid a too far-reaching projection of our personality on the child. This identification with the child is necessary - again as in the analytic situation - the emotional life. We understand the child so badly, as is especially in the case, because we want to consider and interpret intellectually, its purely impulsive and emotional manifestations. This is impossible and leads not only to poor understanding of the child, but even to still worse to a complete misunderstanding of its movements. The difference lies not so much in the emotional life itself, but in the fact that in the child this is expressed spontaneously, whereas we have to activate, motivate, and interpret intellectually, our emotional life as well as the child's.

To this misunderstanding of the child's emotional life on the part of adults is contrasted another phenomenon, the overestimation of which in the pedagogic situation I maintain is just as important. This is the child's incredibly subtle and psychologically correct reaction to all emotional manifestations of the adult, however much the adults try to hide or to intellectualize their true feelings. The child in its young emotional life has an insurmountable interest for the real understanding of the adult's emotional life. Hence in every pedagogic or educational situation one should be conscious of the fact that it is impossible to deceive a child concerning the true feelings one cherishes towards the same or to other persons. With this presupposition, which seems to me raised beyond all doubt, one should always behave as if the child knew everything which we ourselves know at a given moment and in a given situation. This naturally is not to be taken too literally, but one cannot otherwise or better describe the child's emotional, intuitive ability, and his reactions following from this.

What so prevents us from a correct educational and therapeutic understanding, is the desire to understand intellectually. The correct understanding is one of intuition based on identification, whereas the intellectual understanding is again projection to a certain degree, a compelling of the other to our own thought, to our own interpretation. In the pedagogic

situation this leads just to misunderstanding and to resistance as in the analytic situation.

From these discussions we can draw the following conclusions: The creative type, the strong personality which projects, is not fitted to be an educator, at least is not fitted for the education of the child. The type which identifies and the emotional life of which is influenced more from without than directed from within, corresponds far more to the ideal educator. He will better be able to sense the childish emotional life and at the same time to give the child more opportunity and better material for identification. On the other hand, this type is less inclined to projection, that is, less inclined to enforce its own personality on another. On the foundation of our earlier analysis of these two types, the projection type and identification type, it follows that in general the woman is the better educator for the child. She has the ability to identify, especially in relation to the child with whom she is and identifies, and she has at the same time a childlike and more natural emotional life which enables her to identify intuitively.

When we said the strong creative personality is not suitable for an educator, we meant two things. First, the fact that the creative ability, the creative element easily fails with regard to living material, as the emotional loneliness of nearly all creative men shows. The Greek artist could indeed create man in marble after his own image, so according to his ideal, but he failed, as the heroic symbol Prometheus shows, in the creation of living men who should be created in no one else's image but their own.

The second point is this. Not only the really creative man fails in the creation of real men, but also a definite situation into which the ordinary man can get, may have the same bad educational result or easily lead to it. I mean the parental situation, and in it particularly the father's place. His biological and social position gives him the external characteristics of a creative type without its inner strength and greatness. As one may notice, I have come to the usual pedagogic situation, in which the parent represents the strong and powerful, the child represents the weak and helpless. This situation easily leads the parents to a kind of creative-mania, which under certain conditions can be still more

In the genetic part we studied the ego's development from the object relationship, and in the construction part, the effect on the external world of the mechanisms established in the ego. Now we want to consider the force which keeps all these mechanisms going, and gives the impulse power to call these mechanisms. The force is namely, the emotions. The human emotional life is thus basically the centre and real sphere of psychology. In contrast to that part which is concerned with the study of the mechanisms, namely the ego-psychology, one could designate that part which is concerned with the emotional life as the "Emo-psychology", and as it determines the relation to our fellow-men and at the same time to reality in general.

Perhaps we know least of all concerning this part of psychology, our own emotional life. Even psychoanalysis has contributed relatively little to the understanding of the emotional life. This is shown in the mystical concept of the Unconscious, in which all feelings possible are brewed or mixed together as in a witches caldron. One has even got into the habit of speaking of unconscious feelings. This is less a linguistic than a psychological impossibility. It is expressed a lack in the understanding of the emotions, in consequence of which everything emotional is comprehended in an "Unconscious". I said the term unconscious feeling is not so much a linguistic impossibility, by which I referred to the interesting fact that the word "feeling" signifies for us something vague, indefinite, indefinable. In the psychoanalytic literature it is scarcely used, although in essence our whole emotional life rests on the feelings and is directed by the feelings. The concept affect which was used in the early psychoanalytic literature, seems to imply and to signify something other than the concept feeling, it is more what we call emotional. I would say first of all, that the affect does not designate the feeling itself, but an expression of feeling, as for example the anger affect, the love affect. Further - and this is bound up with it - that what is described as affect is a pathologically intensified feeling which energetically demands an outlet. (Pathologically is here meant in the original sense of the word "pathos".) Thus anxiety, jealousy, hatred, are affects; love yearning, hope are feelings. It has the appearance as if the affects were the

painful, pain releasing, thus "pathological" feelings, whereas what is designated as feeling in the real meaning of the word is of a more pleasurable nature. But this differentiation, although correct in a certain sense, is perhaps not fundamental enough. For, as an example we speak of the guilt-feeling as something not pleasant. Therefore one might say that the guilt-feeling is an affect. But I think there is yet another criterion which I have mentioned in connection with the love-feelings, namely, the feelings are uniting, the affects are separating, isolating. The affect is a reaction to the feeling of separation or isolation.

But this definition at best characterizes the bearing of the feelings in the human emotional life and in psychology. They are those forces which bind us to our fellow beings and to the world. We see this clearly in the love feeling which unites our Ego with the other, with the Thou, with men, with the world, and so does away with all fear. But what is unique in love is, that beyond the fact of uniting, it rebounds on the ego. Not only, I love the other as my ego, as part of my Ego, but the other also makes my ego worthy of love. The love of the Thou thus places a value on one's own Ego. Love abolishes egoism, it merges the Self in the other to find it again enriched in one's own Ego. This unique projection and introjection of feeling rests on the fact that one can really only love the one who accepts our own Self as it is, indeed will not have it otherwise than it is, and whose Self we accept as it is. But at the same time we do not hold firmly on to this our Self, but we develop it in that by means of identification we form ourselves according to the ideal of the Thou. This conforming to the love ideal of the Thou does not occur, however, through conscious work of adjustment, indeed is not to be attained at all through this, but it occurs absolutely through identification.

The analysis of the love-feeling showed us that in essence it rests on identification. Perhaps the love-feeling even creates the ability to identify, it certainly increases it. In this sense the love-feeling would be the gate to the world of reality. It begins in the child's feeling towards the mother and in all phases of life, in all its manifestations it proves to be decisive for our relationship to the outer world. But this study of the love-feeling teaches something else. The feeling is something which rests absolutely on reciprocity, i.e., has

identification not merely for its presupposition, but also has as its aim, the setting up of an identity.

We can here supplement, discuss and theoretically base, the earlier definition that the feeling is something uniting. It is easily understood that all tender feelings and particularly the emotion of love, aim at reciprocity and, as such, cannot only be gratified, but also increased and strengthened when the other fosters and expresses the same feelings. It becomes a purely inner problem, when the other has not the same feelings, or at least we seem to miss them in the other. Then in our emotional life, by means of our feelings, we establish what is lacking, namely, the identity which in reality does not exist or, more or less, is missing. In having to admit this, or in other words, when the function of feeling for uniting and identifying has failed, then there remains the "affect" or the expression of feeling which we call affect. It may be that there is no real feeling of reciprocity, or it may be also that we cannot establish it by means of inner substitution. In either case, disappointment follows, i.e., the perception that the feeling is not returned. The reaction to this perception of being disappointed is the feeling of isolation, separation, which manifests itself as the affects of anxiety, hatred.

Before going further in the discussion of the emotional life, I would like to propose the following distinction in its terminology. The reciprocal feelings, especially in the sphere of the love life, which may also lead to a mutual physical expression of these feelings, I would like to designate as sensations. These sensations are specially contrasted with the purely inner annoyance, goes the admission that the uniting force is not present or has failed. But at the same time the affect tries to deny even the tendency, the attempt to unite, indeed as it were tries to deny the object of the sense. In other words, we distinguish between three kinds of manifestations of feeling, two external and one purely internal. The external ones are either uniting pleasurable sensations or separating, painful affects; the internal one is what we call emotional.

The emotional life, the expression of feeling, and the affect sensations, seem to reflect in a purely psychical sphere, a process which in earlier statements I have described as the adjustment to reality by means of

denial. There I attempted to show the influence of this denial mechanism on certain psychological processes such as memory, thought, fantasy. The connection of the emotional life with denial was also mentioned there and here shall be followed up closer.

In doing this we shall start best of all from the sphere of purely inner feeling. As we have said it is a matter of objectifying emotionally an identity which in reality does not exist or does not satisfy. The feeling or emotion in this inner sense amounts to a denial of the lack of identity. The feeling says; this identity between me and the other exists because it exists in me. Often enough a very strong feeling is released in the other exactly the same as in me. The corresponding emotional reaction. This then leads to a pleasurable sensation because it objectifies a merely inner identity. The recognition of the non-existence of this identity leads, as we have said to a painful feeling, the expression of which we designate affect, and which signifies the acknowledgement of a non-identity, or a difference. The inner feeling which lies between the gratifying sensation and the ungratifying affect, is more pleasurable (for example, longing, hope), but yet is not quite free from painful elements. These obviously correspond to the occasional and partial acceptance of the process of denial. With the perception of the real difference appears the painful affect of separation.

Denial itself begins at the primitive level as an attempt to annihilate everything different from the ego, everything non-ego. Everything painful as at the same time non-existent, obviously in order to avoid pain or admitting pain. Formerly I have shown that this result is not attained, because the process of denial is in itself painful or, secondarily, causes pain. Denial is a first attempt to disavow that which is unbearable for the ego, and to annihilate that which is painful. Only when this attempt fails is the ego compelled to another kind of defense against pain, the most important of which is that of identification. But denial is a much more primitive mechanism than identification. Denial says, that which causes me pain does not exist; identification eliminates this source of pain by assimilating it in one's own ego. This process can go so far as to introject this source of pain into one's own ego and so it is transformed into a source of pleasure, this being the mechanism of masochism.

When we understand emotion as a denial of the difference, that is, as an attempt to establish within, an identity which does not exist or does not satisfy externally, then we understand at once one of the most remarkable characteristics of the emotional life. In the analysis of the analytic situation and of the emotional life in general, we find that the individual is inclined to refuse to admit to himself or to deny his feelings. In other words not to admit to himself, nor to others, that he cherishes this or that feeling. This is one of the most conspicuous characteristics in the emotional life, particularly of neurotically unadjusted individuals, and hitherto according to my knowledge has found no explanation. As the feeling is an attempt to establish with another a reciprocally lacking identity with another, then we can understand why one is so much ashamed of one's feelings and therefore wants to hide them not only from the other but even from oneself. This seems to me to explain the feeling of shame in general or why so many neurotics feel ashamed when there is no apparent reason for it, the shame being an emotional reaction to the recognition and admission of feelings that are one-sided. In other words, one is ashamed of having feelings at all if they are not reciprocated. The unpleasant feeling of shame again being an emotional reaction to the realization of difference, of separation.

This denial of one's own feelings manifests itself in different forms and in different spheres. The most important seems to me to be the sexual sphere; not only because it plays a large part in the human life, but also because in the psychoanalytic doctrine it has been misunderstood. As in psychoanalysis so much is spoken of impulses where it would be better to say emotions, an important relation between the emotional life and the sexual life has been overlooked. Certainly sexuality is a sphere in which the feelings find their emotional outlet; this occurs in the form of pleasurable sensations. But just as frequently is the sexual life a means of saving emotional expenditure, of hiding the feelings, or of attaining the end on a primitive physical level instead of on an emotional one.

We can best study this in the analytic situation. We see there, by reason of the situation being one-sided, all these processes being enacted in clear form. Before everything we see the function of the feeling as a uniting

factor aiming at the establishment of identity; the patient has such strong emotional feelings not only because they are roused and then inhibited, but also on that account of himself supplies the feelings of the ~~part~~ in his own emotional life. This we do generally in our phantasies, ~~and~~ which, moreover, the human being is just as much ashamed as of his feelings. Hence we see the patient resisting the verbalization of his feelings and wanting to admit them in emotional reactions. But the realization of his desires in the analytic situation would be destructive because it might prevent him from an inner emotional solution of his conflicts.

But the emotional solution of his conflicts consists in accepting the ~~is~~ of his feelings and his whole emotional life. That is, in the analytic situation he has to admit that he has feelings and moreover, not only emotionally but also verbally. But in doing so at the same time he ~~experiences~~ the blocking of his emotions which he learns to express at least verbally. The therapeutic significance of this emotional release, lies in the fact that the patient learns to express feelings without their being reintrojected; just as a means of self expression. In other words, he learns to renounce the establishment of identity, and this enables him to accept the different ego, to be objective. So the patient in the analytic situation learns through acceptance of his own emotional Self to accept the other, i.e., learns to adjust to the external world foreign to his ego, without reacting to it by affectively denying it or by emotionally identifying with it. He learns to accept the fact that not everything is the ego, that there is also a Thou or other egos, whom he has to accept without wanting by a complicated ego process to destroy or devour them.

In the genetic psychology, in speaking of the anxiety problem, I have ~~also~~ discussed the question raised by Freud as to whether or not all affects are perhaps reproductions, and there I pointed out that this would explain their painfulness. I meant by that, that an intense affect might not only be the reaction to the actual stimulus, but at the same time might be a reaction to a similar and earlier experienced situation. In this connection one could go still further and say that the affect itself is a memory, a reminiscence of an earlier experienced trauma. In this sense all feeling would be painful, the emotional life itself painful, apart from what particular

emotions are concerned. This seems to be proved by experience. For even the not predominantly painful emotions of love, yearning, hope, have also their painful side. The pleasurable element comes only secondarily into the emotional life, namely insofar as one succeeds in realizing in another reciprocity of feeling and in expressing it emotionally. In this, however, the pleasure is less of a positive quality than a result of the freeing from an inner tension, thus again an unburdening of the ego. The real pleasure in it is purely an ego satisfaction in that it expresses the pleasing perception that we succeeded in arousing the identical feeling in the other.

The affect thus originally seems to be the painful reaction to a trauma, a privation. Or, generally speaking, it is the painful reaction to the inner perception that the object is different from our ego, is a non-ego, or reality, and hence it is painful. The most primitive affect of this kind is anxiety or fear, which represents the most general reaction to everything foreign to the ego. The feeling tries to remove this isolating result, in that it establishes an inner identity which was missing externally. There is one particular feeling which seems to have the special ability for doing this, namely the guilt-feeling. This explains the great importance which both theoretically and practically is attached to the guilt-feeling. I think the guilt-feeling occupies a special position among the emotions, as a boundary phenomenon between the pronounced painful affects which separate and the more pleasurable feelings which unite. It is related to the painful separating affects of anxiety and hate. But in its relation to gratitude and devotion which may extend to self-sacrifice it belongs to the strongest uniting feelings we know. As the guilt-feeling occupies the boundary line between the painful and pleasurable, between the separating and uniting feelings, it is also the most important representative of the relation between the inner and the outer, the Ego and the Thou, the Self and World.

This ambivalent or better, this ambiguous character of the guilt-feeling is most clearly expressed in the part it plays in the love life and which we have mentioned in our discussion of the same. As the guilt-feeling certainly disturbs the harmony in love, prevents emotional identification or identity, which separates the lovers, yet in this same sphere we also see clearly its

uniting, binding power. The guilt-feeling often enough not only makes the real separation impossible but it has positive uniting qualities, so that it compels one to devote oneself to the object, to surrender to the object.

In the light of our previous of the emotions one might say that the guilt-feeling is a confession of confession. But not in the simple sense that one admits a definite guilt or obligation as such, but it is an admission of love, of feeling in general. In other words, the guilt corresponds to a realization of the actual of feeling. For every, especially the narcissistic type, the guilt-feeling is the only way of expressing the feelings at all, in other words, the only form in which they can express their feelings, they must turn it all in the feeling of guilt or shame.

This consideration leads to another problem, namely the relation of the emotional life to the character type. In the analysis of character we have neglected this relation, having been more occupied with the presuppositions and mechanisms of character formation than with its impulse forces. In taking the emotional life into consideration we must also estimate its relation to the mechanisms of projection and identification. We have not actually said it, but it is clear that what is projected is the feeling, and also what one identifies with is the feeling; further it is clear that identification occurs by means of the feelings. The same must certainly hold good for projection. The only difference being that identification rests on the perception of identity in feeling, whereas projection has for its presupposition the perception of the difference in feeling. In other words, the identity which the ego tries to establish in the other by means of projection is an identity of feeling, and identification is the pleasurable affirmation of this perception of the emotional identity. If one likes, it is an introjection. We have hitherto avoided the use of the term introjection, because it means something only with regard to the emotional life. For that which can be "introjected", that is, can be taken in to the ego as it were from without, is obviously only feeling.

If after these discussions we now consider the relation of the emotional life to the character type, then we come up against a new problem. This problem is the intensity or quantity of feeling as distinct from the quality, the kind of feeling. If we consider the projective

or introjective type from an emotional viewpoint, we can do so only in terms of quantity or intensity. We must say that the projective type apparently has not different kinds of feelings, but only stronger feelings of the same kind as the identification type. And by means of projection he wants to establish in the other, not so much the same feeling as the ~~intensity~~ intensity of feeling. At the same time, which also characterizes the same expression of feeling in the other. Two questions arise. First, what determines the greater intensity of the emotional life, or is it really only a greater intensity, and if not, what besides compels the one type to project, the other to introject feelings. Finally, are there two such fundamentally different types at all, or are there not rather different ways of emotion, the predominance of which determine the one or other type?

Naturally we can aspire to no solution of these fundamental problems of psychology, within the border of these arguments which are just roughly outlined. But we only want to refer to some observations. It seems quite certain that there are individuals with stronger and richer emotional life than others, and just as certain, that the intensity of the emotional life is somehow connected with the strength of the impulses. But this is no real psychological problem as long as the impulse life and emotional life correspond to one another. The psychological problem begins with the question as to what the individual of originally stronger impulse disposition does with his rich emotional life; as to whether he accepts it and expresses it freely or whether he denies it or projects it. Experience seems to show the following paradoxical relation: The richer, that is the more varied and complete the individual's emotional life is, the less is he driven to projection, the more will he incline to identification and be able to get his outlet and satisfaction in identifying himself with the emotions of the other. Again the narrower and more restricted the individual's emotional life is, the more intense will be his fewer emotions; the less will he be inclined for and capable of identification the lack of which he has to compensate for by projection. Also here projection proves to be a compensatory process for the adjustment of an inner lack; identification on the other hand is an expression of abundance, of the desire for union, for alliance, for sharing.

The projective type is then to a certain degree poor in emotion, but the few feelings he has are as a consequence stronger because the impulse energy is so to say undivided, in other words is more concentrated. But the identification type has a richer emotional life which is less intense not so much in itself as in its expressions. The intensity of expression seems less in the identifying type, because it is a matter of mutual giving and taking in contrast to the other. The projection type seeks to give without taking, giving is no real gift, it is the gift of a poor man who wants to be wealthy, who so to say, only gives in order to be able to take back again. The identification type gives more just because he does not want to be rich in himself. One might now think that these two types would exactly supplement one another emotionally. But often experience shows this is not the case. Also in the social sphere, riches cannot always give what the poor man needs; still less can the poor man always take what riches can give him. The same holds good to a greater degree in the emotional life. And here we come back again to the earlier problem of quality and quantity of emotion. What the projection type relatively poor in emotion looks for and needs, is apparently not the tender and rich emotional scale of the identification type, but his own limited intensity of feeling. On the other hand, what the identification type looks for and needs is the variety and tenderness in feeling corresponding to his own emotional counterfeit in the other, and only biologically and characterologically is compelled to the complimentary type.

Here we find again the same paradox which seems to be characteristic of human psychology. The projective type who suppresses his feelings, hides his emotions then, seems characterologically to be the one who gives, but psychologically he does not give, takes back again. The introjective type who hides his feeling more, but shares it in silence with the other, is really the one who gives, who not only does not take, but gives in addition. What he adds is however the same feeling, thus quality, whereas the projective type looks for the same quantity, intensity. Thus we see in the sphere of the emotional life that to the extreme of projection or identification corresponds emotional giving and taking types, in which the guilt-feeling again operates.

This leads to a discussion of the connection between the emotional life and the true Self. It seems that our true Self is the emotional self which characterologically is not expressed but rather is hidden. This true emotional self again seems to be closely connected with the biological ego. Reading quite generally the man represents the projective, taking type, the woman the introjective, giving type. Accordingly again according to the type, the man has the poorer, the woman the richer feeling and as a rule the woman is the one who gives emotionally, the man the one who takes. At the physiological level it is again reversed as seen in the sex act and in the act of procreation, the man is the giver, the woman the receiver. In the characterological sphere finally the man seems to be the one who gives, the woman the one who receives. In other words, when we compare the three spheres, namely the biological, the emotional, and the characterological, the following scheme for man and woman results. The man seems to be biologically and characterologically the one who gives, but in the real emotional sphere, namely in feeling, he proves to be the one who takes, the projective type. The woman on the other hand is biologically and characterologically appears to be the one who receives, but emotionally proves to be the one who gives, the identification type.

In these conflicts of the emotional life manifested in the individual himself, as well as also in his relation to the sex partner - or in the corresponding type in general - we see the guilt-feeling operating as a balancing mechanism. Only it does not always function successfully, because the types are too mixed and the conditions in general too complicated. The guilt-feeling enables the woman to receive what she wants to give and forces the man to give where he wants to take. This may be the case in either the biological, characterological, or emotional spheres. But what has been said of the sexes is valid for the human ego in general corresponding to them. The guilt-feeling unites not only the biological ego with the biological type, but helps the ego to accept the sex role even though it is not in harmony with the emotional or characterological type. But besides the guilt-feeling is a still more important factor in one's own emotional life in that it there unites the contradictory tendencies of giving and taking, of domination and submission, indeed makes it possible for these tendencies to exist side by side.

In other words the guilt-feeling represents an essentially harmonizing factor in the ego, in that it there unites emotionally the biological Self with the often enough contradictory characterological ego, and this role of uniting or combining only continues further in relation to the object. The production of the guilt-feeling is thus a necessary process of fermentation in our character development from the biological ego to the emotional expression of personality. The balancing function of the guilt-feeling falls away if it is too strong, thus again as a rule, in the projective type with its intense emotions, apart from whether this type belongs to a man or woman. And it fails because there, where it is too strong, it exercises its separating function instead of operating unitingly in the meaning of inner feeling.

Thus the guilt-feeling seems to have the function of balancing the inner conflict between wanting to take and having to give, between wanting to dominate and having to submit, in a word between the biological and the characterological ego. In the terminology of our ego psychology one could also say that the guilt-feeling grows out of the conflict between the tendency to project and the necessity to identify. From the analysis of the analytic situation as from that of the love relation, we have learned that when projection oversteps its mark, it then creates the guilt-feeling. Identification on the other hand does away with the guilt-feeling, abolishes it. Projection leads inevitably to guilt-feeling because it makes use of the other, i.e., compels or at least does not consider the other. Identification removes the guilt-feeling because it signifies an understanding of the other, a love for, a sharing with, the other. Projection creates guilt, because it is based on the denial of the other Self, identification liberates one from it because it is a recognition of the other.

The relation of these two fundamental mechanisms to the emotions can be formulated in the following way. What is projected, as we have stated, is without doubt the feeling; in the same way identification occurs emotionally and by means of feeling. Both mechanisms of projection and identification aim at establishing a purely emotional identity, which is only realized in one single situation, namely in the mutual love emotion. And this realization in the sense and effects of the love

life given place to the various realizations of emotion which are unloaded or affected, one of a separating nature and cause pain. Therefore the sexual sphere in which the feelings and affects are unloaded is characterized by the fact that the most important, they particularly the love called "libido" seems to be active, also that this disintegrable way of experiencing emotional situations; the unloading of affects in the other hand is more of an ego reaction. This disintegrable feeling is most favourably realized in the sexual sphere (to which it was meant to be restricted), but it is possible also in other spheres (as Jung has maintained). But the experience of the disintegrable feeling is not only based on the above mentioned positive conditions, but just as much on the lack of a negative factor, namely the guilt-feeling, or more correctly one might say the lack of that phase in guilt-feeling which goes beyond the amount necessary for the balancing of inner conflicts. The disintegrable emotion can then be experienced only when projection and identification, giving and taking, domination and submission, the discharge of emotion and affect, are operative from both sides together, and in one another, to the same degree and at the same time. Then no plus of guilt-feeling can arise, but this does not mean that no guilt-feeling is necessary, for without it such a mutual liberation would be impossible. Under the most favourable conditions where the disintegrable feeling arises, it is the uninhibited emotional expression of the true Self which is just as spontaneously returned by the other and hence when possible the acceptance of the purely egoistic emotions of pleasure, without being disturbed by the guilt-feeling. In other words, it is not the lack of the guilt-feeling which makes it possible to experience and accept pleasure, but it is the utilization of the inevitable guilt-feeling for the purpose of an inner balance, chiefly for the purpose of attaining the love identification with the other.

In all these emotional processes, besides the problem of quality and quantity, there is added yet another factor which plays an important role, namely the time factor. It is easily seen and is confirmed by daily experience that in the emotional life, a too-early or too-late is just as important as a too-much or too-little. This experience again only confirms the fact that feeling rests absolutely on reciprocity or psychologically expressed

It is the merit of psychoanalysis to have recognized the neuroses as disturbances of the emotional life. But if the painful emotions which we designate as affects in the pathological meaning of the word, are the causes of suffering, then it is easy to see where the healing process must start, and in what it consists. The excess of painful emotions which we call suffering, according to our idea, comes from the fact that the emotional life fails in its task as a uniting factor. As a consequence of this the emotion of separation, of isolation, becomes conscious to us as pain or as we say as agony. Its essential symptoms are anxiety or an excess of guilt-feeling, or the feeling of inferiority, but in every case a feeling of isolation, of being different from the other.

Hence the therapeutic formula seems easy to prescribe: the emotional life must again function in a uniting instead of in a disuniting way, in place of the feeling of isolation must appear the feeling of union, in place of the emotional perception of difference must be identity. This must gradually take place first of all with one individual, then with others and finally with the world of reality. As one can easily see, the establishment or re-establishment of this uniting element occurs in love. But this formula is neither so banal as it seems nor yet so easy in its application, if one only remembers how complicated the emotion of love was found to be. There are in it elements of tenderness, devotion, submission, gratitude, to which are contrasted the egoistic impulsive ego-strivings such as cruelty, domination, jealousy and the desire for possession.

The emotion of love as such, is in itself an absorbing, uniting feeling which paralyzes the mere ego-strivings. But in consequence of this its character, it may easily overdo it and then it leads to compensatory manifestations which we then have to deal with in such characteristics as bondage, masochistic submission and self-sacrifice. Here already we have an important fundamental principle of every kind of psychotherapy. As in the dynamics of the emotions it is always a question of a too-much or too-little, there are at least two pronounced types of patients, each of which needs a little

different means or ways. On the whole, the patient has either too much ego or too little; too many inhibitions or too few, according as there is too much or too little projection or identification, too much or too little guilt-feeling, etc. But what in every case is lacking is the real love emotion which makes for harmony within, with itself and at the same time externally unites in harmony with the other, the Thou.

So in a well balanced love emotion, the other, the Thou is without doubt necessary, because the Thou justifies the ego. The Thou belongs just as much biologically as psychologically and characterologically, i.e., ethically, to the ego, and therapy which has to establish the Thou emotion can be applied in each of these spheres. Therapy is most effective when it accomplishes this in all spheres at the same time. But therapy should not be restricted to the sexual sphere, it should also take into account the other spheres. For the ethical conflict is inseparable from the sexual conflict and the conflicts can just as well be approached from the ethical as from the sexual side. The question as to how in psychoanalysis an over-estimation of the sexual factors arose, leads to the discussion of connections, which are of fundamental importance for the therapeutic problem. In essence it is the medical viewpoint which is responsible for this attitude. In most neuroses the most remarkable symptom is the disturbance of the patient's sex and love life, also the patient's own complaints are mostly related to this. If we remind ourselves of the earlier statements concerning the love life, and bear in mind the part in it played by the sexual function, then we can easily understand what that signifies. It is nothing else than that the individual, as we stated, in the disturbances of his emotional life, in what we call the crises of ego development, has resorted to sexuality as an outlet and means of cure. It is the same mechanism which we see in the analytic situation where the patient always tries to avoid the emotional solution of his conflict. In life as in analysis, in crises in crises which emotionally isolate the ego, it seems to be the easiest means of cure to seek connection with the other, with the world, in the love emotions. But since these individuals are not capable of the love emotion, otherwise they could not have got into the crises, they seek the uniting element in the physical instead of in the emotional

sphere. This naturally does not only solve the emotional problem, but in consequence of the guilt feeling it only increases it. When patients come for help as a rule they present the sexual conflict and the guilt problem. But the sexual conflict may already be considered as a failing in an attempt to recover from an ego crisis and the manifest guilt feeling is a proof of the failure, but at the same time the proof that it is a question of an ethical conflict in the ego.

The physician to whom such a state of affairs is presented, sees naturally only the disturbances of the sexual life and even when he recognizes the ethical part in the conflict, he does not know how to deal with it, for ethics is no part of the medical study, and so it is not his affair. On the other hand, the sexual function is something physical about which the doctor has learned, although the last decades have shown how much the medical study has neglected the human side of the sexual life in favor of the biological and anatomical sides. Also Freud began with a purely medical treatment of the sexual life, for he ordered patients to stop certain sexual practices which he had recognized as harmful. In many cases this proved to be efficacious and was a good therapeutic idea. But in many cases it remained ineffective or in its application was not at all adequate. Along the path which Freud has taken far from this medical point of departure, leading even to the creation of a psychoanalytic world view, he has indeed never completely overcome the medical viewpoint.

What psychoanalysis in its development from the sexual trauma to the guilt feeling has shown, is the knowledge that the so-called neuroses are not a medical problem, but a human problem, which cannot be conceived from a purely medical point of view. In other words, the neuroses is no disease in the medical meaning of the word, but an emotional suffering, primarily no disturbance of the sexual function, but of the ego function. Indeed the symptoms of the neuroses, especially those of a sexual nature, might be considered just an attempt to heal these ego crises, similarly as Freud maintained for many processes of the psychoses. Just as Freud designated the dream as a "guardian of sleep" which only sometimes fails, so generally speaking one might consider the neurotic reactions or symptoms as guardians of health, or as

manifestations of self preservation. They warn the individual that something is wrong in his emotional life, just as a slight physical pain may indicate the beginning of a severe illness.

But as little as the dream succeeds in preserving sleep, so just as little does the symptom warn the individual and save his health. For the symptom is not only a warning but also a sign that some kind of a destructive process has already begun. Here then is where therapy comes in. Whereas the medical therapy in general aims at preventing the destructive process by removing its cause, psychotherapy on the other hand is somewhat different. Certainly we also endeavour to alleviate the suffering, but emotional suffering with regard to its cause and effect is different from physical suffering. First of all, we cannot entirely remove the cause of emotional suffering, even when we find it, because it is in the nature of the human emotional life. The emotional life itself is full of suffering and pain, and therefore it can be only a question of the more or less. To want to prevent emotional suffering would be to uproot the emotional life, as really the Indian doctrine of healing attempts to practice, the Christian doctrine in certain of its dogmas, and the psychotic, attempt in their deadened emotions.

All this and still more proves to be the individual's own therapeutic attempt to remove by the root the foundation of all human suffering, namely the life of the emotions and feelings. If one may compare these attempts to a surgical operation then there are other ways of spontaneous therapy or self help which are of a more calming and liberating nature. These means of help do not pretend to uproot the cause of the evil, the emotional life, but they accept it, affirm it and attempt to give it liberating possibilities of expression. In a word they are cathartic. But they unburden only temporarily and have to be applied again and again, accordingly they are in the nature of a permanent therapy and not of a casual one. To this category of therapeutic means belongs first of all love, further the enjoyment of art and the artistic production, as production in general, no matter in what sphere. To it also belong the pleasures in knowledge in the intellectual sphere, religious ecstasy in the emotional sphere; indeed all ecstatic states from the love emotion to drunkenness have only one and the same purpose, namely, that

of deadening pain. We see here clearly how these two spontaneous tendencies, the introjection and the liberation, correspond to the two earlier mentioned fundamental sides of our emotional life, namely the uniting and the separating. The surgical therapy is uprooting and isolates the individual emotionally, as it tries to deny the emotional life. The non-surgically liberating therapy is uniting, seeks and finds the same emotions in the Thou, in one's fellow beings and thus shares with them both suffering and joy. The one therapy attempts relief from within, the other looks for relief from without.

As we see, these two kinds of spontaneous psychotherapy correspond to the two types which we have described as the projection and identification types. Now although these types in reality are not so sharply distinguished, the mechanisms lying at their foundation simultaneously working with and against one another, yet consciously applied therapy has to take them into consideration. It will depend on the predominance of one or the other tendency, in a word on the type, as to what kind of therapy the patient needs. In the sphere of physical suffering, according to the kind of severity of the illness, not only different means of help, but also different kinds of therapy are used. But with regard to emotional suffering, the view that everything "can be cured from one point" seems to predominate. This similarity may occur with regard to the desired result, namely, the alleviation of the emotional suffering. But the way in which this is attained in the case of individuals of different types, is different. The type who projects too much has to learn to affirm, he who is too much inhibited has to learn to express the emotions. But this learning results in a most remarkable way psychologically. Above all it does not occur intellectually, but emotionally, i.e., by means of identification. But the necessary understanding is also not gained purely intellectually, but by means of projection which teaches us to recognize our true Self in the mirror of the other. The essential factor of this healing process, namely the learning, as a whole results emotionally, that is, again through suffering. In a word psychotherapy, as attempted artificially by psychoanalysis, does not remove emotional suffering, but only teaches the patients how to bear the inevitable suffering. Indeed in regard to the primal source of suffering, the emotional life, psychotherapy often enough is more painful than the original suffering itself. But nevertheless this is not seldom the case

in the sphere of therapy in general. For the recognition and acceptance of the emotional life is itself painful and this pain has originally led to the destructive tendency to uproot it. The patient perhaps suffers less after the therapeutic experience, but it is certain that now he has learned to more easily bear suffering, it may be in recognizing it as inevitable or it may be that it seems less compared with what he has been through.

But again this is also only one side of the problem. The patient learns not only to suffer or rather to bear suffering, he also learns to love, that is, to endure his emotional life and to express it. In a word psychotherapy again gives with nearly pleasure and pain without doing away with conflict, without making pleasure undesirable, without making pain avoidable. But it can and should do something else. We said previously, that the aim of organic therapy, is the removal of the cause of suffering, and in this sense therapy as such is negative. Psychoanalysis can teach us that psychotherapy cannot aspire to such a claim, for the evil is suffering, and its cause is our emotional life which we cannot remove, indeed can scarcely influence at all. Hence in the emotional sphere it would be better not to speak of therapy at all but of psychology, which means psychologically guiding, in the meaning of a pedagogic guidance, which rests on emotional identification and becomes effective through love and suffering. What this guidance in this sense can and should have as its aim is not the removal of the cause of suffering, of the emotional life, but to make means of expression accessible to the emotional life, or to provide them. In a word a psychical cure can be effective only insofar as it is constructive. In the sphere of the emotional life there can be no destructive surgical therapy, but the inhibited tendencies which are liberated seek means of expression which have to be directed so that they do not operate destructively. For in the emotional life, there is a compensatory tendency which nowhere else dominates so strongly and which expresses itself dynamically. As soon as the inhibitions are liberated or become less. Indeed also in the biological sphere, there is a similar compensatory tendency, the utilization of which has been proposed by Wilhelm Ostwald, for healing purposes in the sphere of physical suffering. There it is possible, but can also be lacking, and a cure can also result without compensation. But in the emotional sphere, this is I believe not possible, and this is the reason why psychotherapy can be only

constructive, and then it has little in common with therapy as understood medically.

The need for ecstatic, cathartic therapies show clearly that the surgical means of uprooting fails in the emotional sphere. Indeed we see both tendencies, the defensive, destructive; and the affirming, ecstatic, simultaneously operative in all the mentioned phenomena. In the lovers as in the artist, in the mystic as in the psychotic, in the neurotic as in the average individual; they all simultaneously try the pain denuding means of help. The uprooting and denial, just as much as the affirmation and gratification of their emotional life. Again we see these two contradictory tendencies conditioning one another. The denial of emotional suffering does not remove it, but produces new suffering which has to be numbed by ecstasy. Ecstasy again leads to catharsis and this again establishes a state of painful tension after a temporary alleviation.

Before we speak about the really constructive elements of psychology, we want to point out where the real therapy operates. It is on the border line between the physical and the psychical, or better, at the connection between physical and emotional suffering. In the study of the human illnesses and processes of disease, we experience that nearly every physical suffering is evoked and becomes acute through an emotional conflict. The mechanism of this experience proved beyond doubt, is easy to understand in the light of our doctrine of the emotions. The denial of emotional suffering, especially when caused us by another, leads to a displacement of the same from the psychical to the physical sphere, by which the pain is justified, to a certain extent is objectified.

This "conversion" of the painful emotion appears clearly only in the hysterical spasmatic picture where there is no organic change to be found. But it also lies at the base of physical phenomena of suffering, characterized in general as functional disturbances. But from numerous experiences in psychoanalysis, also real organic diseases appear to be precipitated through converted psychical pain. In all these cases the conversion concerns a painful affect which is displaced from the emotional to the physical sphere, instead of its being able to express itself. A simple symptom of this kind is the headache, which appears

instead of weeping which has been suppressed and which as is well known alleviates the pain if the ego will permit this painful admission. This typical example enables one to illustrate most clearly what this process of affect-communication consists in. It is again that turning of the emotion within, which leads to isolation, to a kind of stubborn withdrawal from the other. Instead of looking for help and alleviation in the sympathy of the other, the patient now denies this foreign inclination and with it the cause of his pain, namely the painful emotion. It cannot, however, be removed but only goes within, into one's own body instead of without, as an expression of affect concerning the other.

In this sense already the patient's appeal for help is the beginning of the process of healing. The admission that he needs help, that he suffers, is not only the symbol of a good prognosis, but in the emotional sphere signifies the cure itself. But it is not to be wondered at that the patients only seek help when in desperation; they must be desperate in order to compel themselves into admitting they need help, and often enough a physical symptom has to help in the overcoming of a last resistance. Therapeutically as often in the purely organic sphere, one has to let the process run its course, and in so doing to a great extent, one trusts to nature. What one can do therapeutically in essence is chiefly one thing: namely to enable the patient a free expression of his emotions at least in speech and so to give him externally a certain discharge of affect. If one emphasizes the similarity to confession in this cathartic verbalization, then we would like to emphasize again the positive constructive character of this process. It is at least just as much if not more of an accusation against the other who has caused the suffering, as a self-accusation or confession. Indeed in the light of this conception it seems almost that the admissions of one's own guilt are only the balancing weights to the violent accusations against the other brought by the patient in the analysis. It seems also that the accusations of the other are more painful than the self-accusations, (which the neurotic produces so liberally) because they contain the painful admission that pain was caused to the ego by another. However that may be, in every case this seems to me to be the difference between the Christian care of souls and the pedagogic guidance of souls: in the one the individual is exhorted to self-accusation, whilst in the other he should

be led to self-expression. This self-expression in regard to pathogenic suffering, in essence consists of accusing the ~~analyst~~ ^{ego} ~~the analyst~~ ^{ego} of the pain to the ego. But this is so liberating, because this admission corresponds to a removal of denial.

Two dangers which lie in the nature of the analytic situation seem to threaten the final success. The first is that the patient soon projects these accusations against the analyst, although only sometimes directly, but always indirectly or silently as a resistance which then threatens the analytic situation. The handling of this resistance is indeed a technical problem but the difficulties of the same concern the patient's whole situation. He must do something with these accusations; if he turns them against himself, then the unbearable guilt feeling is a result; if he turns them against people of his environment then he can no longer live with them; if he turns them against the analyst then the final result of the treatment is threatened. The second danger is that the patient will continue outside the analysis and after its termination the uninhibited expression of emotions which he was permitted in the analysis, indeed was commanded to express. This is, however, not always possible. On the other hand the patient has learned to express his feelings instead of suppressing them. The difficulty lies in the fact that he has to find the middle course, which formerly he could not find, without falling from one extreme into the other.

This is the most difficult problem of psychotherapy. The analytic part has shown us how the individual can become neurotic. The constructive part shows the individual how he himself might be if he accepts his true Self. When the patient in the so-called transference wants to hold fast so strongly to the old mechanisms of projection and identification (parental image) with this resistance he is right insofar as he fears to express his own feelings freely and uninhibited at his own responsibility. In the so-called "didactic-analysis" it may be practicable to discharge the pupil at the stage of identification with the analyst as indeed the admitted aim is that he ought to become like his analyst. But unfortunately most ~~therapeutic~~ ^{therapeutic} analyses thus end because the analyst himself as a rule has not come beyond this stage of identification with his own teacher analyst. It

seems even as if the analyst's own didactic analysis could also be borne in his practice of analysis. Either when he is not able to bring his patient beyond the stage of identification or when as a reaction to his identification with his teacher and analyst he now projects his own repressed Self on to the patients. It is otherwise when the analyst can so develop and express his own individuality and personality that he has no need to do this in the analytic situation. Only then will he be able to avoid projecting his own Self on the patient and so compelling him to an identification.

As one sees, in the analysis fundamentally it is a matter of working through the resistance, and indeed on both sides first on the analyst's and then on the patient's. Technically this may best be described in the following way. In every correctly conducted analysis of the emotions there is a psychological moment in which the success of the whole work depends. This is the moment, in which one has to be free the patients from the analytic pressure. The form in which this results, I have described as the setting of the time limit. But in it as I have stated, one must take care that the time limit is not fixed arbitrarily but that definite criteria for it are to be found in the patient's reactions. The criteria are different according to the type of patient but all emerge at a definite place of the analysis and may be reduced to the following common denomination. It is those real phases of resistance which appear when the patient has overcome the first difficulties in establishing the transference and has got to the point where he wants to end the analysis because otherwise he is in danger of getting too deeply into it. This is the point at which the resistance takes on constructive significance which the analyst must not overlook if the analysis is to succeed. When the patient makes progress in a constructive sense, that is, the more independent and self-reliant he becomes, the more must he react with resistance against the analytic situation which keeps him dependent and not self-reliant. When the analyst does not recognize at the right time the constructive side of this resistance and does not utilize it for setting the time limit, this leads to a complete failure of his very task which consists in letting the patient learn to free himself emotionally when the first urge to freedom appears. But for this purpose the analyst himself must be free, free from anxiety and free from vanity. This is necessary because the patient

cannot directly express his desire for freedom, as he feels bound to the analyst by love and guilt. The patient's direct admissions of the transference are often enough the first compensatory expressions of his guilt feeling which appear as a reaction to his desire for freedom. When one has made concessions and yields to the patient's wish to escape from the pressure of the analytic situation, then one will see new reactions of resistance, which are raised against this "liberty" apparently inflicted on his ego. For whether or not he himself wants it, still he feels that he is sent away and this wounds his pride. At the same time with this resistance, he excuses himself from the responsibility of having wanted the end of the analysis, and thus as a rule willingly resigns the final setting of the time limit to the analyst. In the time between the first appearance of the patient's desire for freedom where the time limit is set, and the real end of the analysis, one must make constructive use of the patient's tendency to free himself. This is used first of all by removing in the analytic situation itself, the guilt feeling towards the analyst.

Briefly, the analysis should and must lead beyond the stage of projection and identification to the development of personality, the first and most important accomplishment of which is the creation of his own analysis. The patient himself carries out the analytic task moreover in each case, corresponding to his own type. That is, he does the analysis in his own manner and way, he forms and uses the analytic situation according to his needs and desires. The analyst must have so much insight and stand so far above the situation that he not only does not hinder the patient in this his striving for personality, but supports it. In this sense the analysis can and should be made a personal creation of the patient's, which he can then accept without guilt feeling and without extreme reactions, as his own accomplishment, indeed as an expression of his own newly gained personality.

We do not deceive ourselves over the fact that this is an ideal picture. Not all individuals, no matter what their conflicts, have creative abilities, and still less can most individuals relate the independence, self-reliance and responsibility bound up with it. The average human being needs to be dependent and to identify in order to be able to adjust himself, just as the child also is

unable to stand alone. To such people the analytic experience sometimes gives them only a taste of how dangerous but also how impossible the free development which they apparently want so much, would be for them. In these cases it can be called a success if the analyst convinces the patient that he had better remain as he is. To the different character types and methods of cure, correspond different therapeutic aims and results. That we cannot always attain the ideal is clear. But we have to bear in mind that we should not even always strive for it in the same way. For what would be an ideal solution for one individual would be destructive for another type in another situation. And so really every case has its own technique, its own analysis and its own solution. This adjusts itself to the patient's personality and to the situation. We ought not to be ruled accordingly to theoretical presuppositions and ideals.

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